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The security-development nexus has received significant attention from 
policymakers as a new trend in post-conflict reconstruction. Integrating the 
traditionally separate areas of security and development, the nexus has been touted as 
a new strategy to achieve a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. 
  
Despite the enthusiasm behind the security-development nexus, it has received 
significant criticism. Critics argue that rather than an integrated approach, the nexus 
results in the securitisation of development, where development is employed to 
further desired security objectives. These critiques focus on the outcomes of the 
security-development nexus, with little understanding of what contributes to these 
outcomes. In my research, I address this gap by focusing on processes and 
investigating how security and development are integrated. The thesis asks what in 
practice inhibits the integration of security and development into a nexus. 
  
To do this, the thesis hypothesises and investigates four tensions that influence the 
integration of security and development. Conceptual tension arises from the different 
understandings of security and development. Causal tension arises from the different 
applications of security and development and the linkages between them. 
Institutional tension arises from the way actors and institutions inform the 
implementation of programmes. Motivational tension arises from the drivers behind 
international involvement. 
   
The research is informed by the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies. From this 
perspective, the security-development nexus is imbued with the potential of a 
positive result. This potential is operationalised through a human security approach, 
defined in terms of people-centredness, holism and emancipation. The tensions track 
the divergence of the security-development nexus from its potential, and show how 
the integration of security and development is inhibited. 
 
The thesis compares two case studies of internationally driven initiatives to address 
organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. Examination of the tensions reveals that 
actors addressing organised crime have attempted to move away from a security 
approach, resulting in incipient integration between security and development. In 
some areas the relationship is mutually constitutive, and sequential in others. 
However, barriers still remain. Integration is inhibited by the prioritisation of 
international security concerns and the dominance of security actors. While these 
factors appear to support the argument on securitisation of development, the 
continued prominence of security is not an explicit strategy that co-opts 
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Introduction: The Security-Development Nexus: An Uneasy 
Relationship 
 
The security-development nexus has received significant attention from 
policymakers as a new trend in post-conflict reconstruction. Bringing together the 
traditionally separate areas of security and development, the nexus has been touted as 
a new strategy to achieve a comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. 
As a result, many actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction have adopted the 
security-development nexus to frame their engagement to the extent that it has 
become a ‗policy mantra‘ (IPA 2006a). As Waddell (2006: 531) argues, ‗it is 
becoming an article of faith that security and development are ―inextricably linked‖‘. 
For example, the UN Secretary General stated that ‗we will not enjoy development 
without security, we will not enjoy security without development‘ (Annan 2005: 6). 
 
The merging of security and development into a nexus goes beyond mere linkages. 
Actors are drawing on traditionally separate epistemological approaches and creating 
new policies and tools to address the complex challenges of post-conflict 
reconstruction. The security-development nexus moves beyond combining different 
areas of focus as actors conventionally associated with development are increasingly 
becoming involved in the security sphere, while security actors are also taking on 
development initiatives. Tschirgi et al. (2010b: 2) outline how a wide range of actors, 
including the UN, African Union, bilateral donors and NGOs ‗have enthusiastically 
embraced the refrain that security and development are interdependent and require 
integrated policies‘.  
 
Scholars have also acknowledged that security and development have become 
closely related, culminating in a historically specific attempt to institutionalise the 
two concepts into an integrated framework. Schnabel (2011: 44) contends that 
‗security and development agendas and requirements have been increasingly difficult 
to separate and a formerly antagonistic relationship has now evolved into mutually 
supportive coexistence to achieve cooperation‘. The mutually beneficial relationship 
between security and development described by Schnabel is indicative of a 
comprehensive approach that shifts away from a preoccupation with the state to also 
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acknowledge the needs of individuals in post-conflict states. This supports the 
enthusiasm of policymakers that the security-development nexus is able to meet both 
challenges through an integrated approach. 
 
Despite the enthusiasm behind the security-development nexus, it has also received 
significant criticism. Critics argue that rather than an integrated approach, the nexus 
results in the securitisation of development, where development is employed to 
further desired security outcomes. While the implementation of the security-
development nexus appears to support these arguments, the critiques focus on the 
outcomes of the security-development nexus, with little understanding of what 
contributes to these outcomes. This research seeks to address this gap to determine 
why the security-development nexus does not achieve the expectations attached to it. 
As critics focus on the dominance of security in the nexus, this research contends 
that the problem lies in the integration of security and development. As such, the 
thesis investigates what in practice inhibits the integration of security and 
development into a nexus.  
 
In contrast to the focus on outcomes in the literature on the securitisation of 
development, this research focuses on processes, examining how security and 
development are integrated into a nexus, and what limitations exist. To do this, the 
thesis hypothesises and investigates four tensions that influence the integration of 
security and development. These tensions are analysed by examining how the 
security-development nexus is implemented in two case studies of internationally 
driven initiatives to address organised crime – Sierra Leone and Bosnia. 
 
Relevance and Contribution of the Research 
 
The primary critique of the security-development nexus is put forward by critical 
peacebuilding scholars, focusing on the securitisation of development. Rather than 
the integrated approach expected by policymakers, security continues to be the 
overriding concern. This is a valid critique, as international engagement framed by 
the security-development nexus often results in the securitisation of development in 
practice. The resulting analysis however, while critical of international engagement, 
focuses solely on the outcomes of the nexus. Duffield (2007) expands on this to draw 
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out several explanations of why the security-development nexus results in the 
securitisation of development, such as fears of security threats spreading 
internationally. Yet, the focus continues to be on how policymakers have responded, 
such as curbing migration and encouraging self-reliance (Duffield 2010). Duffield 
(2010) holds the security-development nexus responsible for a shift in how 
international actors control problems – aiming to control the actions of people in 
developing countries rather than the state in order to contain problems before they 
spread regionally and internationally. As such, the security-development nexus is 
taken as a fixed or given concept and analysis focuses on the result of the nexus and 
its policy implications. We are left with no understanding of how this outcome is 
arrived at. 
 
From the perspective of the securitisation of development, the security-development 
nexus is understood to have a negative result. The securitisation literature calls for 
‗desecuritisation‘ in line with the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. These 
arguments run contra to the widespread adoption of the security-development nexus 
as a new, comprehensive approach. Stern and Ojendal (2010: 6) note ‗an ever-
growing amount of economic resources and political will is being poured into the 
―security-development nexus‖ and the attendant revamping of national and 
multilateral institutions‘. Regardless of criticisms, the nexus has become an 
important element of international engagement in post-conflict countries. Yet calls 
for ‗desecuritisation‘ aim to discard the nexus without considering the potential 
benefits it can bring to post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
In response, this research seeks to understand what causes these outcomes. The 
emphasis on a one-sided nexus by proponents of the securitisation of development 
argument suggests that the integration of security and development is not 
straightforward, but it is a negotiated and political process that has significant 
implications for resourcing post-conflict reconstruction. Yet the processes of the 
security-development nexus are not currently explored in the literature on the 
securitisation of development. This research seeks to fill this gap. The thesis is based 
on the premise that the outcomes described by critics are a function of the 
implementation of the nexus. In order to understand the outcomes of the security-
development nexus as put forward by its critics, the thesis probes how security and 
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development are integrated and the inner characteristics of the nexus, analysing the 
processes that underpin the nexus. 
 
Beyond the critical literature on the securitisation of development and the 
developmentalisation of security, critiques have also emerged from orthodox 
peacebuilding scholars. Taking a problem-solving approach, these critics question 
how operational the security-development nexus is. Critiques have focused on the 
nature of security and development, but also the difficulty of security and 
development actors working collaboratively (Chandler 2007; Stern and Ojendal 
2010; Tschirgi et al. 2010b). These critiques begin to engage with the problematic 
relationship between security and development, but they focus on the effectiveness 
of the security-development nexus. 
 
This research bridges the two areas of critique. It builds on the operational critiques 
of how the security-development nexus is put into practice, looking inside the nexus 
to analyse the role of security and development and their relationship. To understand 
why the nexus does not fulfil its potential, the thesis investigates how the security-
development nexus is implemented, in particular analysing the dynamics of 
integration. No judgement is made on the effectiveness of the security-development 
nexus, rather it focuses solely on what limits the integration of security and 
development into a nexus.  
 
The research is informed by the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies. From this 
perspective, the security-development nexus is imbued with the potential of a 
positive result.  This potential is operationalised through a human security approach, 
defined in terms of people-centredness, holism and emancipation. The thesis tracks 
the divergence of the security-development nexus from this potential and shows how 
the integration of security and development is inhibited. 
 
Analysis of the security-development nexus is taken in a new and original direction 
by identifying and examining tensions that influence the integration of security and 
development. This approach disrupts the idea of the security-development nexus as 
‗something given, clear and shared‘ (Stern and Ojendal 2010: 10), and seeks to 
identify the difficult choices, underlying assumptions and conflicts that underpin the 
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nexus. Although scholars have argued that security and development have moved 
beyond their ‗formerly antagonistic relationship‘ (Schnabel 2011: 44), this research 
is premised on the assumption that rather than being straightforward, the integration 
of security and development is mediated by a series of tensions. 
 
While security and development are both understood to be necessary for a new, 
comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction, bringing them together is a 
contentious process, resulting in a series of conflicts and contradictions. Four 
tensions have been hypothesised that affect the integration of security and 
development into a nexus. Conceptual tension arises from the different 
understandings of security and development. Causal tension arises from the different 
applications of security and development and the linkages between them. 
Institutional tension arises from the way actors and institutions inform the 
implementation of programmes. Motivational tension arises from the drivers behind 
international involvement.
1
 The analysis of these four tensions explains what in 
practice inhibits the integration of security and development, and why it results in the 
outcomes described by critics. 
 
 
Examining the Security-Development Nexus 
 
In order to establish why the security-development nexus is more closely aligned to 
the critiques on the securitisation of development than the expectations of 
policymakers, this thesis investigates what inhibits the integration between security 
and development. Because the securitisation critique argues that the nexus is 
unbalanced and one-sided, it can be expected that the relationship, or site of 
integration, is flawed. 
 
The research takes a positive starting point based on the enthusiasm of policymakers 
adopting the nexus. In contrast to a traditional security approach to organised crime, 
which engages with the threat posed by criminal activity to the state and seeks to 
disrupt it through law enforcement or military strategies, this research engages with 
                                                 
1
 These tensions are outlined in detail in Chapter 1. 
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the idea of an integrated and holistic approach that brings security and development 
together in an emancipatory approach. As well as focusing on the security threat 
posed by organised crime, such an approach would ensure that the impact of 
organised crime on development is also recognised, but also that development 
strategies are employed to address the factors that make a country conducive to 
organised crime. The inclusion of development is also expected to bring a new set of 
practices, particularly with the focus of many development actors on local 
engagement and people-centred approaches. 
 
It is recognised that the security-development nexus is not perfect, as it is still 
influenced by resources, the personality of personnel and other factors. However, to 
analyse the tensions and understand their impact on the security-development nexus, 
a spectrum is established between a traditional security approach and an integrated, 
emancipatory approach.
2
 Analysis investigates what inhibits a shift away from a 
traditional security approach towards the other end of the spectrum, recognising that 
a complete shift is impossible. 
 
As this research aims to understand how the security-development nexus is 
implemented in practice, it requires in-depth qualitative analysis. Qualitative 
research is ‗most interested in how humans arrange themselves and their settings and 
how inhabitants of these settings make sense of their surroundings through symbols, 
rituals, social structures, social roles and so forth‘ (Berg 2001: 6-7). It is a ‗means of 
accessing unquantifiable facts‘ (Berg 2001: 7).  
 
A theoretical model of critical security studies is employed to investigate the 
security-development nexus. Building on constructivist theories, critical approaches 
to security studies engage in a critique of traditional security approaches. Rather than 
a distinct theoretical perspective, critical approaches to security studies tend to be 
defined in contrast to the ontology, epistemology, starting point and assumptions of 
traditional approaches to security, particularly realism. This includes the ‗emphasis 
upon parsimony and coherence; its privileging of a rational, state centric worldview 
based upon the primacy of military power in an anarchic environment; its emphasis 
                                                 
2
 This spectrum is outlined in more depth in the discussion of each tension in Chapter 1. 
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upon order and predictability as positive values; and its structural view of 
international politics as ahistorical, recurrent, and non-contextual‘ (Newman 2010: 
83).  
 
Critical theories also seek to move beyond a traditional approach to security. Critical 
security studies is based on the assumption that ‗security can operate according to a 
different logic: that progressive ends can be achieved through security rather than 
outside it‘ (McDonald 2008: 71). In contrast to attempts at ‗desecuritisation‘ in the 
securitisation of development literature, this approach engages with the potential that 
the nexus will result in a comprehensive approach that differs significantly from a 
traditional security approach. As such, critical security studies is used as a theoretical 
model to examine what inhibits the integration of security and development.
3
 
Methodologically, critical security studies is based on constructivist foundations, 
where the security-development nexus is understood as a concept that is given 
meaning by the actors that employ it. As such, the nuances in how the security-
development nexus is understood and applied by external actors engaged in post-
conflict reconstruction are examined. 
 
Critical security studies is distinguished from other epistemological approaches by its 
‗methodological flexibility‘ (Salter 2013: 17). The emphasis is on using the best 
tools for the specific research question. Increasingly, critical security scholars are 
drawing on different approaches to inform their research design and choice of 
methods. Salter and Mutlu (2013) outline five different approaches to research within 
critical security studies: the ethnographic turn, the practice turn, the discursive turn, 
the corporeal turn and the material turn. As this research posits that the outcomes of 
the security-development nexus are a function of its implementation, it examines 
how the nexus is put into practice. As such, it fits within the practice turn. 
Drawing on practice theory, the practice turn has its foundations in philosophy and 
sociology. It has only recently been applied to international relations, most notably 
through studies by Bigo (1996; 2002), Pouliot (2010) and Williams (2007). For 
Neumann (2002), practice theory provides a valuable tool for international studies, as 
it entails a shift away from ‗armchair analysis‘ to investigate how social action is 
                                                 
3
 The theoretical framework for this research will be explored in more depth in Chapter 1. 
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enacted in and on the world. It draws on Wittgenstein‘s contention that the meaning 
of a concept is understood by analysing how it is used (cited in Collins 2001). 
Accordingly, this research engages with the security-development nexus as it is 
adopted and implemented by external actors addressing organised crime as part of 
post-conflict reconstruction. The research focuses on the integration of security and 
development into a nexus and why this might be problematic. Examining how the 
nexus is put into practice reveals tensions between the two components of the nexus 
and factors inhibiting their integration. The research posits that this produces a 
flawed integration that results in the outcomes that critics of the nexus have focused 
on, rather than a comprehensive approach.   
 
As this research is situated within the disjuncture between the potential of the nexus 
and its critiques, it engages in immanent critique. A key element of critical security 
studies, immanent critique compares the outcomes – the securitisation of 
development, with the stated objectives – a comprehensive approach that integrates 
security and development (Stamnes 2004). As Booth (2005: 11) points out however, 
immanent critique cannot assess practices on the basis of blueprints that are not 
possible in reality. Rather analysis needs to be based on unfulfilled potential that 
already exists. The focus on ‗immanent, unrealised or unfulfilled possibilities‘ gives 
the analysis critical purchase, preventing recommendations that call for possibilities 
that are out of reach (Wyn-Jones 2005: 221). Postone and Brick (1993: 230) argue 
that this unfulfilled potential needs to be located within the existing society, not 
judged from outside as a ‗transcendental ought‘. While it can be argued that the 
integration of security and development ‗ought‘ to result in a new, comprehensive 
approach, this needs to be possible, or immanent, in its existence to account for the 
unfulfilled potential. This ‗unfulfilled potential‘ has been highlighted above as the 





Research Design  
 
                                                 
4
 The unfulfilled potential will be explored in more detail in relation to the two case studies in Chapter 
2. 
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To examine specific sites of enquiry into how the security-development nexus is 
implemented in practice this research uses case study methods. Through case studies, 
the research examines how the four hypothesised tensions influence practice, 
particularly how they affect the integration of security and development. Case study 
methods are valued for the depth of analysis they allow of a particular phenomenon. 
George and Bennett (2004: 17) define a case as ‗a class of events‘, whether a 
revolution, type of governmental regime or kind of economic system. For the 
purpose of this research the ‗case‘ is internationally driven initiatives to address 
organised crime as part of post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
Case study methods have been widely criticised (see for example King et al. 1994; 
Lieberson 1994; Maoz 2002). The most consistent critiques have focused on the 
validity of small-n studies and the representativeness of their findings (Gerring 
2006). However, these criticisms have been challenged by proponents of case study 
methods. For example, Collier (1993: 165) argues that the use of a few cases has 
gained greater legitimacy as ‗much political phenomena… are best understood 
through the careful examination of a small number of cases‘. Similarly, Lijphart 
(1971: 685) argued that ‗the intensive analysis of a few cases may be more promising 
than the superficial statistical analysis of many cases‘. Gerring (2004: 341) even 
contends that the debate is irrelevant: ‗the perceived hostility between case study and 
non-case study research is largely unjustified and, perhaps, deserves to be regarded 
as a misconception‘.  
 
Despite the critiques of case study methods, they continue to be regularly employed 
generating insightful research on the social world. George and Bennett (2004: 19) set 
out four advantages of case study methods that highlight their value in theory 
development and hypothesis testing: ‗their potential for achieving high conceptual 
validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful 
means to closely examine the hypothesised role of causal mechanisms in the context 
of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity‘. As such, 
case study methods provide an effective tool to examine the tensions in the security-
development nexus. Case study methods provide for a detailed examination of the 
tensions in practice, allowing an analysis of the complexity and messiness of social 
phenomena. However, they also ensure space for other tensions to be identified on 
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the basis of the research findings. While the research findings may lack broad 
generalisability, the in-depth analysis of case study methods provides a thorough 
understanding of how the tensions influence the integration of security and 
development. 
 
The rigour and validity of case study methods can be enhanced by examining more 
than one case. Gerring (2004: 350) notes that this allows for the testing of hypotheses 
with more confidence. However, it is rarely possible to achieve a controlled 
comparison. This is particularly the case with post-conflict reconstruction. While 
international engagement in post-conflict reconstruction has become increasingly 
similar, with many scholars critiquing the use of ‗blue prints‘, each engagement still 
differs significantly. Different leadership, personnel, budgets and other factors ensure 
that differences persist across international engagement. However, these differences 
can produce significant conclusions and deeper insights into social phenomena. 
 
Differences can be accommodated by combining comparative case study analysis 
and within-case analysis, where each case is analysed separately, and then compared 
to draw conclusions on the tensions that influence the security-development nexus. 
Collier (1993) considers within-case analysis critical to the viability of small-n 
research. George and Bennett (2004: 234) argue that the combination of comparative 
and within-case methods allows ‗structured iterations between theories and cases‘, 
providing an effective tool for comparing different cases. Comparing two cases 
allows an investigation of how important each tension is by examining the extent of 
its influence in different cases, while maintaining the detailed analysis of each case 
through within-case analysis. As such, within-case analysis allows a rich 
investigation of the tensions in the security-development nexus through the lens of 
critical security studies. 
 
For this research, two cases have been selected of external actors addressing 
organised crime as part of broader post-conflict reconstruction efforts – the West 
Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) in Sierra Leone and the EU Police Mission (EUPM) 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5
 These cases have been selected as they have sufficient 
                                                 
5
 Hereafter referred to as Bosnia. 
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similarities to facilitate comparison. However, they also have key differences that 
allow for an examination of the tensions in significantly different contexts. 
 
In Sierra Leone, there are many and varied actors addressing organised crime 
connected through the WACI. The initiative was developed in response to the 
Political Declaration on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and 
Organised Crime in West Africa and its accompanying Regional Action Plan drafted 
by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The WACI is an 
inter-agency project to address organised crime and illicit drug trafficking, bringing 
together UNODC, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), the UN 
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) and Interpol. However, on the ground, 
implementation of the WACI was primarily driven by the UN Peacebuilding Mission 
in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and UNODC officers based in the country. The focus of 
this research was the core WACI project in Sierra Leone, SLEU74 ‗Building 
Institutional Capacity to Respond to the Threat Posed by Illicit Drug Trafficking and 
Organised Crime in Sierra Leone‘, which was implemented from April 2010 – April 
2013. 
 
Until June 2012, organised crime was addressed in Bosnia by EUPM. The mission 
took over from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in 2003 to continue 
the police reform process. Since then the mission has evolved through four phases. 
The focus of this research was EUPM IV, which commenced in January 2010 until 
the mission ended in June 2012. The fourth phase focused solely on organised crime 
and corruption. The fourth phase also provides a better insight into the EU‘s 
initiatives within the security-development nexus, as by 2010, the EU had articulated 
its policy in this area.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 
In line with the practice turn within critical security studies, the thesis considers that 
evidence can be drawn from how the security-development nexus is used, how it is 
adopted and implemented by external actors addressing organised crime. As such, 
the research draws on the epistemic knowledge of those actors to test the validity of 
the hypothesised tensions and understand their impact on the integration between 
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security and development. There are limitations to drawing on policy discourse. For 
instance, underlying the emancipatory discourse are less positive practices. In 
relation to human security, Pugh, Cooper and Turner (2008: 396) note that the more 
emancipatory aspects ‗either are not followed through or have been captured to work 
in the interests of global capitalism‘. While emancipatory language can be used to 
describe practices, what appears to be a positive process is driven by more sinister 
motives. In order to overcome these challenges and ensure both policy and practice 
are examined, a range of data collection techniques have been employed. 
 
The case studies were investigated through field research. Lieberman (2004) argues 
that field research allows the collection of data and testing of hypotheses, as well as 
inductively developing new hypotheses. Immersion in the field also ensures an 
appreciation for context and nuance that is not available remotely. Research was 
conducted in Bosnia in October 2011 and March 2012, and in Sierra Leone in 
January and February 2012. Research relied on two data sources – interviews with 
international, national and civil society actors; and official documentation from 
international actors addressing organised crime. 
 
During field visits, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the key 
international actors engaged in initiatives to address organised crime. These 
interviews were designed to determine how individuals within international 
organisations engaging with organised crime witnessed and understood the 
implementation of the security-development nexus. They also sought to understand 
the factors that influence the security-development nexus, which will be set out in the 
empirical chapters that discuss the tensions. Interviews were also conducted with 
other actors connected to initiatives to address organised crime, including local law 
enforcement agencies, international NGOs, diplomatic representatives and civil 
society actors.
6
 The aim of these interviews was to elicit a secondary perspective on 
how the security-development nexus is implemented. Particularly with actors that 
work in partnership with the key international organisations engaged with organised 
crime, these interviews provided another layer to triangulate the findings. 
 
                                                 
6
 A full list of interviewees is included in Annex I. 
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A first wave of interview participants was identified within the key international 
organisations engaged with organised crime – UNIPSIL and UNODC in Sierra 
Leone and EUPM and the EU Delegation in Bosnia. Other international actors were 
also identified by assessing which embassies or diplomatic missions were active in 
initiatives to address organised crime based on reports and articles on their website. 
In Bosnia this revealed specific programmes, such as the US Department of Justice 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), as well 
as embassies with police liaison officers directly engaged with organised crime. 
 
Relevant government bodies were also identified. This included the Sierra Leone 
Police, the Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU), the Office of National 
Security (ONS) and Interpol in Sierra Leone. In Bosnia, relevant bodies included the 
Ministries of Security and Justice, as well as entity Ministries of Interior, Interpol 
and the Prosecutor‘s Office. In Bosnia, government bodies were more reluctant to 
engage in interviews than in Sierra Leone and were less open in their responses. 
Members of civil society organisations that focused on organised crime, 
development or security and had a visible presence, such as a website were also 
identified for the first wave of interviews. Further participants at each level were 
identified through snowball sampling, drawing on the contacts of participants at all 
three levels. 
 
In Bosnia, interviews were conducted throughout the country in Sarajevo, Banja 
Luka, Srebrenica, Zvornik, Tuzla and Zenica. However, as the primary focus was on 
how international actors were engaging with the security-development nexus, those 
in Sarajevo and Banja Luka were the most informative. International and 
governmental actors were based in either Sarajevo or Banja Luka. Although Sarajevo 
is the capital of Bosnia, the Government of Republika Srpska is based in Banja Luka. 
Civil society actors in these cities were also better informed about the activities of 
international actors addressing organised crime than those further afield. As such, in 
Sierra Leone interviews were limited to the capital Freetown, and the surrounding 
area. While interviews in other parts of the country may have yielded interesting 




Analysis has also relied on the official documentation, reports and policies of the 
actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. This included policy 
documents, but also strategic texts, such as planning documents and evaluations. 
While policy documents adhere to representational knowledge rather than practical 
knowledge, as it is intentional and explicit, it still provides a useful avenue to probe 
the assumptions behind policy developments. Such a wide range of data sources 
ensures the greatest breadth of data to assess how the four tensions influence the 
integration of security and development into a nexus.  
 
These data sources, both official documentation and interviews, are considered texts 
for textual analysis, which is the study of human communication (Babbie 2010). In 
contrast to historical approaches, textual analysis engages with data within its 
communicative context, considering how these texts produce meaning (Ifversen 
2003). McKee (2003: 1) notes that ‗textual analysis is a way for researchers to gather 
information about how other human beings make sense of the world‘. In this context, 
textual analysis provides a tool to understand how the security-development nexus is 
given meaning by the actors adopting it, the nuances in how the nexus is understood 
and applied. 
 
Although this research relies on a range of data sources, limitations remain in 
accessing the knowledge that informs practice. Using policy documents as well as 
interview data ensures that the research does not just rely on how individuals 
represent practice. While underlying meaning can be detected in both data sources, 
texts remain controlled data. Ethnographic methods, such as participant observation 
may produce deeper insight by observing how initiatives are put into practice. 
However, as the research focuses on multi-year programmes in two countries, this 
was not feasible. The interpretation of the knowledge and understandings of external 
actors is also dependent on the researchers reading of the texts. The use of specific, 
articulated frameworks to examine each tension aimed to maintain the rigour and 





External actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction have enthusiastically adopted 
the security-development nexus on the basis that it will achieve a new and 
comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. Despite this enthusiasm, the 
security-development nexus has also attracted significant criticism. In particular, 
scholars have argued that development has been brought into the nexus to achieve 
security outcomes. This suggests that the relationship between security and 
development is contentious. This research investigates this relationship to determine 
what in practice inhibits the integration of security and development. 
 
Within the practice turn of critical security studies, this research uses comparative and 
within-case study analysis to investigate the implementation of the security-
development nexus. It seeks to understand why the security-development nexus does 
not result in a shift from a traditional security approach to an integrated and 
emancipatory approach by examining the four hypothesised tensions. This analysis 
reveals the barriers to the integration of security and development into a nexus.  
 
Chapter 1 sets out the theoretical framework for this research, it outlines the 
emergence of the security-development nexus and key debates, before discussing the 
use of critical security studies as a theoretical model to examine the nexus. It also 
outlines the four hypothesised tensions, explaining what they are, how they are 
expected to affect the integration of security and development, and how they will be 
investigated. Chapter 2 discusses organised crime as a site of inquiry and provides 
background on the selected cases. The chapter sets out the comparability of the two 
case studies, the presence of organised crime in the two countries and how the 
security-development nexus has been employed to address it. Chapters 3 and 4 
investigate how the four tensions influence the integration of security and 
development in the two case studies – Sierra Leone and Bosnia. Chapter 5 brings the 
analysis of the tensions together, identifying the barriers that affect the integration of 
security and development. However, it also highlights the latent potential of the 




Chapter 1: A Critical Analysis of the Security-Development 
Nexus 
 
The security-development nexus has become a key feature of international 
engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, bolstered by statements that security and 
development are inextricably linked. Based on the recognition that a comprehensive 
approach to post-conflict reconstruction is essential, external actors have 
enthusiastically adopted the refrain that ‗there will be no security without 
development and no development without security‘ (UN 2004a). In policy, the 
security-development nexus is proposed as a means to implement post-conflict 
reconstruction in ways that are more comprehensive. Despite the enthusiasm of 
policymakers, scholars have argued that the security-development nexus has not 
lived up to this promise. The gap between policy and practice has primarily been 
explained by the securitisation of development, where development is co-opted by 
security actors to deliver security objectives. However, this explanation engages with 
the outcome of the security-development nexus, rather than its inherent 
characteristics and dynamics. This research seeks to understand what inhibits the 
integration of security and development into a nexus.  
 
This chapter expands on the background for this research. The first section outlines 
the emergence of the security-development nexus, followed by an examination of the 
different approaches to study the nexus. The third section explores the use of critical 
security studies as a theoretical model to investigate the security-development nexus. 
This is followed by an overview of the four tensions that are hypothesised to 
influence the integration of security and development, and how they will be 
examined through the two case studies.  
 
The Security-Development Nexus as a Framework for Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction 
 
Building on the increasing recognition that there will be no security without 
development and no development without security, external actors engaged in post-
conflict reconstruction have been eager to merge security and development into a 
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new, comprehensive approach. Since the early 2000s, the adoption of the security-
development nexus has been accompanied by additional resources and the 
transformation of institutions engaged in post-conflict reconstruction (Stern and 
Ojendal 2010). As a result, the security-development nexus has become a guiding 
framework for external engagement in post-conflict reconstruction. However, the 
connection between security and development is not new. Security and development 
have been linked historically in various permutations. 
 
Hettne (2010) tracks a genealogy of the linkages between security and development 
from the 18
th
 century to the current day. In the 18
th
 century, economic order was seen 
as a peace order; security was essential for economic prosperity (Hettne 2010). 
Development strategy shifted towards state capitalism in the 19
th
 century, when it 
focused on strengthening the material base of the state through industrialisation 
reinforced by the security interests of the elite (Hettne 2010). At the end of the 19
th
 
century, with the failure of the League of Nations, development and security 
switched places; where previously order and predictability enabled development, in 
this period wealth served to reinstate order through the politics of war (Hettne 2010). 
Following World War II, the European Economic Community was developed as a 
security community, and development aid was used as a tactic of security in the 
struggle between the superpowers (Hettne 2010).  
 
Other scholars have also highlighted earlier connections. Writing on South Africa, 
Mamdani (1996) argued that security and development were used to maintain the 
divide between the generally democratic, mostly white, urban areas and the 
indirectly ruled, rural areas, through schemes to control the migration of rural 
populations into cities. After World War II, the development aid provided through 
the Marshall Plan was in response to concerns of further conflict in Europe (Stern 
and Ojendal 2010). Development was also a tactic in the Cold War to prevent the 
spread of communism (Duffield 2010). These examples highlight how security and 
development have been pursued in parallel throughout history. 
 
The contemporary security-development nexus is qualitatively different. Rather than 
the parallel pursuit of security and development objectives, the nexus combines 
security and development in deeper, more institutionalised ways. For example, the 
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UK, US, Netherlands and Canada have introduced inter-ministerial committees and 
funding mechanisms to address the security-development nexus (Chandler 2007). 
The UK Government created Conflict Prevention Pools and, more recently, the 
Stabilisation Unit, which bring together the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International 
Development (DfID) (Krause and Jutersonke 2005; Kent 2007; World Bank 2011). 
The US Government created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stability, which is jointly staffed by members of US Government agencies 
traditionally associated with security and development, including the Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Department of State and the Department of 
Homeland Security (US Department of State 2010). The EU developed the 
Instrument for Stability (IfS)
7
, a rapid funding mechanism designed to equip the EU 
with ‗a strategic tool to address a number of global security and development 
challenges‘ (European Commission 2006: 3). 
 
This institutionalised linkage between security and development has emerged at a 
particular historical point. The end of the Cold War resulted in a focus on other forms 
of conflict and insecurity. Until the 1990s, security threats were primarily directed at 
a state by another state. The preoccupation with the threat of ‗mutually assured 
destruction‘ between the US and the Soviet Union obscured threats from non-state 
actors (Reisman 2003). However, during the Cold War, many internal wars were 
underway, often supported by the major powers. Unlike interstate wars, these internal 
wars featured paramilitary groups, gangs, foreign mercenaries and troops, 
disenfranchised civilians and forcibly recruited combatants as well as state armies 
(Akkerman 2009: 76). These conflicts also took a different form to interstate wars, 
blurring war, organised crime, human rights violations, guerrilla warfare and counter-
insurgency (Kaldor 2006). Duffield (2010: 67) describes them as ‗livelihood wars 
fought by non-state actors on and through the modalities of subsistence… where the 
endemic abuse of human rights is part of the fabric of conflict itself‘. While the state 
may still be under threat in internal wars, citizens also experience a significant threat. 
When the Cold War ended, these forms of insecurity gained more prominence. 
 
                                                 
7
 In 2014, the IfS was replaced with the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), which 
also aimed to address security and development challenges in a comprehensive approach. 
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The withdrawal of US and Soviet Union support from a number of countries, many 
of which had only recently become independent, also created a new challenge – 
weak or failed states. These countries had inadequate state structures, resulting in 
‗poorly guarded borders, weak law enforcement, incipient taxation, underdeveloped 
financial systems as well as a large presence of displaced people and refugees‘ 
(Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009: 9). Weak or failed states are prone to 
conflict and instability and contribute to global problems such as poverty, HIV/AIDs, 
drugs and terrorism (Fukuyama 2004; Kaldor 2009). These problems have had a 
considerable impact on how security is conceived. Security threats have shifted from 
strong states that may invade or attack another state, to weak states that cannot 
control factors that contribute to global problems. It has become recognised that state 
weakness, once a problem of development, contributes to global insecurity through 
terrorism and criminal networks, as well as national insecurity, as weak states are 
rarely able to meet the welfare needs of their populations, which could result in 
conflict. 
 
This period of instability and persistent conflict marked the post-Cold War 
interventionist stage. Without the veto power of the US and the Soviet Union, the 
UN Security Council mandated the international community to intervene in many 
internal wars to end conflict and build peace. Between 1989 and 2009, there were 20 
major multilateral post-conflict operations (Paris and Sisk 2009). During this period, 
approaches to post-conflict reconstruction evolved rapidly. Early attempts at post-
conflict reconstruction after the Cold War were security focused. However, the 
increasing recognition of the unique features of these internal wars – from the role of 
non-state actors, the impact of violence on civilians, or the role of inadequate state 
structures – resulted in a broadening of approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. 
As Woodward (2003: 3) contends, by the early 2000s, security approaches were 
‗beginning to yield to the lessons of the 1990s – the neglect of human and social 
capital, gender relations and institutions‘.  
 
The problems created by early approaches to post-conflict reconstruction provided 
donors with a stronger understanding of the many factors that lead to conflict and 
state failure and the complexity in resolving them (Ottaway 2002). In response, 
external actors have expanded their mandates to address the interconnection of 
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political, security and economic issues in comprehensive approaches to post-conflict 
reconstruction. As early as 1998 the UN was beginning to advocate for a 
comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. In his Annual Report on the 
Work of the Organisation, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan defined post-conflict 
reconstruction as ‗integrated and coordinated actions aimed at addressing the root 
causes of violence, whether political, legal, institutional, military, humanitarian, 
human rights-related, environmental, economic and social, cultural or demographic‘ 
(UN 1998).  
 
During the post-Cold War interventionist phase, development actors also came to 
play a significant role in post-conflict reconstruction. The engagement of 
development actors in new areas has supported the institutionalisation of the 
security-development nexus. Early on, the humanitarian aid community discovered 
the impact their work could have on conflicts. The Biafran famine in the late 1960s 
highlighted how humanitarian relief could prolong conflict, and with it the death and 
suffering of numerous civilians and non-combatants. Smilie (1995: 104) refers to the 
airlift and the broader relief effort as ‗an act of unfortunate and profound folly. It 
prolonged the war for 18 months‘. The development community had a similar 
experience with the Rwandan genocide. In the early 1990s Rwanda was widely 
viewed as a development success following high economic growth (Krause and 
Jutersonke 2005). Once the genocide began in 1994, it was recognised that 
development assistance could reinforce social cleavages and actually cause conflict if 
wrongly distributed (Krause and Jutersonke 2005). 
 
As violence and war became more visible with the end of the Cold War, the 
relationship of development and conflict has also become clearer. In 2003, Collier 
described conflict as ‗development in reverse‘. Violent conflict destroys 
infrastructure, services and other development advances creating billions of dollars 
worth of damage (Ball 2001; Brinkerhoff 2005; Duffield and Waddell 2006). For 
Duffield and Waddell (2006), the destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods 
through violent conflict creates a disequilibrium that promotes further violence, 
severely undermining sustainable development. The potential to advance 
development during a conflict is also severely restricted. While progress may not 
completely stop, Ball (2001) argues that ‗what is possible to accomplish under 
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conditions of war tends to be both very limited and under constant threat of reversal‘ 
(Ball 2001: 719). As a result, the post-conflict period is marked by widespread social 
and economic insecurity (Kostovicova et al. 2010).  
  
Development has also been recognised as a contributor to the outbreak of violent 
conflicts. Underdevelopment has come to be acknowledged as a factor in insecurity, 
contributing to crimes, terrorism and conflict (Duffield 2001). Since the 1990s, 80% 
of the world‘s poorest countries have experienced violence (Tschirgi et al. 2010b). 
The 2000/2001 World Development Report highlights how failed development in 
Bosnia and Sierra Leone contributed to conflict (World Bank 2001: 33). The role of 
poverty has also been recognised as a contributing factor to conflict, driving people 
towards violent leaders (Duffield 2001). Brinkerhoff (2005:7) argues that ‗if youth 
are in school, job opportunities are available and families have hope that their 
wellbeing will improve, citizens are less likely to engage in crime or be recruited into 
insurgency‘ (Brinkerhoff 2005: 7). As a result, economic inequality, 
underdevelopment and poor governance have become recognised by policymakers as 
a root cause of conflict (Buur et al. 2007). 
 
In response, development actors have become involved in conflict prevention and 
post-conflict reconstruction alongside security actors. Development aid has been 
withdrawn from states in response to excessive military aggression or expenditure 
(Uvin 2002). Tools have also been developed to mobilise development resources for 
conflict prevention, such as early warning indicators in potential pre-conflict 
countries (Uvin 2002). Development actors have engaged in new areas following 
conflict, including justice, reconciliation, disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration programmes, policing, and governance reforms (OECD 1997). The 
increasing involvement of development actors in post-conflict reconstruction paved 
the way for a comprehensive approach that integrates security and development. 
 
Although there is now broad recognition that a comprehensive approach to post-
conflict reconstruction is needed, there have been different strategies to bring the 
different elements together. Some actors have sequenced the key elements of post-
conflict reconstruction. Dobbins (2008: 68) sets out a hierarchy of tasks: security, 
humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilisation, democratisation and 
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development, arguing that ‗unless higher priorities such as security are adequately 
resourced, sustainable progress on those falling lower on the scale are likely to be 
elusive‘. A number of scholars agree that security should be addressed before other 
activities (Last 2000; Baker 2001; Jeong 2005). For example, Jeong (2005: 26) states 
that ‗adequately controlling physical violence and maintaining order, along with 
humanitarian activities takes priority over qualitative, social development, such as 
economic and social processes‘ (Jeong 2005: 26). 
 
Others actors have implemented elements of post-conflict reconstruction 
simultaneously. Berdal (2009: 96) argues that the priorities of post-conflict 
reconstruction, such as ‗providing a secure environment, stabilising governing 
structures and ensuring basic life-sustaining services …are mutually reinforcing and 
need to be pursued in parallel‘. This approach is evident in Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. Disarmament and 
demobilisation of armed fighters must be accompanied with effective reintegration 
strategies to avoid a return to conflict. Kaldor (2007) argues that if not done 
simultaneously, ex-combatants with ready access to surplus weapons and no other 
form of income generation could potentially reignite conflict.  
 
Despite the general acknowledgment of the need for components of post-conflict 
reconstruction to be implemented simultaneously, it remains a complicated process. 
Sisk (2009: 10) argues that some elements of post-conflict reconstruction ‗are likely 
to interact in ways that have the potential to undercut, not advance, the goal of 
establishing legitimate, effective institutions in war torn countries‘. As a result, 
approaches to post-conflict reconstruction have continued to evolve to improve 
comprehensive interventions in post-conflict states. The security-development nexus 
is one of these innovations, as it seeks to integrate security and development into a 
comprehensive approach.  
 
New institutions, tools and approaches have been developed to merge the two 
traditionally separate areas. Actors conventionally associated with development, such 
as DfID, have become involved in the security sphere, and security actors are taking 
on development tasks. ‗The security-development nexus has become a truism that 
inspires policymakers to make concerted efforts to overcome the established 
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boundaries between sectorally defined institutions and policies by developing more 
coordinated, holistic strategies at the national and international level‘ (Tschirgi et al. 
2010b: 406). In response, many governments and inter-governmental organisations 
have created mechanisms to bring together security and development components in 
their approach to post-conflict reconstruction.  
 
By bringing together security and development elements, the security-development 
nexus is posited as a significantly different approach to post-conflict reconstruction. 
The nexus is understood as an avenue to more effective and sustainable approaches 
through coordinated, holistic strategies (Tschirgi et al. 2010a). Alongside security, 
development is viewed as an equally important objective to address insecurity in 
order to limit the effect on individuals. For example, DfID‘s strategy for security and 
development recognises the linkages between the two concepts, acknowledging that 
both need to be addressed to improve the lives of the poor (DfID 2005). This shifts 
the focus away from just securing the state to address individual needs, pointing to a 
balanced and people-centred approach. 
 
The use of development strategies also fits within the growing acknowledgement that 
military means are inadequate to address security threats. In relation to organised 
crime it has become increasingly evident that it cannot be addressed without rule of 
law and good governance, areas that go beyond the remit of security actors. Rather 
than just another strategy to achieve security, rule of law and good governance 
programmes consider the impact of organised crime on individuals and communities, 
extending beyond a focus on the state. While development contributes to security 
outcomes, it brings in new tools and strategies that broaden the focus of post-conflict 
reconstruction. As a result, the security-development nexus can be understood as the 
pairing of hard and soft strategies to enhance post-conflict reconstruction and ensure 
positive outcomes for individuals and communities affected by conflict. As Stern and 
Ojendal (2010: 10) recognise ‗the notion of a ―nexus‖ seems to provide a possible 
framework for acutely needed progressive policies designed to address the complex 
policy problems and challenges of today‘. From this perspective, the security-
development nexus is understood as a new and innovative strategy to achieve a 
comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. 
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Studying the Security-Development Nexus 
 
Although policymakers have enthusiastically adopted the security-development 
nexus, it has received significant criticism. Scholarly inquiry into the security-
development nexus has emerged within the peacebuilding literature, and it fits within 
the two main approaches – critical and orthodox. How these two approaches view the 
security-development nexus will be outlined below, followed by an explanation of 




Critical approaches see peacebuilding as inherently flawed, and argue that it needs to 
be radically rethought. With the security-development nexus, rather than the 
innovative approach presented by policymakers, critical scholars argue that the 
relationship between security and development is not comprehensive and balanced as 
one side, whether security or development, continues to dominate the nexus. These 
arguments have resulted in two bodies of critique – the securitisation of development 
and the developmentalisation of security. 
 
The primary critique of the nexus focuses on the securitisation of development. From 
this perspective, development is being integrated with security to achieve security 
outcomes rather than the comprehensive approach outlined above. Scholars argue 
that the ‗trend seems to be that security at home is becoming the overriding priority 
of both [security and development] agendas‘ (Beall et al. 2006: 53). This is 
supported by the reframing of development objectives around terrorism, crime and 
conflict. For example, in 2004 the British Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed ‗we 
know that poverty and instability lead to weak states which can become havens for 
terrorists and other criminals‘ (Guardian 2004). Underdevelopment has come to be 
understood as dangerous; ‗the ripple effects of poverty, environmental collapse, civil 
conflict or health crises require international management, since they do not respect 
geographical boundaries. Otherwise, they will inundate and destabilise Western 
society‘ (Duffield 2007: 1). The result is a one-sided security-development nexus 
where development is simply another tool to achieve international security. Rather 
than an end goal, poverty reduction becomes a means to achieve security outcomes, 
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shifting the focus away from individual wellbeing towards international security 
needs. 
 
This critique focuses on the impact of the security-development nexus on 
development practices, arguing that the development agenda has been co-opted for 
security purposes, side-lining the key modalities of development, such as local 
engagement and a focus on individual needs. This argument is derived from earlier 
connections, such as the counterinsurgencies of the 1970s and 1980s which used 
development to ‗win the hearts and minds‘ of populations by supporting 
communities once insurgents had been driven from an area (Buur et al. 2007). For 
example, in Malaya, only 25% of time was spent on defeating insurgents, with the 
remainder dedicated to development activities (Duffield 2010). The extensive focus 
on development activities was designed to undermine and isolate insurgents rather 
than enhance the wellbeing of individuals and communities. 
 
The concept of securitisation was developed by the Copenhagen School of Security 
Studies to describe the process where an issue is taken out of normal politics to 
justify extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998). Aradau (2004) argues that normal 
politics is how things are done in liberal democracies. As such, securitising an issue 
allows decisions to be made outside of the democratic political process, beyond 
debate and deliberation (Aradau 2004). For development, this means that approaches 
focus on what decision makers – international donors – deem important, not that 
which is important for recipients. Beall et al. (2006) argue that the securitisation of 
development ‗ignores certain crucial aspects of the development process, not least 
the development agendas of partner governments, and other regional, national and 
local organisations‘.  
 
In practice, there are many examples where the implementation of the security-
development nexus adheres to the arguments on the securitisation of development. In 
2010, the UK government demanded ‗that projects in the developing world must 
make the ―maximum possible contribution‖ to British national security‘ (Watt 2010: 
1). The US government has also used development to further their security interests. 
As part of the US War on Terror, many countries were offered aid, arms sales, trade 
concessions and political patronage in exchange for joining the ‗coalition of the 
 35 
willing‘ (BOND 2003). For some countries, such as Yemen, participation in the War 
on Terror had the potential to undermine the fragile social and political situation in 
the country, which would negatively impact on development (Tschirgi et al. 2010b). 
Furthermore, an increasing amount of development assistance is being channelled 
through the military. Between 1998 and 2006 the share of the US aid budget 
provided to the Department of Defence increased from 3.5% to 21.7% (Brown and 
Tirnauer 2009). These examples highlight the prioritisation of security over 
development. 
 
These changes are also affecting practices on the ground. In Afghanistan security 
forces have used development tools to ‗win the hearts and minds‘ of local 
communities, providing generators to households as part of their counter-insurgency 
strategy (Duffield 2011). While the provision of generators may be a useful tool for 
households in Afghanistan, in this case there was no local engagement to determine 
if they were needed. This suggests that development is being employed to achieve 
security objectives rather than improve wellbeing. Duffield (2001: 16) contends that 
for development actors, ‗the convergence of development and security has meant that 
it has become difficult to separate their own development and humanitarian activities 
from the pervasive logic of the North‘s new security regime‘. As Donini (2010: 4) 
notes, NGOs in Afghanistan ‗are allowing their universe to be defined by political 
and security considerations rather than by the humanitarian imperative to save and 
protect lives‘. Duffield (2007: 128) points out that approaches defined by  
―enlightened self-interest‖ often gloss over contradictions between domestically 
oriented security interests and South-oriented development priorities‘ (Duffield 
2007: 128). While ‗enlightened self-interest‘ brings in the tools and strategies of 
development, the focus is on security outcomes rather than development needs. This 
limits the contribution of development, in particular the focus on individual 
wellbeing, as development tools are employed to protect the state. As a result, the 
integration of security and development into a comprehensive approach is also 
limited.  
 
The argument on the securitisation of development highlights the use of development 
by security actors to achieve their objectives. However, rather than just security 
involvement in areas that have been the responsibility of development actors, 
 36 
development actors have also become active in addressing security challenges. 
Through the security-development nexus, development actors engage in security 
initiatives to further their own agenda, improving the lives of individuals in 
developing countries. This raises the potential for the developmentalisation of 
security, as development influences how security initiatives are implemented. In 
contrast to the securitisation of development, from this perspective security is co-
opted by development actors to achieve their desired outcomes – creating space for 
development. For example, DfID engaged in security sector reform (SSR) in Sierra 
Leone in order to create a secure environment to ensure the sustainability of 
development initiatives. 
 
The literature on the security-development nexus is beginning to engage with this 
perspective. Chitiyo (2010: 26) argues that ‗the developmentalisation of security is 
becoming the ―new wave‖ in the security-development nexus‘. Kuhn (2008) has set 
out how securitisation and developmentalisation influence each other. Pugh, Gabay 
and Williams (2013) have also assessed whether UK policy on the security-
development nexus has shifted from securitisation of development to 
developmentalisation of security. This perspective resonates with the fears of 
security actors that they will lose their mandate and end up focusing purely on 
development tasks.  
 
Both of these critiques suggest that the security-development nexus does not result in 
a comprehensive approach, as one element, whether security or development, 
continues to dominate. Arguments on the securitisation of development have been 
accompanied by calls for ‗desecuritisation‘. This is aligned with critical 




In contrast to critical perspectives, a number of scholars take a problem-solving or 
conventional critique that revolves around effectiveness, and aims to improve 
performance. For instance, in relation to peacebuilding, Paris (2009b:108) recognises 
that the record is ‗mixed and full of disappointments, but missions have on the whole 
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done considerably more good than harm‘. This places the emphasis on identifying 
flaws and developing solutions. 
 
Similar approaches have been applied to the security-development nexus, with some 
critics engaging with the flaws in order to identify solutions. Stern and Ojendal 
(2010) and Tschirgi et al. (2010) question the value of the security-development 
nexus given that it draws on poorly defined and contested concepts. This raises 
concerns of ineffective action, as it is difficult for security and development actors to 
work in collaboration when there is no shared understanding of the nexus. Chandler 
(2007: 362) has questioned the motives of external actors adopting the security-
development nexus, arguing that it ‗reflects a retreat from strategic policymaking and 
a more inward looking approach to foreign policy‘. While these critiques engage 
with the problematic relationship between security and development, they focus on 
the effectiveness of the security-development nexus. These scholars are therefore 
broadly supportive of the security-development nexus as long as there is an attempt 
to identify and correct the flaws. 
 
In line with the peacebuilding literature, critical approaches to the security-
development nexus argue that it needs to be radically rethought. Many of the 
arguments from this perspective, particularly on the securitisation of development, 
do resonate with practice. Yet, when it comes to the security-development nexus, 
critical approaches immediately overlook the potential of the nexus. Arguments on 
securitisation prompt very little probing of why the nexus results in that outcome and 
not the outcomes expected by policymakers. 
 
In contrast, the orthodox critique engages with the effectiveness of peacebuilding and 
aims to improve performance. There is a risk that this research falls into the 
conventional, problem-solving response that Duffield (2008) argues seeks to lift the 
security-development nexus out of its current malaise through ‗more research, a 
better circulation of ―good practice‖ and incremental reform‘. While the orthodox 
scholars are broadly supportive of the security-development nexus pending 
coordination and sequencing, this research argues that what is required to bring 
security and development together into an emancipatory approach is more 
fundamental than just coordination and sequencing. Changes are required at 
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conceptual, institutional and motivational levels because the underpinnings of the 
nexus, as outlined by the four tensions in the next section, limit its ‗success‘. The 
research also analyses the security-development nexus from a critical perspective. In 
line with Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009: 23), the thesis ‗raises questions about 
existing institutions, policy assumptions and the interests they serve, and is ready to 
challenge these assumptions‘. 
 
As a result, the research challenges both critical and orthodox perspectives on the 
security-development nexus. With a starting point that engages with the positive 
potential of the security-development nexus, the research does not immediately call 
for a radical rethink of the nexus, and it challenges arguments on the securitisation of 
development. However, it acknowledges that there are no easy fixes for the security-
development nexus, and the emphasis on emancipation is critical of the universal 
liberal blueprint put forward by orthodox scholars. Positioned between the two 
bodies of critique, the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies is used as a 
theoretical model to investigate the security-development nexus.  
 
 
The Welsh School of Critical Security Studies 
 
From the perspective of the Welsh School, the security-development nexus is imbued 
with the potential of a positive result. As a result, the assumptions of the Welsh 
School best support an investigation into the disjuncture between the theory and 
practice of the security-development nexus. This section situates this theoretical 
model within broader critical approaches. It also explains why the Welsh School is 
adopted for this research and how it is operationalised.  
 
Critical security studies scholars engage in a critique of traditional security 
approaches, and seek to move beyond them. Within critical security studies there are 
different perspectives on how security moves beyond its traditional focus. Buzan 
(1991) emphasises the ‗broadening‘ of the security agenda to include environmental, 
economic, political and societal considerations. Others focus on ‗deepening‘ security 
through the inclusion of other referent objects of security (Peoples and Vaughan-
Williams 2010). Since Krause and Williams‘ (1997) Critical Security Studies: 
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Concepts and Cases, which analyses the limitations of traditional security studies, 
numerous critical perspectives on security have emerged. Peoples and Vaughan-
Williams (2010: 1) argue that ‗among these perspectives there are crisscrossing lines 
of convergence and divergence over the object, method, and implications of being 
critical‘. 
 
Within these diverse perspectives of critical security studies, two distinct schools can 
be identified – the Copenhagen School and the Welsh School. The Copenhagen 
School examines the securitisation process and the way in which it moves a 
phenomenon out of the normal political process to justify extraordinary measures 
(Buzan et al. 1998). Securitising an issue is viewed negatively as it limits the shift 
away from traditional security approaches, instead adding new areas to security. 
These arguments on securitisation are closely linked to concerns of the 
‗securitisation of development‘. In parallel to the Copenhagen School, scholars 
critical of the ‗securitisation of development‘ call ‗for ―desecuritisation‖ out of a fear 
that those issues labelled as ―security concerns‖ will be captured by state elites and 
addressed through the application of zero-sum military and/or police practices, which 
may not necessarily help address human securities‘ (Bilgin 2008: 98). 
 
In contrast, the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies takes a positive view of 
security. Rather than focusing on security in terms of threats, the Welsh School‘s 
interpretation is closer to Cicero‘s early interpretation as the ‗absence of distress‘ 
(cited in Wæver 2008). As such, security is understood to be broader than just state 
security. ‗Broadening securitisation will broaden ―real‖ security (and bring resources 
and attention) to a wider range of problems and actors beyond the state‘ (Newman 
2010: 85-86). The Welsh School takes a normative approach, distinguished by its 
‗desire to radically reconceive security as the emancipation of individuals and 
communities from structural constraints‘ (Burke 2007: 6). As such, security is 
imbued with the potential to be emancipatory, rather than militaristic and state-
centred.  
 
The focus on emancipation within the Welsh School of critical security studies 
derives from the Frankfurt School of international relations, in particular 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas. For Booth (2007: 112), ‗as a discourse of 
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politics, emancipation seeks the securing of people from those oppressions that stop 
them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do, compatible with the 
freedoms of others‘. The concept of emancipation has been heavily criticised, 
particularly by Realist theorists. Ayoob (1997) considers its use the ‗height of 
naiveté‘. However, Booth (2007) notes that even Realists have sought to connect 
their preoccupation with state security to the security of citizens. Smith (2005) adds 
that the state is often the greatest threat to individual security. When emancipation is 
linked directly to security it becomes more practicable.  
Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from 
those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what 
they would freely choose to do. War and the threat of war is one of those 
constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and 
so on. Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. 
Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security (Booth 1991: 
319).  
 
The concept of emancipation describes a significantly different approach to security, 
which aligns with the stated aims of the security-development nexus. Rather than 
address threats from organised crime solely through a security approach, the addition 
of development brings in the human element, achieving a comprehensive approach 
that broadens the focus away from state security to also engage with the needs of 
individuals and communities. 
 
Within the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies, emancipation is the desired 
end goal of security. As a result, it is only vaguely defined, which weakens its value 
as an analytical tool. For Booth, emancipation is a process to be defined by those 
whose security is in question: ‗what the world will look like must be settled by those 
future generations, when new and different possibilities and problems become 
clearer‘ (Booth 1990: 3). While Critical Security Studies provides some guidance as 
to what emancipation is, the actual conceptualisation should be derived from those 
experiencing emancipation. Such a conceptualisation is limited as an analytical tool 
without extensive research involving the intended beneficiaries of post-conflict 
reconstruction. As a result, a more concrete conceptualisation is required. 
 
Within this research, emancipation is operationalised through human security. 
Human security provides the theoretical basis for the integration of security and 
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development into a nexus that is emancipatory. Glasius (2008) describes human 
security as a bridging concept that brings security and development together. As 
such, it provides a useful concept to operationalise emancipation within the context 
of the security-development nexus. However, human security remains contentious 
within critical security studies. Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010: 120) argue 
that ‗aspects of human security discourse seem to resonate with the ―emancipatory‖ 
impulse of some approaches, yet the practices associated with human security and 
development have still roused much critical debate over whether the concept is 
simply a way of managing perceived risks to global security‘. Newman (2010: 77) 
adds that human security is ‗considered – and as a result generally dismissed – as 
―uncritical‖ and unsophisticated by critical security scholars‘. Similarly, Christie 
(2014: 95) warns of the ‗hidden dangers of engaging in a discourse of security that 
has been embraced by the policy community‘. 
 
Beyond critical scholarship there is further critique of human security.
8
 Tadjbakhsh 
(2014: 4) notes that ‗what was supposed to be a simple, noble and obvious idea soon 
became engulfed in a cacophony of political and academic debates centred on its 
definitions, their advantages and weak points, and on its theoretical and practical 
applicability‘. Despite these criticisms there remains value in the key tenets of 
human security. Tadjbakhsh (2014: 45) argues that it can still be considered an 
‗evaluative framework‘ and Christie (2014: 101) notes that human security can be 
used to ‗further specific emancipatory goals‘. Furthermore, the critiques and debates 
that surround government action, such as debates over definition, whether broad or 
narrow, the prioritisation of particular securities and their timing are of little interest 
to critical scholars (Christie 2014). 
 
Richmond (2007: 460) describes two versions of human security – ‗the institutional 
approach and the emancipatory approach – and while one sees the creation of liberal 
institutions to protect human security as paramount, the other aims at empowerment 
of individuals and the removal of unnecessary constraints over their lives‘. While 
policy communities have readily adopted the first version, resulting in what Christie 
(2010: 170) has labelled a ‗new orthodoxy‘, the latter version still holds the potential 
                                                 
8
 The criticisms of human security have been addressed in detail by Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007). 
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to articulate what emancipation involves. Some scholars continue to challenge the 
emancipatory potential of human security (see for example Williams and Krause 
1997; McCormack 2008). Taken out of its policy context there is still value in the 
concept. As Christie (2010: 170) argues ‗human security retains some limited critical 
potential for engaging with particular security problems and may be usefully 
employed for narrowly defined short-term goals‘. For this research, human security 
is used as a lens to highlight the distinction between a traditional security approach 
and a new, emancipatory approach that reifies comprehensiveness.  
 
Human security emerged out of debates that security needed to be reconceptualised 
after the Cold War. ‗The structural change of the international order influenced 
security policy agendas and provoked a global political and scientific debate on the 
reconceptualization of security‘ (Brauch 2008: 30). The concept was coined by 
UNDP in the 1994 Human Development Report, which stated that  
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as 
security of a territory from external aggression, or as protection of national 
interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear 
holocaust… Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who 
sought security in their daily lives (UNDP 1994: 22). 
In practice, human security has been implemented in different ways, from Japan‘s 
broad approach that encompassed ‗freedom from fear‘ and ‗freedom from want‘ to 
Canada‘s narrow approach that focused solely on ‗freedom from fear‘. Both of these 
approaches embrace the institutional approach to human security. 
 
The emancipatory approach is bottom-up and empowers ‗individuals to negotiate and 
develop a form of human security that is fitted to their needs – political, economic 
and social, but also provides them with the necessary tools to do so‘ (Richmond 
2007: 461). It is ‗capable of being shaped by, and reflects, local interests and 
particularities‘ (Richmond 2007: 461). As with emancipation, this appears vague and 
open to different interpretations by the individual subjects of human security. 
However, at a conceptual level human security has been posited as a shift away from 
traditional security. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007) argue that human security is a 
paradigm shift from state security towards a focus on the security of communities 
and individuals. Similarly, Teitel (2011: 4) points to a shift from ‗an emphasis on 
state security – that is, security as defined by borders, statehood, territory and so on – 
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to a focus on human security: the security of persons and peoples‘. By focusing on 
the needs and perceptions of people within a state, rather than the state itself, human 
security becomes agent-centred and emancipatory (Futamura et al. 2010).  
 
In contrast to a traditional security approach that focuses on the state and militaristic 
tactics, human security is holistic. As Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007: 60) argue, 
‗human security recognises that threats are multiple and interlinked‘. Some scholars, 
such as Paris (2004) have argued that this can include everything from substance 
abuse to genocide. As a result, there have been numerous debates on which aspects 
of human security should be prioritised (see Khong 2001; Tow and Thomas 2002). 
However, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2007: 17) argue that ‗to ―hierarchise‖ and 
prioritise among human security goals may be a futile exercise as the concept 
actually rests on the postulate that all threats are interdependent: the eradication of 
one is of little effect without the implementation of comprehensive security to restore 
the individual‘s dignity‘.  
 
Human security recognises the interconnection between elements of international 
engagement and the need for collaboration across components. Berdal (2009: 96) 
argues that the many and varied priorities of post-conflict reconstruction, from 
ensuring security, good governance and service provision, need to be pursued 
simultaneously. A lack of success in one area has the potential to undermine others. 
For example, undertaking disarmament and demobilisation programs without an 
effective reintegration program would result in disenfranchised ex-combatants with 
few skills other than open warfare. This would result in continued instability in the 
post-conflict country. A holistic approach is particularly important across security 
and development components. The EU has acknowledged that ‗neither is possible 
without an adequate level of the other‘ (Ferrero-Waldner 2006).  
 
The holistic approach of human security has parallels with the aim of a 
comprehensive approach. The policy mantra that ‗there will be no security without 
development and no development without security‘ requires an integrated approach 
that recognises and addresses the threats to both security and development, but also 
how the two concepts interact. This suggests that integration also requires an 
appropriate balance between the two concepts. Addressing only one side of the 
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mantra is likely to be self-defeating. For example, focusing only on security may 
create space for development. However, without directly engaging with 
development, security will be undermined, as ‗there is no security without 
development‘.  
 
Human security also emphasises a people-centred approach. Contrary to a state-
centric approach, human security engages with the threats to individuals and 
communities. As Thakur (2004: 347) argues, ‗human security puts the individual at 
the centre of debate, analysis and policy‘. However, rather than seeking to identify 
and address the threats to individuals and communities through a top-down approach 
reminiscent of traditional security approaches, human security advocates for a 
bottom-up approach. As Tadjbakhsh (2005: 25) notes ‗people are not passive 
recipients of ―security‖ or victims of its absence, but active subjects who can 
contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to security problems‘.  
 
A people-centred approach implies more than just a refocusing on individual and 
community needs rather than that of the state. It also implies a shift to treat 
individuals as agents of change. This suggests that initiatives rely on local 
knowledge to inform decision-making. As Kaldor (2007: 189) argues ‗people who 
live in zones of insecurity are the best source of intelligence‘. Local knowledge 
provides insight into what problems exist and how they can be resolved to ensure 
local needs are met.  The use of local knowledge raises several challenges however. 
Consulting local actors is likely to raise a wide range of concerns, including some 
that conflict. This creates a problem in deciding which issues are significant and need 
to be addressed.  
 
Local engagement can bolster spoilers that have an interest in maintaining the status 
quo. It can also be difficult to ensure that all groups are empowered to participate 
equitably. Even Sen (1999), who advocates for local involvement in decision-
making, has recognised the negotiated and political process of increasing freedoms 
and choice. Similarly, holistic approaches have been criticised for their unintended 
consequences. For example, in relation to statebuilding, Paris and Sisk (2009) argue 
that many elements may undercut the desired outcomes rather than creating more 
effective results. In contrast to a traditional security approach, human security 
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requires careful consideration of how different elements will fit together and 
potential consequences. This relies on a long-term commitment and familiarity with 
the local context, an approach that differs significantly from military engagement to 
protect the state. 
 
Despite difficulties, human security presents the opposite end of the spectrum from 
traditional security approaches. As such, it articulates in more detail what 
emancipation involves. This provides analytical grasp to the positive potential of the 
security-development nexus. Through immanent critique, the thesis examines the 
security-development nexus from the standpoint of its positive potential 
operationalised through human security. From this perspective, the four hypothesised 
tensions are examined to track the divergence of the security-development nexus 
from this potential, and show how the integration of security and development is 
inhibited. 
 
Tensions in the Security-Development Nexus 
 
For external actors, adoption of the security-development nexus is expected to 
achieve a new and comprehensive approach. For example, Schnabel (2011: 44) 
points to their ‗mutually supportive coexistence‘. There have been numerous calls to 
integrate the two concepts into a comprehensive approach (see for example UN 
2004a). However, as noted earlier the nexus has been critiqued for its asymmetry, 
suggesting that either security or development dominates. The focus of critics on the 
asymmetry of the security-development nexus suggests that rather than a mutually 
supportive relationship, the linkage between security and development is uneasy – 
attempts at integration raise a series of conflicts and contradictions that are not easily 
resolved. 
 
In response, this research examines the relationship between security and 
development to determine what inhibits the integration of the two concepts. In their 
study on post-conflict reconstruction, Paris and Sisk (2009: 1) define tensions as 
‗competing (and sometimes contradictory) imperatives facing those who attempt to 
reconstitute effective and legitimate governmental structures in war-torn states‘. 
These competing imperatives become ‗vexing policy dilemmas – that is, multiple 
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imperatives where there are no obvious solutions‘ (Paris and Sisk 2007: 1). This 
research contends that the integration of security and development into a nexus is 
influenced by a series of tensions. 
 
Through a human security lens, hypotheses have been developed of four tensions 
that influence the integration of security and development. The integration of 
security and development into a nexus that promises emancipation relies on specific 
understandings of security and development. Conceptual tension, which arises from 
the different understandings of security and development, influences what is 
integrated with what and thus the type of nexus that emerges. Similarly, an 
emancipatory nexus relies on a particular understanding of the relationship between 
security and development – how they influence each other to achieve a particular 
outcome. The causal tension, which arises from different perspectives on how 
security and development are applied and the linkages between them, influences the 
form of integration between the two concepts. 
 
Even when there is a concerted effort to achieve an emancipatory nexus, the actors 
and institutions involved influence the balance between security and development. 
This institutional tension influences the extent of the integration between the two 
concepts. Although the security-development nexus is a new trend to ensure that 
post-conflict reconstruction becomes more effective and sustainable, this is driven by 
different motivations, from containing problems to enhancing the security and 
wellbeing of individuals. This motivational tension reveals the reasons why security 
and development are being integrated and thus the prioritisation of each concept 
within the nexus. 
 
Investigation of these four tensions explains the relationship between security and 
development within the nexus in order to understand why the implementation of the 
security-development nexus results in the outcomes outlined by critics. This section 
introduces the four hypothesised tensions. It outlines the parameters of each tension 
and how they are expected to influence the integration of security and development. 
How each tension will be analysed in the empirical chapters is also articulated, along 





The integration of security and development into a nexus that aligns with human 
security relies on a particular understanding of the two concepts. Shifts in the two 
concepts since the end of the Cold War suggest that they are becoming closely 
related and interconnected, making their integration into a comprehensive approach 
that aligns with human security appear to be a natural evolution. However, other 
understandings of security and development have also emerged. This section sets out 
the shifts in security and development, the divergent understandings of security and 
development and how this influences the security-development nexus. It then sets out 
how this tension is examined in the two case studies.  
 
Shifts in Security 
 
In response to the broader forms of insecurity that were recognised after the Cold 
War, security has been reconceptualised. Security has traditionally been understood 
in terms of state security. While this perspective gained prominence during the Cold 
War, the concept of security extends back much further. Wæver (2008) places the 
introduction of security in the first century. During this period security was ‗the 
absence of distress upon which a happy life depends‘ (Cicero 45BC, cited in Wæver 
2008: 101).  
 
From its first introduction until the early 1940s, security was seen as a public good, 
available to all. This changed when what is now considered the traditional view of 
state security gained credence in the 1940s. ‗To handle a long term geopolitical 
rivalry with the Soviet Union, the US needed a concept to express an effort with both 
military and non-military components and justify a policy above normal political 
vacillations‘ (Wæver 2008: 102). As a result, security shifted from a positive 
institution to a negative one, situated within a threat that states must respond to. This 
view of security was consolidated during the Cold War. 
 
The Cold War period was dominated by realist interpretations of security. Realists 
define security as ‗the absence of existential threats to the state emerging from 
another state‘ (Muller 2002: 369). The survival of the state and its sovereignty was 
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the priority during the Cold War period based on the perception that states existed 
within an anarchic international system with self-help the only avenue for recourse 
(Hettne 2010). The universally accepted belief that the two superpowers could 
destroy the world through their nuclear capacity powered this conception and 
provided a justification for the use of extreme measures. Buzan, Wæver and de 
Wilde (1998) interpreted the meaning of security as a threat to someone or 
something that has an inherent right to survive that justifies extraordinary measures 
appropriate for security threats only, such as secrecy, violence and conscription. 
Under this interpretation of security, labelling an incident a security issue 
depoliticises and adds urgency to the issue, giving states broad freedom to respond. 
 
The traditional understanding of security has had a strong influence on post-conflict 
reconstruction. During the Cold War, this understanding of security limited 
international engagement in conflict and post-conflict states to ceasefire monitoring 
in countries deemed important to superpower interests. The first phase of 
interventions after the Cold War were also defined by this perspective of security. 
They focused on building peace in negative terms – ending violence and preventing a 
relapse to war in order to limit the impact on international security. However, the end 
of the Cold War revealed the inadequacy of the dominant perspective on security. 
Traditional understandings of security did not consider the impact of insecurity on 
individuals and communities, making it inadequate in addressing the civilian 
casualties and displacement caused by internal wars. This perspective also neglected 
the role of non-state actors in internal wars. These shortfalls and the identification of 
new security challenges triggered debates on the reconceptualisation of security 
(Brauch 2008). 
 
The result was a new perspective on security that focused on the needs of 
individuals, which has been encapsulated by human security. Human security was 
put forward as a new paradigm of people-centred security that was in direct contrast 
to the state-centric focus taken during the Cold War. UNDP‘s (1994) initial 
conceptualisation highlighted seven areas of security, from economic to 
environmental, that needed to be considered by policymakers. However, the concept 
of human security has been heavily criticised. Critiques have primarily highlighted 
the lack of a clear definition and the vagueness of the concept (see for example 
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Khong 2001; Rogers 2002; Douzinas 2007; Duffield 2007; Jabri 2007; Chandler 
2008; Duffield 2010). Despite the critiques, Paris (2001: 88) acknowledges that the 
concept has brought together a ‗coalition of ―middle power‖ states, development 
agencies and NGOs – all of which seek to shift attention and resources away from 
conventional security issues and toward goals that have traditionally fallen under the 
rubric of international development‘. As a result, human security has become the 
driving force of many actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction. The focus on 
individual security and non-military strategies indicates a shift away from traditional 
understandings of security, creating space for the inclusion of development through 
the security-development nexus. 
 
Shifts in Development 
 
During this time, approaches to development have also shifted to focus increasingly 
on individual needs, becoming closely related to new conceptualisations of security. 
Development became a focus of the international community in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Initially a tool for the reconstruction of post-war Europe after the Second World 
War, the mandate of development quickly expanded. The 1950s and 1960s were 
marked by decolonisation, with many states in the developing world gaining their 
independence. The membership of the UN more than doubled between 1950 and 
1970, growing from 60 to 127. However, many of these new states lacked the 
infrastructure, capacity and resources to grow into advanced economies. Against this 
backdrop, development became a major preoccupation of economists, drawing on 
contemporary growth models, such as those put forth by Keynes (Ranis 2004). The 
primary focus of development in this early stage was economic growth and 
modernisation. 
 
By the 1970s, the economic approach to development was becoming recognised as 
inadequate as the results were not ‗trickling down‘ to the poor as predicted. This 
triggered a focus on the needs of individuals. A study by the International Labour 
Organisation in the 1970s found that economic growth and employment did not 
necessarily provide freedom from poverty, as many individuals were still unable to 
meet their basic needs (Deneulin 2009). A new approach was developed to ensure 
that the basic needs of all individuals in developing countries were met. Streeten 
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(1979), a major proponent of the basic needs approach, argued that the direct 
provision of basic needs has a more immediate impact on poverty than economic 
approaches that focus on raising incomes and productivity. While the basic needs 
approach aimed to bring developing countries above the poverty line by directly 
providing goods and services in health, nutrition and basic education, it did not 
attempt to develop self-sufficiency in these areas. ‗Some see the basic needs 
approach as the answer to the needs of world poverty, others as a plot by the rich 
countries to keep the poor in a constant position of inferiority‘ (Ghosh 1984: 4). 
Despite mixed perceptions of the underlying objectives and impact of the basic needs 
approach, it began a shift in development approaches away from economics towards 
a human-centred framework. 
 
In the late 1980s, Amartya Sen‘s capability approach emerged as another alternative 
to economic approaches to development. Building on advances made with the basic 
needs approach, Sen adds dimensions of capability and agency, shifting development 
closer to a human-centred paradigm. ‗The people have to be seen… as being actively 
involved – given an opportunity – in shaping their own destiny, and not just as 
passive recipients of the fruits of cunning development programs‘ (Sen 1999). 
Within the capabilities approach, ‗social arrangements should expand people‘s 
capabilities – their freedom to promote or achieve what they value doing and being‘ 
(Alkire and Deneulin 2009: 31). There are a number of criticisms of this approach; 
for instance it lacks a coherent list of important capabilities, comparing wellbeing is 
not that useful, and there is a high informational requirement to make comparisons 
(Clarke 2002). However, the capabilities approach brings empowerment and agency 
into development. This addition shifts development from a focus on humans as 
subjects to humans as agents. 
 
Human development consolidated the shift away from economic development. 
Human development promoted the idea that ‗development is not about economic 
performance alone, but most importantly about people and their wellbeing‘ (Jahan 
2002: 1). Human development gained prominence in 1990 with the publication of the 
first UNDP Human Development Report. UNDP defined human development as 
‗both the process of widening people‘s choices and the level of their achieved 
wellbeing‘ (UNDP 1990: 9). The report criticised the continued focus on 
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development economics in the World Bank‘s World Development Report as the 
‗excessive preoccupation with GNP growth and national income accounts has… 
supplanted a focus on ends by an obsession with the means‘ (UNDP 1990: 9).  
 
Since the inception of human development approaches, development has evolved to 
include new areas, from gender, trade, democracy and climate change with a strong 
focus on poverty alleviation (Alkire and Deneulin 2009). Development actors have 
also developed new programmes to achieve human development outcomes, such as 
through the Millennium Development Goals. While all of these shifts have been 
subject to intense debate and critique, which is beyond the scope of this research, it 
highlights a trajectory towards human-centred approaches. The emphasis on human-
centred approaches implies that the inclusion of development within the security-
development nexus will contribute to a shift towards a people-centred approach to 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
Resurgence of Traditional Understandings 
 
While these shifts align with human security, traditional understandings of security 
and development have resurfaced along the way. In the 1980s debt crisis, when 
several developing countries defaulted on their loans, and many more were 
struggling with their repayments, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) reverted to economic models of development. Structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs), which were a condition of debt relief, required extensive economic 
liberalisation (Stromquist 1999). These programmes had a negative effect on the 
majority of countries that implemented them, reversing the social improvements of 
the 1970s (Cornia et al. 1992; Reimers and Tiburcio 1993; Samoff 1994). 
Programmes of the World Bank and IMF now aim to incorporate human 
development elements, but principles of economic development remain important. 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Process (PRSP) is ‗country-driven‘ and requires 
broad participation of civil society (IMF 2003). In contrast to the ‗harshly imposed 
borrowing conditions‘ of the SAPs, the PRSP is ‗portrayed as ―partnerships‖ based 
on mutuality and trust‘ (Gould 2005: 1). However, Craig and Porter (2003: 53) note 
that underlying the human development principles, neoliberal principles remain. This 
approach suggests that some actors still understand development in economic terms. 
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Although security actors have increasingly begun to focus on individual security 
needs, state security fears remain present in the policymaking of donor governments. 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the US government returned to a 
realist paradigm to frame their security policy, with many other states following suit. 
Unprepared to address a non-state based enemy, the US National Security Council 
immediately began to develop plans to invade Iraq (Bergen 2011). Other countries 
were encouraged to join a coalition of the willing, with aid, arms sales, trade 
concessions and political patronage provided in return (BOND 2003). As with 
development, this approach to security points to understandings of security that are 
aligned to traditional, hard security perspectives rather than human-centred security. 
 
These different approaches to security and development indicate that security and 
development are not fixed concepts, but can be interpreted differently by different 
actors. This can limit the broadening of security to focus on emancipation. 
Conceptual tension arises from these differences in understandings of security and 
development. In their analysis of the security-development nexus, Stern and Ojendal 
(2010) outline varied understandings of security and development, arguing that it is 
difficult to create a ―nexus‖ from two contested concepts. There is ‗widespread 
discourse emerging as though there were broad agreement on both the content of 
these concepts and the consequences of creating policy that reflects a (certain) 
understanding of the ―nexus‖‘ (Stern and Ojendal 2010: 8). Similarly, Tschirgi et al. 
(2010) argue that the use of poorly defined concepts can result in ineffective action, 
widening the gap between policy and practice.  
 
While the understandings of security and development may not necessarily be 
contested, the lack of consensus creates a problem for the integration of security and 
development as it raises questions over exactly what is being merged with what.  
 
Investigation of the conceptual tension seeks to establish: 
 How external actors understand the concepts of security and development in 
relation to their initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and 
Bosnia 
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 What these understandings mean for the integration of security and 
development  
 
The referent object and locus of initiatives are two factors that change depending on 
how security and development are conceptualised. To identify the meaning attached 
to security and development, the referent object and locus of initiatives to address 
organised crime will be identified. The framework for this analysis will be set out 
below, with the empirical analysis explored in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Divergent Understandings of Security and Development 
 
Although security and development have both shifted towards human-centred 
approaches, the reality is much more complex. As new approaches have emerged, 
older approaches have retained their influence, resulting in overlapping and 
contradictory perspectives of security and development. Rothschild (1995) argues 
that security has extended in four ways: downwards from national to individual 
levels and upwards from the national to the global level to recognise a broader range 
of referent objects to be secured; horizontally to recognise many more security 
threats; and the range of actors responsible for providing security has expanded to 
account for these new areas.  
 
A similar analysis can be applied to development. Development has also shifted 
downwards from the national to individual level through human development. The 
recognition that development problems are not geographically isolated, as pressures 
such as climate change and economic decline are not contained within state borders 
has shifted development to be considered within a global context. The variables that 
impact on development have broadened to include migration, water, trade, culture, 
democracy, technology, human rights, globalisation, consumption, gender and 
participation. As a result, the actors tasked with providing development have 
expanded. As well as official governmental aid agencies, NGOs and 
intergovernmental agencies, the private sector is also increasingly participating in 
development (Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011).  
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Rather than a linear evolution, both security and development have broadened into 
many areas. Human security and human development approaches have continued to 
gain prominence. Although there are conflicting perspectives on human security, 
with a division between ‗freedom from fear‘ and ‗freedom from want‘, the main 
premise behind human security is the emphasis on people‘s security (Kaldor 2007). 
Similarly, human development also emphasises the wellbeing of people rather than 
economic performance (Jahan 2002). Drawing on Sen‘s capabilities approach, the 
aims of both human security and human development is to enable individuals to 
shape their future (Sen 1999). 
 
Despite the increasing focus on human security and human development, the practice 
of some actors continues to fit within a realist understanding on security and 
economic development approaches. Williams (2011b: 164) argues that development 
is directly informed by the ‗prevailing international order‘. Given the recent changes 
in international order, from the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the invasion of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of the BRICS, and the global financial crisis, 
development is in a state of flux (Williams and Harmon 2013). This argument can be 
applied to international politics more broadly, having implications for security policy 
also. For example, the terrorist attacks in September 2001 resulted in a rethinking of 
security policy by the US in particular, with the result that underdevelopment was 
considered a threat in the 2002 and 2004 National Security Strategy (National 
Security Council 2002; National Security Council 2004).  
 
Although the US National Security Strategy has included development as a key 
element, this is driven by concerns over the survival of the state and preservation of 
sovereignty. The 2002 US National Security Strategy recognised that ‗the events of 
September 11, 2001 have taught us that weak states like Afghanistan can pose as 
great a danger to our national interest as strong states‘ (National Security Council 
2002: 4). While this statement recognises underdevelopment as a threat to security, 
the security under threat is not that of the Afghan people, but of the US state. As 
such, development is being used as a strategy to ensure state security, an approach 




Similarly, while development has become increasingly framed in human 
development terms, neoliberal economic perspectives continue to influence some 
actors. The World Bank and IMF traditionally adhered to economic approaches. 
While their approach has since been modified to focus on poverty eradication and 
human development, some scholars argue that their practices continue to be informed 
by ‗sharp neoliberal economism‘ (Craig and Porter 2003: 53). As such, their 
practices still reflect economic approaches to development. 
 
While these perspectives can be considered opposite to human security and human 
development, with the focus on the state rather than individuals, there are blurred 
boundaries between them with new understandings of security and development 
emerging in between. Human security and human development depend on bottom-up 
approaches that directly engage with individuals to achieve human-centred 
outcomes. However, other approaches emphasise human-centred outcomes but 
address problems from the top-down. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
which seek to improve development outcomes for individuals employ top-down 
strategies that are implemented at the state level through strategies such as 
privatisation of public services (Bond 2006). Antrobus (2003) critiques the MDGs 
over their quantifiable indicators and their abstraction from the social, political and 
economic context. While the MDGs aim to improve conditions for individuals, they 
are indicative of an approach to development that fits in between human 
development, and neoliberal economism. 
 
Recent debates regarding resilience also assume a position between the two 
dominant approaches. Strategies to ensure resilience are focused at the individual or 
community level to enhance self-reliance to cope with security and development 
challenges. Chandler (2012b: 213) argues that ensuring resilience has the effect of 
‗facilitating or developing the self-securing agency... of those held to be the most 
vulnerable‘. While these strategies are implemented at the local level, they are 
designed to protect international security. As Duffield (2007: viii) argues ‗the 
benevolence with which development cloaks itself – its constant invocation of rights, 
freedom and the people – conceals a stubborn will to manage and contain disorder 




These four perspectives on security and development differ in their referent object. 
Buzan et al. (1998) define the referent object of security as the object identified as 
being existentially threatened with a legitimate claim to survival that justifies 
extraordinary measures. Although development does not address claims to survival, 
an analysis of the referent object still reveals the priorities of external actors, 
specifically what they seek to achieve and for whom. The moral claims of 
development can also be viewed as extraordinary measures as they are ‗actions 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure‘ (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Rather 
than being governed by the state, development often bypasses beneficiary 
governments or takes on state responsibilities. For example, Duffield and Waddell 
(2006) refer to NGOs tendering for contracts to run government departments in 
Afghanistan. 
 
For external actors addressing organised crime after conflict, there are a range of 
referent objects that reflect the perspectives on security and development discussed 
above. Human security and human development, as well as top-down, but human 
centred approaches focus on the sub-state level, identifying individuals, groups and 
people as the referent object. In contrast, realist and containment perspectives focus 
on the regime, state and international level as the referent object. Another layer of 
analysis is required to further distinguish between these different understandings. 
The locus of external initiatives, whether initiatives are implemented at the state or 
local level, distinguishes between top-down and bottom-up approaches, revealing the 
nuances in the different approaches (see Fig 1). 
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Figure 1 Understandings of security and development by referent object and 
locus 
 
The individual end of the spectrum of referent objects may refer to the promotion of 
agency and bottom-up processes to address organised crime, drawing on Sen‘s 
(1999) work on capabilities. Chandler (2012a: 116) notes that ‗the individualised 
understanding of development takes a rational-choice view of the individual, or an 
―agent-orientated view‖ in which development is about enabling individuals to make 
effective choices by increasing their capabilities‘. However, the focus on individuals 
does not necessarily imply agent-centred approaches. Sorenson and Soderbaum 
(2012) argue that the safety of individuals is often provided from above, and 
individual focused approaches may entail biometric techniques and racial profiling. 
 
While an individual referent object may be agent-centred, it requires initiatives 
directed at the local level to be agent oriented. The Human Security Study Group 
(2007: 4) contends that a bottom-up approach is necessary ‗to enable vulnerable 
communities to create the conditions for peace and stability themselves‘. The result, 
as set out in quadrant C (Fig 1), is a human security or human development approach 
that supports individuals. This aligns with an emancipatory approach to post-conflict 
reconstruction. While Sen (1999) recognises that the state has a supporting role in 
enabling individuals, initiatives implemented at the state level result in top-down 
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benevolence (quadrant A). Liberal peacebuilding literature argues that top-down 
approaches ‗provide the answers on how to build peace before the questions have 
even been asked about how it constitutes a local, more locally sustainable, fitting 
form of peace‘ (Richmond 2010: 5). As a result, initiatives are imposed even though 
they seek positive outcomes for individuals (Kaldor and Salmon 2006). 
 
Further along the spectrum, groups include self-organised social, economic or 
political units such as interest groups, ethnic groups, tribes, networks or villages 
(Bueger and Vennesson 2009). ‗People‘ considers the population as a whole. These 
two categories appear in line with a human-centred approach. Proponents of human 
security regularly use ‗individuals‘ and ‗people‘ interchangeably when discussing 
human-centred approaches (see for example Haq 1994; Newman 2001). However, 
there is a risk that individuals become disembodied, stripped of their political and 
social life, with their agency reduced to ‗bare life‘ (Agamben 1998). When 
individuals are removed from their social and political interests and grouped 
together, they cannot be empowered to create the necessary conditions themselves. 
Shani (2011: 65) argues that grouping peoples together ‗divests the individual of 
dignity and identity – rendering her/him ―mute and absolutely alone‖‘. The result is a 
top-down approach as it seeks to improve the conditions for the group as a whole, 
without acknowledging their different interests. 
 
The other end of the spectrum shifts away from human-centred approaches. The 
regime as referent object seeks to maintain current government control (Bueger and 
Vennesson 2009). A state centred referent object aims to achieve stability within a 
specific territory. Concerns over the transnational effects of organised crime, and its 
impact on security and development globally focuses on the international level as the 
referent object.  
 
There is also variability in the locus of initiatives at this end of the spectrum. Realist 
understandings of security argue that a focus on the state ensures benefits for its 
people. ‗The state, as the only legitimate representative of the collective will of the 
―people‖ it controls, is empowered through the doctrine of national security to define 
and defend the long-term, ―national interest‖ of its people‘ (Shani 2011: 56). 
However, Luckham (2007: 682) argues that ‗the security of the state does not 
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necessarily ensure the security of citizens‘. As such, initiatives are top-down and 
seek to protect the regime, state or international level (quadrant B). This aligns with 
traditional security discourse, where internationals become engaged to ‗fix‘ a 
problem and rapidly withdraw. This is reminiscent of economic development 
approaches, such as the IMF‘s Structural Adjustment Programmes and hard security 
approaches. 
 
Duffield (2005) argues that hard security approaches have increasingly shifted to 
focus on securing populations. As a result, initiatives that seek to address the state-
international referent object can also be implemented at the local level (quadrant D). 
Programmes that seek to foster resilience through local level capacity building 
adhere to this perspective. However, the primary aim of local resilience to insecurity 
and underdevelopment is to contain problems locally to prevent international 
spillover rather than enhancing security and development at the local level (Duffield 
2005). As such, these approaches are not human centred despite implementation at 
the local level. 
 
This analysis highlights four different understandings of security and development, 
as set out in Figure 1: 
 Quadrant A: Top down benevolence: The referent object is the individual/ 
people end of the spectrum. As such, initiatives to address organised crime 
seek outcomes for individuals. However, the locus of these initiatives is at the 
state level, resulting in a top-down approach. 
 Quadrant B: Hard Security/ Economic Development: With the referent object 
at the state/ international level and the locus of initiatives at the state level, 
the focus of initiatives to address organised crime is to support state and/or 
international interests through a top-down approach. 
 Quadrant C: Human Security/ Human Development: With a referent object at 
the individual/ people level and the locus of initiatives at the local level, this 
category is aligned with the promise of emancipation. Initiatives to address 
organised crime support individual needs through a bottom-up approach. 
 Quadrant D: Containment: Although the locus of initiatives is at the local 
level, the referent object is the state/ international level. As such, initiatives to 
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address organised crime seek to contain problems at the local level, 
developing local capacity to limit the threat organised crime poses to the state 
and international level. 
 
These categories will be used to examine how external actors addressing organised 
crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia understand security and development and assess 




As noted earlier, proponents of the security-development nexus regularly assert that 
security and development are ‗intrinsically linked‘ or that ‗there will be no security 
without development and no development without security‘. Many actors convey the 
relationship between security and development as uncontested. For example, Hilary 
Benn, UK Secretary of State for Development between 2003 and 2007, noted that 
‗development without security is impossible; security without development is only 
temporary‘ (cited in Waddell 2006: 534). Similarly, the EU has acknowledged that 
‗there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and that 
without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace‘ (EU 
2007). These and similar statements have become so widespread that they are 
referred to as a mantra. They present the relationship between security and 
development as common sense and beyond debate. However, the practice of external 
actors points to different understandings of the cause and effect between security and 
development. 
 
The policy mantra that security and development are ‗intrinsically linked‘ points to a 
circular causal relationship where the achievement of security has a direct effect on 
development and vice versa. This is recognised as a ‗virtuous‘ relationship, where 
success in one area has a direct positive influence on the other: ‗with high levels of 
security leading to development and development further promoting security‘ 
(Stewart 2004: 19). This understanding justifies the integration of security and 
development into a nexus and suggests a positive relationship, where both 
development and security needs are addressed. Stewart (2004b: 2) argues that in this 
context ‗policies towards security may become one part of development policy 
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because in so far as they enhance security, they will contribute to development; and 
policies towards development may become part of security policies because 
enhanced development increases security‘.  
 
Arguments suggesting a ‗virtuous cycle‘ have been contested however. Stewart 
herself (2004: 19) acknowledges that this cycle ‗can more readily be broken because 
it is easy to have relatively high levels of security without necessarily experiencing 
economic growth, or to have high levels of security and economic growth, but not 
inclusive growth so the potential for conflict remains‘. Similarly, Denney (2011) 
finds that while there is evidence to support a negative correlation between security 
and development, it is much more difficult to prove a positive causal relationship. 
Denney (2011: 291) contends that ‗there may be no natural, self-fulfilling correlation 
between security and development and that forging this link is an uphill struggle‘. 
 
Attempts to comprehend the relationship between conflict and development have 
resulted in varied, and often conflicting arguments on the causal relationship between 
security and development. In the World Bank report Breaking the Conflict Trap, 
Collier et al. (2003) have identified a two-way relationship between development and 
the incidence of civil war: ‗war retards development, but conversely, development 
retards war‘ (Collier et al. 2003: 1). Civil war has been acknowledged as detrimental 
to development, being labelled ‗development in reverse‘ (Collier et al. 2003: ix). The 
report goes on to explore the social and economic costs of war. However, 
development is also recognised as a strategy that can mitigate and prevent civil war. 
‗Development can be an effective instrument for conflict prevention... civil war thus 
reflects not just a problem for development, but a problem of development‘ (Collier 
et al. 2003: ix). 
 
While it is now well established that violent conflicts have a negative impact on 
development, the converse argument has also been made, that underdevelopment and 
poverty increases the risk of insecurity. Schnabel and Farr (2011: 3) argue that 
‗repeated cycles of political and criminal violence cause human misery and disrupt 
development. Additionally low levels of human development can contribute to 
instability and conflict‘. Some scholars have also highlighted the role of misplaced 
development in increasing insecurity. Krause and Jutersonke (2005) argue that 
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development programmes in Rwanda, which were viewed as successful, actually 
entrenched social cleavages and contributed to genocide. 
 
These relationships have been further developed by Menkhaus (2004). In contrast to 
the ‗virtuous cycle‘, Menkhaus outlines the ‗vicious circle‘ of the security-
development nexus in Somalia. ‗Endemic insecurity blocks progress in economic 
rehabilitation and recovery. The lack of employment opportunities in turn impedes 
demobilisation and reinforces criminality and armed conflict‘ (Menkhaus 2004: 149-
150). Menkhaus (2004) argues that the ‗vicious circle‘ metaphor is compelling 
because it explains the intractability of civil war, it acknowledges the complexity and 
mutually reinforcing causes of conflict and underdevelopment, and it fits in with 
political economy explanations of protracted conflict. 
 
Similarly, Stewart (2004b) contends there is a three-way connection between 
security and development: security/insecurity impacts on wellbeing; insecurity 
affects development and economic growth; and development affects security. These 
three connections primarily focus on the ‗vicious‘ cycle, in that insecurity 
undermines development, economic growth and wellbeing, and underdevelopment 
contributes to insecurity. In particular, Stewart (2004) addresses the impact of 
horizontal inequalities in driving insecurity. However, as noted above, Stewart 
(2004) also highlights the potential for a ‗virtuous‘ cycle. 
 
The policy mantra that ‗there will be no security without development and no 
development without security‘ obscures the lack of clarity on the causal relationship 
between security and development. However, external actors expect that the security-
development nexus adheres to the ‗virtuous‘ cycle. This assumes a particular causal 
relationship, and conceals the tension in how the two concepts interact. As Waddell 
(2006: 531) argues ‗understanding the linkages between security and development 
must involve more than simply asserting that either one necessarily encompasses, 
requires or reinforces the other‘.  
 
The lack of clarity on how security and development are connected is heightened 
when they are applied to a particular problem such as organised crime. The policy of 
external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia reveals three 
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different ways that the concepts are related to organised crime: security and 
development approaches are necessary to address organised crime; organised crime 
undermines security and development; and insecurity and underdevelopment are 
connected to a rise in organised crime. These perspectives embrace both the ‗vicious‘ 
and ‗virtuous‘ cycles of security and development. However, they create different 
interactions between security and development. As a result, the way that security and 
development influence each other remains unclear. 
 
Two factors influence how the two concepts are integrated – how each concept is 
applied by external actors, and how the linkage between the two concepts is 
understood. 
 
Examination of the causal tension seeks to determine: 
 How do external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and 
Bosnia apply security and development? 
 How is the linkage between security and development understood by external 
actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia? 
 What does this mean for the integration of security and development into a 
nexus? 
 
The following sections outline the framework for this analysis, exploring the two 
factors. This tension is then examined in relation to the two case studies in chapters 3 
and 4. 
 
The Application of Security and Development 
 
Security and development can be applied in different ways. Security and 
development can be considered as approaches or processes to achieve a beneficial 
end state, in this case the absence or reduction of organised crime. However, security 
and development may also refer to an end state, or the goal of external engagement. 
Tschirgi (2010b: 3) sums up this distinction as ‗between security and development as 
societal goals and as policies to achieve these goals‘. These different applications 
affect whether they are considered a cause or effect, with consequences for how the 
two concepts influence each other. 
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The argument that if security and development were in place, it would be more 
difficult for organised crime to take root, refers to security and development as an 
end state or condition, as does the argument that addressing organised crime will 
enhance security and development in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. In contrast, the 
argument that security and development approaches are necessary to address 
organised crime refers to security and development as processes. Although subtle, 
these differences influence whether organised crime is seen as a barrier to achieving 
security and development, or security and development are strategies to prevent and 
address organised crime. As such, the different applications have implications for 
how the two concepts are integrated, with an influence on the causal relationship 
between the two concepts.  
 
Traditionally, security and development have been applied in different ways. 
Security has referred to an end state where the referent object, whether individuals, 
the state, or international level, is secure. Luckham (1994: 683) refers to security as 
‗an abstract noun, describing a desirable existential state‘. The focus on the end state 
is often connected to exit strategies, as security actors have traditionally been 
deployed to achieve certain objectives and withdraw. What that end state is can 
differ, from the absence of a particular threat, to capacity to solve problems, to 
human security (Baker and Weller 1998). While the changing global order has raised 
questions over what security is, whose security is at stake, how and from what threat, 
the application remains the same – achieving a desirable end state. This is evident in 
how security is applied in approaches to organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. 
 
In contrast to security, the application of development has historically been more 
variable. Radical perspectives pose development as a grand strategy of social 
transformation. These perspectives stem from Sen‘s (1999) arguments that 
development is not about specific goals, but the provision of freedoms. Leal (2007: 
546) contends that the primary goal of development is ‗not to reform institutional 
development practice, but to transform society‘. Cornwall (2007) also views 
development as a transformative process, informed by moral imperatives of what is 
possible. Rather than defining a particular end goal, these applications of 
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development provide space for bottom-up engagement to define priorities and 
processes. 
 
However, development has also been defined in terms of specific goals to be 
achieved. From the early attempts at modernisation, to the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes of the 1980s, to the current focus on Millennium Development Goals, 
development has attempted to achieve a particular end state. Such an approach is 
necessarily top-down, as development is expressed in terms of predefined goals 
(Penska 2013). 
 
Viewing security and development as a process aligns with the promise of 
emancipation. Engaging with the two concepts as processes identifies steps to 
address the needs of the referent object, acknowledging that this is not a static goal. 
For example, at an early stage of international engagement, if a community is asked 
what would make them secure and enhance their wellbeing, they identify X. Before 
X is achieved, they realise that Y would be beneficial. But this may not have been 
foreseeable from the initial standpoint, and the first stage was required to make Y an 
option. Such a perspective identifies concerns in partnership with those directly 
affected, suggesting a people-centred approach that engages with the full range of 
concerns. In contrast, understanding security and development as an end state or 
condition suggests that it is an achievable, identifiable goal. Such a perspective 
results in a top-down approach, as there is no need to work in partnership with local 
actors to determine what needs to be achieved and how.  
 
These different applications influence the causal relationship between security and 
development. As a process, security and development would be considered a cause 
contributing to an end state. In contrast, as an end state of external involvement, 
security and development become the effect. Applying the concepts in the same way 
may indicate a strong relationship between the concepts where they are mutually 
constitutive. However, they may remain separate. Different applications complicate 
the relationship. If one is understood as an approach or process, while the other is an 
end state or condition, this could suggest a sequential relationship rather than one 
that is mutually constitutive. As such, the application of security and development 
has implications for how security and development influence each other. The 
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empirical analysis will identify how security and development are applied within 
initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. 
 
The Linkages between Security and Development 
 
The causal tension is also evident in how external actors perceive the linkages 
between security and development. Although it is recognised that the two concepts 
are interconnected, these linkages can be placed into two categories, separate or 
integrated. As separate factors, both security and development are necessary to 
address organised crime. However, this linkage does not consider security and 
development to be dependent on each other. From this perspective there is no causal 
relationship between security and development. They are both important, but require 
separate processes and will have separate outcomes. In contrast, some external actors 
perceive the linkage between security and development to be integrated. This implies 
a deeper relationship where one concept depends on the other in a sequential 
relationship. Alternatively, the integration of security and development may be 
interdependent, where both concepts need to be implemented simultaneously or there 
will be adverse consequences for both security and development. 
 
In their review of the literature pertaining to the security-development nexus, Spear 
and Williams (2012) have identified additional categories to describe the linkages 
between security and development. Security and development can be defined in 
either-or terms (zero-sum) (Spear and Williams 2012). However, as this research 
engages with actors that are working within the framework of the security-
development nexus, it is unlikely that this category will apply in relation to initiatives 
to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. Integration is further broken 
down. While Spear and Williams (2012) recognise the sequential approach to the 
security-development nexus, they add a new category, hierarchical, where 
development is employed to achieve security outcomes. As well as recognising a 
mutually reinforcing relationship, Spear and Williams (2012) also contend that 
security and development may be conceived as synonymous, where they entail the 
same thing: ‗ensuring that the referent object can pursue its cherished values 
effectively‘. Other categories also engage with specific contexts. Security and 
development may be selectively co-constitutive, where they are interconnected in 
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complex and diverse ways, or sui generis, where the relationship is always context 
dependent.  
 
These categories establish a spectrum from separate to integrated linkages (see Fig. 
2). While Spear and Williams (2012) consider sequential, hierarchical, simultaneous 
and synonymous linkages as integrated, the level of integration varies. For example, 
a sequential linkage does not imply integration. Security is believed to make space 
for development. While this points to a connection between the two, they remain 
separate. These categories establish an analytical framework that will be used to 
understand how external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and 
Bosnia perceive the linkages between security and development, and what this means 


















Different actors and institutions have traditionally informed security and 
development approaches. Through the security-development nexus, attempts have 
been made to develop linkages between institutions associated with development and 


































governments have created new joined up mechanisms that bring different elements 
of government together. However, Kent (2007: 129) argues that the relationship 
between security and development aspects of government remains difficult as ‗the 
established organisational procedures and perspectives from one institution do not 
readily mix with those of others‘. For example, the UK government established 
Conflict Prevention Pools, bringing together representatives of the Ministry of 
Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DfID to share their expertise on 
conflict and post-conflict countries. However, there were difficulties in bringing the 
different bodies together. ‗Though the cabinet officials expressed their will, they did 
not ultimately provide the structures or incentives that would facilitate the 
modification of organisational behaviour, patterns or attitudes‘ (Kent 2007: 133).  
 
While the Conflict Prevention Pools may reach a compromise that satisfies all three 
bodies, this is difficult to translate into practice. Members of the Conflict Prevention 
Pools have reported distrust from their own departments. Kent (2007: 133) noted that 
one official involved in a ‗joined-up‘ government approach on Sudan complained 
that membership in that unit ‗meant they individually were ostracized by their own 
departments, ―since they could no longer be trusted‖‘. 
 
While external actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction have been eager to 
merge security and development, the interface between the two areas remains 
problematic. Security and development actors have been informed by specific 
institutional drivers - they have emerged from different institutional architecture, 
they understand problems in different ways and thus their approach to problems 
differs. While the adoption of the security-development nexus seeks to bring the two 
areas together, there is a risk that these institutional differences will continue to 
influence the practices of external actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction, 
affecting the balance between security and development and the extent of their 
integration. 
 
Institutions are ‗organised, established procedures‘; they are ‗frameworks of 
programs or rules enabling identities and activity scripts for such identities‘ 
(Jepperson 1991: 143, 146). As such, institutions are self-reproducing to the point 
that they become taken for granted (Greenwood et al. 2008). For security and 
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development approaches particular practices have become associated with their 
institutional identity. These institutional underpinnings influence how the security-
development nexus is implemented. As Przeworski (2004: 527) argues ‗―institutions 
matter‖: they influence norms, beliefs and actions, therefore they shape outcomes‘. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 340-341) argue that these norms are nothing more than 
‗powerful myths‘, yet many organisations adopt them even when conformity 
‗conflicts sharply with efficiency criteria‘.  
 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983: 22) argue that organisations can be viewed as ‗captives of 
the institutional environment in which they exist‘. As a result, it is difficult for 
external actors to move beyond their institutional underpinnings. Numerous 
governments have created bodies to integrate security and development elements of 
post-conflict reconstruction. From the UK‘s Conflict Prevention Pools to the EU‘s 
Instrument for Stability, these mechanisms seek to combine security and 
development practices into a new and comprehensive approach. However, there is a 
risk that security and development practices will ‗speak past each other‘ (Spear and 
Williams 2012: 10), with practices continuing to adhere to either security or 
development rather than integrating the two into a genuine nexus.  
 
This suggests that the institutional underpinnings of security and development may 
continue to influence practices even when external actors seek to integrate the two 
through the security-development nexus.  
 
Analysis of the institutional tension seeks to determine: 
 Whether and how the institutional underpinnings of security and development 
influence initiatives to address organised crime 
 How these institutional underpinnings affect the integration of security and 
development in a nexus 
 
Analysis of the institutional tension will engage with ideal types of security and 
development to determine whether the institutional underpinnings adhere to security 
or development, or whether external actors have integrated the two into a new 
approach. Three areas will be analysed – the institutional architecture of external 
actors, how they understand organised crime and their approach to organised crime. 
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The framework for this analysis will be set out below, followed by empirical analysis 
based on the two case studies in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Ideal Type Analysis 
 
The practices of external actors addressing organised crime are compared to ideal 
types of security and development approaches. This ideal type analysis determines 
whether the institutional underpinnings of external actors continue to align with 
security or development approaches, or whether they have integrated the two. 
Swedberg and Agevall (2012: 19) describe an ideal type as ‗an attempt to capture 
what is essential about a social phenomenon through an analytical exaggeration of 
some of its aspects‘. As such, they provide a tool to identify whether practices adhere 
to security or development approaches, or a new and integrated approach. 
 
As outlined in the discussion on the conceptual tension, there are multiple 
interpretations of security and development. As a result, it is necessary to construct a 
specific ideal type. As this research is situated within a shift away from traditional 
security approaches towards emancipation, it takes security and development at their 
most different to determine whether the adoption of the security-development nexus 
has influenced the practices of external actors. Drawing on the framework to 
examine the conceptual tension, the ideal type of security is linked to quadrant B: 
hard security, with the state as the referent object and a locus at the state level. This 
ideal type aligns with traditional approaches to organised crime, which have adopted 
a hard security approach. For example, US agencies such as the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) and the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs (INL) are heavily militarised. As Carrier and Klantschnig (2011: 3) argue 
‗the USA has certainly been a prime mover in global drug policy, pushing an agenda 
of prohibition and harsh supply-reduction measures that in their militarised form 
truly resemble a war‘. In contrast, the ideal type of development is linked to quadrant 
C: human development, with the referent object at the individual/ people level, and a 
locus at the local level. This ideal type aligns with emancipation as it supports 
individual needs through a bottom-up approach. 
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Defining a specific ideal type of security and development based on a theoretical 
understanding of the concept ensures the validity of ideal type analysis (Gerhardt 
1994). The final step to ensure the validity of analysis engages with the elements to 
be analysed. In line with Gerhardt‘s approach ‗the ideal type notion contains only the 
elements provided to be indispensable‘ (Gerhardt 1994: 88). The analysis addresses 
those elements that reveal insights on the institutional underpinnings of UNIPSIL, 
UNODC and EUPM. This includes their institutional architecture, how they 
understand organised crime and how they approach organised crime. How the ideal 
types frame these three factors is outlined in the following section.    
 
Institutional Architecture 
The institutional architecture of security and development actors differs as they are 
influenced by different contributors and donors. External actors engaged in post-
conflict reconstruction do not exist in a vacuum. The inception and creation of 
initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia were decided upon 
and planned in donor countries before the missions were deployed. These actors in 
headquarter locations played a key role in setting the mandate and objectives of the 
initiatives to address organised crime. As such, the background of these actors, 
whether they come from a security or development perspective, influences the 
approach of actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia.  
 
Donors also influence the institutional architecture of external actors addressing 
organised crime. Donors often overlap with contributors. However, they play an 
ongoing role throughout the initiative and funding may be directed to activities 
deemed to be the most important by donors. As such, their background has a 
significant influence on the priority given to security and development elements. 
Analysis of the contributors and donors of external actors addressing organised crime 
in Sierra Leone and Bosnia will develop an understanding of the institutional 
architecture underpinning their engagement – whether it is security or development 
focused. 
 
From the security ideal type aligned with quadrant B, the primary contributor to post-
conflict reconstruction is the state. The security ideal type is designed to achieve the 
objectives of government ministries or departments, which maintain direction and 
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control. As a result, funding is also channelled through the state. This ensures that 
the donor retains some influence over the objectives of the programme. Carrier and 
Klantschnig (2012) assert that UNODC‘s reliance on law enforcement programmes 
is a result of the key priorities of its major donors – the US, Sweden and Japan. As 
such, the security ideal type is influenced by state priorities. 
 
In contrast, the development ideal type is independent. The development ideal type 
continues to be guided by the humanitarian principles set forth by the Red Cross, 
such as independence, humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Neutrality has become 
less important; particularly as advocacy and issues related to justice and human 
rights have become a core feature of development engagement. The development 
ideal type is independent of governments in both their home and host countries. As 
such, the key contributors to the organisation‘s strategy and direction are internal, 
including the board of directors and staff. Local partners also influence the objectives 
of the development ideal type.  
 
Funding for the development ideal type comes from a variety of sources. The 
development ideal type receives grants from government development agencies, 
regional organisations such as the European Union and the UN. These grants may be 
for specific projects or operational funding to support the organisation. Public 
donations, either through regular giving or appeals, also provide substantial funding. 
The diverse funding sources add to the independence of the development ideal type. 
While they are accountable to donors, whether individuals or governments, 
objectives are set by the organisation rather than donors.  
 
Understanding of Organised Crime 
Security and development actors also have a different understanding of problems. 
How problems are understood influences how they are addressed by external actors. 
Analysis will focus on how organised crime is understood and the language adopted 
by external actors to discuss organised crime, as this reveals how external actors are 
likely to address it. The language adopted to discuss the programme and organised 
crime also reveals the position of external actors. Buzan et al (1998: 46) argue that ‗a 
speech act is not only linguistic; it is also social and is dependent on the social 
position of the enunciator and thus in a wider sense is inscribed in a social field‘. As 
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such, these factors are analysed to determine how external actors understand 
problems. 
 
For the security ideal type, organised crime is understood as a threat to the donor 
country. This includes security threats posed by organised crime networks, such as 
extortion, kidnapping and violence, plus the low level crime and violence associated 
with the demand side of organised crime. As such, initiatives to address organised 
crime focus on the elements that pose the greatest threat to donors. Organised crime 
is treated as ‗a political actor to be contained through reactive bargaining and 
coercion‘ (Cockayne 2011: 5).   
 
The language employed by the security ideal type also reflects how organised crime 
is understood. The language of the security ideal type is technical and task oriented, 
referring to a situation that needs to be addressed before the organisation can 
withdraw. Terms such as interdiction, eradication and demand reduction reinforce 
the view of organised crime as a threat as they refer to specific goals and associated 
responses that are understood by all personnel. The technical nature of the 
terminology removes the human element of approaches to organised crime and 
focuses solely on the objectives of the operation. The technical language also 
distances security engagement from local civilians, invoking a requirement for 
experts. Security language heightens the urgency of a situation. A security speech act 
designates ‗an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and 
the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience‘ (Buzan et al. 1998: 27). 
Donors often respond to such language by prioritising security.  
 
The development ideal type understands organised crime in terms of its impact on 
individuals and communities. USAID (2013: 3) notes that organised crime ‗threatens 
political, economic and social development: it can foster corruption and violence, 
undermine rule of law and good governance, jeopardise economic growth and pose 
potential public health risks‘. As such, the focus is on the affect that organised crime 
has on affected countries and their population. This influences the activities 
development actors engage in, as they seek to address the underlying factors that 
support the growth of organised crime, such as poverty, unemployment and weak 
institutional capacity. However, they also seek to directly address the impact of 
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organised crime through the treatment of drug users and raising awareness of the 
dangers of organised crime. As such, organised crime is treated as ‗a structural factor 
that should be addressed through structural transformation‘ (Cockayne 2011: 5). 
 
As a result, the language of the development ideal type focuses on the agency of 
intended beneficiaries. The development ideal type seeks to ‗work with‘ 
beneficiaries rather than do things for them. As such, the language is empowering 
and positive. Cornwall (2007: 471) contends that ‗the language of development 
defines worlds-in-the-making, animating and justifying intervention in current 
worlds with fulsome promises of the possible‘. Development language places itself 
as virtuous, moral and above criticism. For example, Toye (2007: 505) argues in 
relation to poverty reduction that it ‗has a luminous obviousness to it, defying mere 
mortals to challenge its status as a moral imperative‘. The development ideal type 
also has a tendency to employ technical language to carve out a role for itself. 
However, in contrast to the technical language of security actors, it remains focused 
on people-centred objectives. 
 
Approach to Organised Crime 
Security and development actors have also traditionally had a different approach to 
problems. Generally, security actors have sought to neutralise threats, while 
development actors have engaged in long-term strategies of social transformation. 
The approach to problems is intertwined with the structure of the organisation. 
Directly addressing a threat goes hand in hand with a hierarchical structure with a 
clear chain of command, whereas a focus on transformation is compatible with a 
collaborative approach. Security and development actors have also traditionally 
worked in partnership with different actors to achieve their aims, with benefits 
accruing to different referent objects. As such, analysis examines the approach of 
external actors, their structure, who they work with and who they seek to benefit. 
 
The aim of the security ideal type is to achieve the designated objectives and 
withdraw. Operations are conducted in the most efficient way to neutralise the threat, 
often stopping the flow of illicit goods at its source. The approach is top-down, 
following directives issued at headquarters. While the security ideal type often works 
with local law enforcement in the country of deployment to build their capacity, this 
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is rarely in partnership due to fears of corruption. Adhering to a militaristic approach, 
the personnel of the security ideal type are armed and trained to use force if 
necessary. 
 
This approach is supported by a hierarchical structure. Guidance and directives are 
issued by government ministries and contributing organisations with frontline 
personnel following orders. There is a clear chain of command from the strategic, 
headquarter level, to those carrying out initiatives. Objectives are pursued through 
‗operations‘ with clearly defined aims and activities. These objectives are carried out 
in partnership with actors at the state level to enhance state institutions. 
 
The approach of the development ideal type is determined through internal 
consultation and external analysis. Programmes respond to the situation on the basis 
of advice from partners rather than strategies developed at headquarters. The 
development ideal type works in partnership with local organisations, supporting 
them to make change. As such, the approach is bottom-up and context specific. 
Decision-making within the development ideal type is collaborative, involving the 
board and staff members. The development ideal type has offices in many countries, 
which results in long-term engagement and embedded staff, many of whom are local. 
The experiences of ground staff are incorporated into strategy and programming. 
There is also a strong emphasis on partnership with local organisations. As the 
development ideal type is based in countries for long periods, plans, strategies and 
relationships are long-term and focus on a range of issues that change over time 
depending on the country context. The development ideal type works at the local 
level in partnership with civil society and community-based organisations to ensure 




Figure 3 Ideal Types of Security and Development 
 
Figure 3 outlines the three factors of analysis across the ideal types, which are 
understood as a spectrum from hard security approaches, to bottom-up development, 
in line with the quadrants set out in the discussion on the conceptual tension. Of 
course, approaches to security and development exist across this spectrum. However, 
the ideal types are a useful tool to establish whether the institutional underpinnings 
of external actors addressing organised crime adhere to security or development, or 
whether they have integrated the two into a new and comprehensive approach. 
Analysis also draws out whether particular institutional underpinnings are a barrier to 




Although donors, policymakers and practitioners have enthusiastically adopted the 
security-development nexus as a new trend to enhance the effectiveness and 
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sustainability of post-conflict reconstruction, this is driven by different motives. 
From a critical security studies perspective, it can be assumed that the adoption of 
the security-development nexus will refocus attention on individual security and 
human development. However, the motivational drivers of donor governments may 
still be framed by concerns over their own economic and state security. As such, 
donor governments can use the security-development nexus in self-interest. This 
creates a tension in the security-development nexus, as external actors can implement 
initiatives according to human security and emancipatory principles, while being 
driven by motives based on state and economic security. The motivational tension 
influences why security and development are being integrated and the prioritisation 
of each concept within the nexus. 
 
Proponents of human security have connected the human security of individuals in 
conflict-affected countries to the human security of individuals in donor countries 
(Kaldor 2009). The Barcelona report of the Study Group on Europe‘s Security 
Capabilities called for ‗enlightened self-interest‘, as ‗Europeans cannot be secure 
while others in the world live in severe insecurity‘ (Human Security Study Group 
2004: 10). The Madrid report of the Human Security Study Group (2007) argues that 
human security augments national security. Similarly, Axworthy (2004) argues that 
human security and national security are two sides of the same coin. However, this 
argumentation does not align with the emancipatory view of human security. With 
the continued interest of states in their own security and economic growth, the needs 
of individuals in conflict-affected states are likely to take second place. 
 
Rather than security challenges such as internal wars, failed states, terrorism and 
crime becoming a priority because of their impact on civilians, the interest of many 
donors is derived from the threat they pose to international security. As Duffield 
(2007: 1) has argued, underdevelopment is now seen as dangerous as its effects are 
not contained by borders, but have the potential to ‗inundate and destabilise Western 
society‘. Even when international involvement is connected to human security, there 
is a risk that external actors will withdraw once the threat to international security is 
addressed, rather than pursuing the long-term goal of human security. 
 
Analysis of the motivational tension seeks to establish: 
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 Why organised crime is a priority in the two case studies and for whom 
 Whose priorities are dominant  
 How development is included and for what purpose 
 What these factors reveal about the integration of security and development 
 
Building on the analysis of the referent object in relation to the conceptual tension, a 
spectrum of motivations can be identified, extending from individual needs to 
international security concerns. Rather than just focusing on what external actors seek 
to achieve however, this tension examines the prioritisation of security and 
development within the nexus and what this means for their integration. The different 
perspectives on motivations are outlined in the next section, before being used to 
analyse the drivers of external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and 
Bosnia in chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Engagement to What End? 
 
There are varying arguments on the drivers behind the adoption of the security-
development nexus. The most prominent claim emerges from the critics of the nexus, 
specifically proponents of the securitisation of development argument. This 
perspective stems from the understanding that underdevelopment is dangerous. For 
example, Duffield (2001) argues that the civil wars that erupted after the Cold War 
ended identified poverty and underdevelopment as security threats. This 
understanding has emerged from concerns about the inability of weak and 
underdeveloped states to control security problems such as terrorism and organised 
crime as they often have weak law enforcement and poorly guarded borders raised 
by scholars such as Fukuyama (2004). In this context, the security-development 
nexus seeks to address poverty and underdevelopment to achieve Western security 
interests. While a comprehensive approach that addresses the underlying factors of 
insecurity, such as poverty and unemployment, is valuable, the preference is for a 
minimal approach that seeks to contain problems within the developing world before 
they affect international security (see for example Duffield 2007).  
 
Governments and international organisations have driven these concerns, particularly 
after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. In 2004, Kofi Annan recognised that 
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‗chaos can no longer be contained by frontiers. It tends to spread, whether in the form 
of refugee flows, terrorism or illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons or even human 
beings‘ (Annan 2004: A20). As such, the UN notes the importance of development in 
protecting against these threats.  
Development has to be the first line of defence for a collective security 
system that takes prevention seriously. Combating poverty will not only 
save millions of lives, but will also strengthen states capacities to combat 
terrorism, organised crime and proliferation. Development makes everyone 
more secure (UN 2004a: 2). 
 
The argument that weak states are breeding grounds for security threats such as 
terrorism and organised crime has been challenged. Newman (2007) in particular 
argues that terrorist groups emerge from strong stable states as well as weak states, 
and many different government systems, from authoritarian to democratic. Moreover, 
Newman (2007: 464) notes that most weak states are not a base for terrorist groups: 
‗most of the ―weakest‖ and poorest African states, for example, are not associated 
with terrorism, whereas more relatively stable and prosperous states in the Middle 
East clearly are‘. However, development is increasingly posed as a strategy to 
address security threats. For example, the 2005 annual report of Denmark‘s 
development agency, DANIDA, states that ‗development assistance is useful, if 
necessary for our own security‘ (DANIDA 2005: 15). Scholars have also taken on 
board the threats to international security. Picciotto, Olonasakin and Clarke (2007: 
98) argue that the growth in intra-state war, increasing global interconnectedness, and 
the rise of frail and fragile states, demands the merging of security and development 
to ensure international stability and prosperity. 
 
These arguments can result in the comprehensive approach attributed to the security-
development nexus. In relation to EU engagement in global security, Penska and 
Ginsberg (2012: 233) argue that the EU ‗will yield a far larger security dividend than 
it does at present if it can harness the so-called three Ds – diplomacy, development 
and defence/security into a strategic decision-making system‘. The UK‘s former 
Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, noted that ‗in today‘s 
interdependent world – this small and fragile planet – our self-interest and our mutual 
interests are inextricably woven together. Our personal security depends on 
international security‘ (Benn 2004: 8). While this supports a comprehensive approach 
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based on ‗enlightened self-interest‘, there is a risk that international security will be 
an overriding concern, with the result that the development needs of individuals and 
communities receive less attention. 
 
From the securitisation of development perspective, the security-development nexus 
has emerged from growing concerns that underdevelopment poses risks to 
international security, from intra-state conflict with its potential for spillover to 
neighbouring states, refugee flows and a need for international involvement to end 
conflict and maintain peace, to organised crime and terrorism. Accordingly, ensuring 
the most effective processes for individuals and communities in post-conflict states is 
given less priority than addressing the security threats. As Ayangafac and Cilliers 
(2011: 124) argue ‗rather than focusing on improved security for the population, 
subsequent assistance provided is focused on bolstering measures and systems 
geared towards countering threats to Western interests/countries and the international 
system‘. Ioannides and Collantes-Celador (2011: 415) argue that this has been the 
case with EU engagement in the Western Balkans, where initiatives ‗respond 
primarily to internal security needs rather than functional imperatives or local 
realities‘. 
 
The result is an attempt to contain problems before they spread internationally. This 
defensive approach does not seek to overcome problems, but rather aims to ensure 
problems in fragile and conflict-affected states do not affect donor countries, or 
international security. Chandler (2012b) contends that the emphasis on containment 
is evident in the way Western powers and international institutions are distancing 
themselves from taking responsibility for development. The result is an approach that 
addresses the symptoms rather than the causes of problems in fragile and conflict-
affected states. As a result, they will never be resolved, just managed. This approach 
is evident in traditional law enforcement approaches to organised crime. Cockayne 
(2011: 6) argues that the focus of these initiatives ‗are not, as a rule, to transform 
local interdiction capacity, but rather to contain the impacts of criminal activity in 
that country on the interests of the home jurisdiction‘. 
 
On the other end of the spectrum however, the security-development nexus is 
employed for different motives. While many development agencies have engaged 
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with the security-development nexus because of security concerns, others have 
become involved in security programmes to create a suitable environment for 
development. As Glasius (2008: 47) notes, ‗projects aimed at long-term solutions but 
with a higher risk of going wrong – such as repairing infrastructure, putting people 
back in education or employment, or overtly political projects – are put on hold until 
circumstances allow‘. As a result, development actors have participated in security 
programmes, particularly security sector reform (SSR), to provide space for 
development. This was the rationale behind DfID‘s SSR programme in Sierra Leone 
(UK Government 2004). While this represents self-interest, as development agencies 
are pursuing security reforms to enable their own programmes, the end result is 
ultimately focused on individuals within the post-conflict country rather than the 
donor country.  
 
This perspective aligns with an emancipatory view of the security-development 
nexus. From this viewpoint, the security-development nexus is understood as an 
integrated approach to address the overlapping development and security challenges 
present in post-conflict countries. As Tschirgi (2010: 5) argues ‗the nexus emerged 
in response to the complex and interlocking humanitarian, human rights, security and 
development crises that confronted international policymakers in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War‘. This poses the security-development nexus as a 
necessary innovation to address contemporary challenges more effectively. This also 
aligns with the understanding of a ‗virtuous‘ relationship between security and 
development by seeking to achieve more inclusive development (Stewart 2004a). 
This suggests that the security-development nexus seeks improvements for 
individuals in fragile and conflict-affected states. Such a perspective draws on the 
shift of both security and development approaches away from a focus on the state 
and economic development, to acknowledge the needs of individuals.  
 
These different perspectives highlight a spectrum of motivations, from the needs of 
individuals in beneficiary countries, to international security concerns (see Fig. 4). 
As such, evaluation of the motivational tension builds on the analysis of the referent 
object in relation to the conceptual tension. While analysis of the conceptual tension 
identifies the object threatened by organised crime, analysis of the motivational 
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Figure 4 Spectrum of Motivations 
 
These different motivations create a tension in the security-development nexus, as 
they result in the prioritisation of different elements. An approach driven by concerns 
of international security will engage with development to the extent that it 
contributes to international security rather than addressing the needs of individuals in 
the country of focus. When international involvement is centred on individual needs, 
the result is likely to be more comprehensive as insecurity and underdevelopment 
both need to be addressed. These differences have implications for the balance 
between security and development, and thus how they are integrated.  
 
To establish the motivations of external actors addressing organised crime and the 
influence of these motivations on the integration of security and development, the 
thesis examines three interlinked but separate issues - which actors are addressing 
organised crime and why, how this affects their practices and how development is 
included. 
 
Prioritising Organised Crime 
 
Organised crime by its nature extends beyond borders, as trafficking, money 
laundering and transnational networks bring unwanted security threats into otherwise 
secure countries. The threat to international security posed by organised crime has 
been a growing concern for international actors. In 2004, the UN High Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change noted that ‗organised criminal activities 
undermine peacebuilding efforts and fuel many civil wars through illicit trade in 
conflict commodities and small arms‘ (UN 2004b: 16). In 2009, a special debate of 
the UN Security Council focused on drug trafficking as a threat to international 
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security (UN Security Council 2009). In 2010, the UN Security Council recognised 
the ‗serious threat posed in some cases by drug trafficking and transnational 
organised crime to international security in different regions of the world‘ (UN 
Security Council 2010: 1). A special meeting in 2012 recognised illicit cross border 
trafficking and movement as a threat to international peace and security (UN 
Security Council 2012a). As such, organised crime is a particularly salient example 
of self-interest. To determine whether organised crime is prioritised solely because of 
the threat it poses to international security, or because of the impact it has locally, 
analysis will examine which actors are engaged in initiatives to address organised 




Even when international security is identified as the motivational driver of 
international involvement, it does not necessarily undermine the integration of 
security and development into a nexus. The security-development nexus may be 
adopted as it is understood to contribute to more effective outcomes in terms of 
international security. As a result, development can be used to enhance international 
security. Analysis of the motivational tension and its impact on the integration of 
security and development needs to go deeper to examine how the interests of 
external actors affect their practices. Engaging with local priorities aligns with an 
emancipatory perspective, but also contributes to international security by addressing 
organised crime at its source. However, a continued focus on international priorities 
in the target country adheres to a traditional security approach, suggesting that the 
security-development nexus has not altered the practices of external actors. 
 
In a study on local ownership in statebuilding, Martin et al. (2012) evaluate tensions 
between the security needs and agendas of international and local actors. 
‗Internationals tend to focus on state and institution building, whereas local priorities 
centre much more on the need for socio-economic reconstruction, including 
improved job prospects‘ (Martin et al. 2012: 3). This division is common across 
many areas of international engagement as the security threats that affect locals differ 
from those of concern to internationals. Referring to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, 
Ayangafac and Cilliers (2011: 122) note that it is of ‗immense importance to the 
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West‘. However, within the region, ‗the principal security threats posed by the lack 
of capacity to monitor territorial waters are illegal fishing and the exploitation of 
natural resources‘ (Ayangafac and Cilliers 2011: 122). A similar disjuncture can be 
seen in approaches to organised crime. Schroeder and Friesendorf (2009: 151) argue 
that ‗current counter-crime programmes have reflected the interests of international 
actors and their ways of fighting crime rather than local conditions or the needs of 
the local population‘. To understand what impact the motivational drivers of external 
actors has on the integration of security and development, analysis will establish 
whether practices address international or local priorities. 
 
Inclusion of Development 
 
As noted above, the merging of security and development into a nexus came out of 
attempts to enhance post-conflict reconstruction to ensure more effective outcomes. 
Within the framework of the security-development nexus it is understood that for 
organised crime to be addressed effectively, negating the potential threat to 
international security, approaches need to move beyond a security approach. A 
traditional security approach, such as arresting known criminals, does not address the 
root causes of the problem. These strategies are unlikely to be effective and may 
even have negative unintended consequences. Glenny (2008) discusses the case of 
Viktor Kulivar ‗Karabas‘, a well-respected criminal leader in Odessa, Ukraine. When 
‗Karabas‘ was assassinated in 1997, his death resulted in a power struggle between 
other criminal groups, initiating open violence and instability. Similarly, Felbab-
Brown (2010) argues that standard law enforcement programmes can have 
unintended consequences – ‗the weakest criminal groups can be eliminated through 
such an approach, with law enforcement inadvertently increasing the efficiency, 
lethality and coercive and corruptive power of the remaining criminal groups‘. 
Comparatively the arrest of key individuals can empower other groups to take their 
place.  
 
As such, development can enhance approaches to organised crime, resulting in a 
more sustainable response. However, the inclusion of development also engages with 
local needs, moving beyond a focus solely on international priorities to align with 
emancipation. Analysis of the motivational tension investigates the inclusion of 
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development through the security-development nexus, assessing how it is integrated 
with security. This will determine whether the inclusion of development aligns with 
an emancipatory approach or whether it adheres to a traditional security approach. 
 
To identify where the motivations of external actors addressing organised crime in 
Sierra Leone and Bosnia fit on the spectrum from international needs to local needs, 
and what this means for the integration of security and development, analysis will 
focus on why organised crime has been prioritised and by whom, how international 
and local needs are balanced, and how development is included within initiatives to 




Although the security-development nexus is expected to achieve a new and 
comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction, the critiques suggest that the 
relationship between the two concepts is not straightforward. This research 
investigates the relationship between security and development in more detail, 
examining how the four hypothesised tensions influence the integration of security 
and development into a nexus. Based on the positive standpoint of the Welsh School 
of Critical Security Studies, the hypothesised tensions emerged from an analysis of 
what might limit the shift away from a traditional security approach. This chapter has 
set out the parameters of these four hypothesised tensions – the basis and 
assumptions behind each tension, as well as the analytical tools that will be used to 
investigate the influence of each tension in relation to initiatives to address organised 
crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. 
 
The conceptual tension arises from the divergent understandings of security and 
development among actors adopting the security-development nexus. While the 
understandings may not be contested, the differences in how security and 
development are understood raises questions over how the two concepts merge, with 
implications for what the nexus seeks to achieve. Analysis of this tension seeks to 
determine how security and development are understood by actors addressing 
organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia, and what this means for the integration 
of security and development into a nexus. 
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The causal tension also raises questions regarding the composition of the nexus. 
However, it emerges from different understandings of the causal relationship 
between security and development. Security and development can be applied in 
different ways, which has implications for how they come together – whether one is 
necessary for the other, or they are mutually constitutive. The linkages between the 
two concepts are also understood differently. They may be understood as integrated, 
where there is a strong causal relationship, or separate, where both are necessary, but 
they do not rely on each other for positive outcomes. Analysis of this tension seeks to 
identify how external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia 
apply security and development, how they understand the linkage between security 
and development, and what these factors reveal about the causal relationship between 
security and development, and the integration of the two concepts into a nexus. 
 
The institutional tension arises from the way actors and institutions inform the 
implementation of programmes. Although the merging of the two concepts is 
presented as straightforward by policymakers, and there have been numerous 
attempts to create mechanisms that bring the two areas together, security and 
development actors have traditionally had different starting points, different 
understandings of problems and different approaches to address them. The 
institutional underpinnings of security and development actors have a significant 
influence on how external actors adopt the security-development nexus. Although 
they are often understood as ‗myths‘, these institutional underpinnings continue to 
guide the actions of external actors. As such, they can create a barrier in integrating 
security and development. Analysis of this tension draws on ideal types to assess 
whether the institutional underpinnings of external actors addressing organised crime 
in Sierra Leone and Bosnia continue to adhere to security or development 
approaches, or whether they have integrated the two.  
 
The motivational tension arises from the different drivers behind external 
engagement. While the security-development nexus is adopted as a new trend to 
enhance post-conflict reconstruction, this may be superficial, with many actors 
adopting it out of self-interest. However, the two drivers are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. If external actors seek a more effective approach to enhance their own 
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security and development, it can benefit both sides. However, there is a risk that 
international concerns will take precedence, influencing the prioritisation of security 
or development within the nexus. Analysis of this tension probes the motivations of 
external actors addressing organised crime and what affect this has on the integration 
of security and development. 
 
These four tensions will be examined in chapters 3 and 4 through the two selected 
case studies – initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. By 
examining the tensions through the two case studies, the thesis seeks to establish 
whether and how the tensions limit the shift away from a traditional security 
approach. The analysis of the four tensions builds a typology of the factors that 
inhibit the integration of security and development into a nexus, but also points to the 
latent potential of the nexus, which will be discussed in chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2: Addressing Organised Crime Through the Security-
Development Nexus in Sierra Leone and Bosnia 
 
The tensions in the security-development nexus will be investigated by analysing 
how the nexus is implemented by external actors addressing organised crime in 
Sierra Leone and Bosnia. As discussed above, organised crime was addressed in 
Sierra Leone through the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), which brought 
together the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Peacebuilding 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and other bodies in a collaborative approach. In Bosnia, 
organised crime was addressed through the EU Police Mission (EUPM). In both case 
studies, initiatives to address organised crime were framed by the security-
development nexus. Organised crime was also identified as a significant factor in the 
post-conflict period that needed to be addressed through external involvement in 
both Sierra Leone and Bosnia. Programmatically this provides a comparability not 
found across many cases of post-conflict reconstruction. As such, the two case 
studies provide a strong basis to investigate what in practice inhibits the integration 
of security and development.  
 
This chapter sets out the rationale for focusing on organised crime as a site of inquiry 
on the security-development nexus, and it then examines the selected case studies in 
more detail. The comparability of the two case studies is outlined, identifying both 
their similarities and differences. Each case is then explored in more depth, setting 
out the presence of organised crime in each country, how the security-development 
nexus is invoked and what this means in practice. This sets up the framework for the 
analysis of the tensions within the two case studies. 
 
Initiatives to Address Organised Crime as a Site of Inquiry 
 
Within this research, initiatives to address organised crime are adopted as the site of 
inquiry, as it represents one aspect of post-conflict reconstruction. Post-conflict 
reconstruction can mean many things. It has been used synonymously with 
statebuilding and peacebuilding, it has been used to refer to physical reconstruction, 
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it has also been used to refer to social reconstruction, such as reconciliation 
(Ramsbotham et al. 2005; Paris and Sisk 2007; Roberts 2008). Post-conflict 
reconstruction can include all of these areas, as it has become a multi-faceted process 
that aims to rebuild states, societies and communities through a shift from a conflict 
shattered shell towards a vibrant, sustainable and democratic state that meets the 
needs of its citizens (Darby and MacGinty 2008). As an object of study, post-conflict 
reconstruction is too large to generate detailed insight into the security-development 
nexus. As a result, initiatives to address organised crime have been selected as one 
element of post-conflict reconstruction that can provide insight into the 
implementation of the security-development nexus. 
 
The study of organised crime has been dominated by criminology. From this 
perspective, the focus has been on understanding particular forms of organised 
crime, the actors involved and the methods and routes employed. This strategy has 
also been adopted by the policy literature, such as threat assessments produced by 
UNODC and other law enforcement bodies. Consequently, much of the literature 
takes a positivist or objectivist stance. 
 
There is a growing body of critical literature on organised crime covering a wide 
spectrum of issues. Beare (2003: xviii) compiled a collection of articles to outline 
‗the exploitable nature of the concepts we are discussing; the non-empirical basis for 
many of the media, police and political responses; and the unintended consequences 
that can result from well-intentioned initiatives‘. Critical scholars have examined the 
social construction of crime, identifying it as behaviour that threatens the interests of 
the powerful (see for example Quinney 2001). This has been particularly prevalent in 
contemporary debates on drug policy. Critical scholars have also been exploring 
areas that are often off limits in conventional organised crime literature. In relation to 
conflict-affected states, this includes the potential for criminal groups to play a 
stabilising role in the post-conflict period because of their role in governance, the 
economy and the provision of livelihoods and services for people (see for example 
Reno 2011). Such a perspective generates very different responses to law 
enforcement, including bringing criminal actors into political settlements. 
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While this research uses responses to organised crime as a site of enquiry, it does not 
engage with debates in the organised crime literature. Rather the focus is on how the 
security-development nexus is understood and implemented. How external actors 
engaged in post-conflict reconstruction engage with organised crime is taken as the 
starting point. As such, this section outlines how policymakers understand the 
presence of organised crime in the post-conflict period, and how this shapes their 
response. 
 
The role of organised crime in post-conflict countries has increasingly been 
recognised. As Kemp, Shaw and Boutellis (2013: 8) note ‗look at a map showing the 
location of UN peace operations and superimpose a map of major crime-affected 
regions and there is a clear overlap‘. Many armed groups rely on illicit economies to 
fund their activities and they are unlikely to disengage once violent conflict ends. 
The post-conflict context also provides a ‗site of competitive advantage‘ for 
organised crime networks because of ‗their ready pools of unemployed labour, 
populations inured to violence and weakened state capacity‘ (Cockayne 2011: 1). As 
a result, organised crime poses significant challenges and it has become a key 
element of post-conflict reconstruction in many countries. As such, initiatives to 
address organised crime provide a microcosm of post-conflict reconstruction. These 
initiatives are part of a broader programme of international engagement, they are 
implemented by actors engaged in other aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and 
they interact and overlap with other initiatives. 
 
The presence of organised crime has an impact on both development and security in 
post-conflict countries. During post-conflict reconstruction, governments are only 
beginning to regain control over the economy, security forces and rule of law. With 
incomes that dwarf official revenue, organised crime has the potential to undermine 
state capacity to control security threats and leverage government officials. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates that 
drug trafficking profits alone are around 125 billion US dollars, giving organised 
crime groups significant economic power in contrast to governments emerging from 
conflict (FES 2013). Miraglia, Ochoa and Briscoe (2012) argue that organised crime 
erodes the state‘s capability to deliver public goods, harms the state‘s legitimacy and 
affects the peace process. Similarly, Van Dijk (2007) notes that the most significant 
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effect is on the quality of governance. Writing on US engagement in Iraq, Williams 
(2011a: 115) notes that ‗criminal enterprises, criminal activities and corruption have 
had profoundly debilitating effects on US efforts to impose political and military 
stability as well as on its reconstruction efforts‘. The World Bank estimates that the 
impact on development from organised crime is similar to that of violent conflict – 
both result in 20% less development performance (World Bank 2011).  
 
These factors highlight that organised crime is not just a security problem; it also has 
consequences for development, governance, rule of law, corruption and state 
legitimacy. As a result, the need for a comprehensive approach to organised crime 
that engages with both security and development is gaining wider acceptance. 
Felbab-Brown (2013) calls for a multifaceted approach that addresses ‗all the 
complex reasons that populations turn to illegality, including law enforcement 
deficiencies and physical insecurity, poor rule of law, suppression of human rights, 
economic poverty and social marginalisation‘. Cockayne and Lupel (2009b: 4) note 
that ‗the threat posed by organised crime to international and human security has 
become a matter of considerable strategic concern for national and international 
decision-makers‘. The connection between organised crime and development has 
increasingly been recognised by international actors. The 66
th
 session of the General 
Assembly Thematic Debate focused on drugs and crime as a threat to development. 
As a result, external actors addressing organised crime after conflict are readily 
engaging with the security-development nexus.  
 
Although often posed as a security problem, the financial motives behind organised 
crime impact on development as well as security. Illicit trade in goods undermines 
the economic security of the state as it can ‗undermine competition and investment, 
hollow out production capacity and fuel inflation, fatally weakening state revenues‘ 
(2009a: 153). The presence of organised crime can also encourage individuals to 
seek out opportunities in the illicit economy, which detracts resources from the 
development of small and medium-sized enterprises. Cockayne and Lupel (2009a: 
153) argue that ‗organised crime can offer survival strategies or even sustainable 
livelihoods, creating a ladder of opportunity and upward mobility for communities 
with few other economic prospects‘.  The development challenges posed by 
organised crime are more pronounced in post-conflict states. The UN Office on 
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Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2008a: 1) notes that ‗they risk becoming shell-states: 
sovereign in name but hollowed out from the inside by criminals in collusion with 
corrupt officials in the government and security services. This not only jeopardises 
their survival, it poses a serious threat to regional security because of the 
transnational nature of the crimes‘. As a result, organised crime cannot be addressed 
solely through security strategies, but requires an integrated approach.  
 
Despite the wider implications of organised crime, it has traditionally been addressed 
as a security problem. For example, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
emphasised law enforcement strategies ‗at the cost of alternative methods from the 
medical, educational and development fields‘ (Carrier and Klantschnig 2012: 4). The 
US governments ‗war on drugs‘ further securitised this approach to drug control, and 
many governments have adopted similar tactics. Laws have been passed in Bolivia, 
and Honduras is discussing similar legislation, allowing the air force to shoot down 
suspected drug planes (Cawley 2014). The reliance on security approaches extends to 
other forms of organised crime also. Responses to organised crime have frequently 
relied upon security strategies using military and police in order to reduce avenues 
available to organised criminals and punish individuals involved (Cockayne and 
Pfister 2008).  
 
The adoption of the security-development nexus to address organised crime 
represents a significant change in approach. However, the need for a broader 
response to organised crime has gained increasing recognition. In 1998, at a special 
session on drug control the UN General Assembly recognised that security 
approaches were inadequate. The UN noted that drug problems are often connected 
to underdevelopment and called for a more balanced approach. 
Despite the adoption of international conventions promoting the 
prohibition of illicit drug crops, the problem of the illicit cultivation of the 
opium poppy, the coca bush and the cannabis plant continues at alarming 
levels. History has shown that there is no single response to reducing and 
eliminating the cultivation and production of illicit drugs. Balanced 
approaches are likely to result in more efficient strategies and successful 
outcomes (UN General Assembly 1998: 17). 
The balanced approach included alternative development strategies to prevent and 
eliminate cultivation of illicit crops, rural development measures, economic growth 
and sustainable development (UN General Assembly 1998). While these strategies 
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adhere to the argument on the securitisation of development, as development is 
merely a strategy to address the security threat posed by drug trafficking, the impact 
of organised crime on civilians has also been recognised. 
 
While initially focused on drug control, the call for a more balanced approach has 
expanded to other forms of organised crime. The 2004 UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime considers economic development and technical 
assistance to be one method of implementation, calling on State Parties to take ‗into 
account the negative effects of organised crime on society in general, in particular on 
sustainable development‘ (UN 2004c: 32). The Convention also recognises the 
impact underdevelopment can have on organised crime. The Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons calls on State Parties to ‗take or 
strengthen measures, including through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, to 
alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to 
trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity‘ (UN 
2004c: 46). These changes contribute to a shift towards an emancipatory approach, 
as the impact of organised crime on individuals and communities is recognised, 
resulting in attempts to address the human side of security. 
 
The shift towards an emancipatory approach is evident in the policy of initiatives to 
address organised crime through the integration of development. UNODC has 
increasingly recognised the linkages between security and development in their 
approach to organised crime. In 2005, UNODC recognised the linkage between 
underdevelopment and a crime prone environment (see for example UNODC 
2005b). More recent reports on organised crime in West Africa cite the level of 
development, with reference to the Human Development Index (HDI), claiming that 
poor countries ‗are unable to control their coasts and airspace‘ (UNODC 2008a: 1). 
UNODC also recognises that ‗the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the 
most effective antidote to crime, while crime prevention helps to reach the MDGs‘ 
(UNODC 2010b: iii). While some of these statements invoke development as a 
strategy to achieve security, there is an increasing recognition that development is an 
important objective and tool in addressing organised crime independent of security.  
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As a result, UNODC policy has become increasingly focused on development. 
UNODC has included alternative development programmes alongside rule of law 
and trend analysis, as ‗drugs, crime, corruption and terrorism affect the lives of 
individuals and are major obstacles to sustainable development‘ (UNODC 2008c: 
13). In response, UNODC has aimed to place strategies to address organised crime 
within national development strategies (UNODC 2012a). The 2010 report Crime and 
Instability recognises the importance of UN agencies working together ‗making use 
of the full range of military, development and crime prevention tools available‘ 
(UNODC 2010a: 55).  
 
Rather than just achieve security for countries and regions affected by organised 
crime, UNODC‘s policy seeks to achieve both security and development. Organised 
crime is recognised as an impediment to development, but underdevelopment is also 
acknowledged as a factor that allows organised crime to flourish. As a result, 
organised crime is recognised as a much broader problem that requires a range of 
strategies beyond policing and military tactics. The focus of UNODC policy extends 
beyond the state to consider underdevelopment as a factor in encouraging organised 
crime. As such, the inclusion of development in policy shifts initiatives to address 
organised crime away from military and policing strategies and a preoccupation with 
the state.  
 
The adoption of the security-development nexus to frame approaches to organised 
crime provides an effective site of enquiry to assess what in practice inhibits the 
integration of security and development into a nexus. As a microcosm of post-
conflict reconstruction, it also allows insight into these factors in relation to post-
conflict reconstruction more broadly. Accordingly, two case studies of post-conflict 
reconstruction that focused on organised crime have been selected to investigate the 
security-development nexus. This chapter examines the comparability of these case 
studies before outlining the presence of organised crime and the response of external 
actors. 
 
Comparability of the Case Studies 
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Although sparked by different factors, the wars that preceded post-conflict 
reconstruction in Sierra Leone and Bosnia had many similarities, resulting in a 
comparable response from external actors. The conflicts in Sierra Leone and Bosnia 
had high levels of civilian casualties, and both conflicts were ended through forceful 
international intervention. Both conflicts were regional in nature. The Bosnian war 
was one of a series of wars of secession from Yugoslavia. The Sierra Leone war was 
linked to the war in Liberia, with rebel leaders supported by Charles Taylor.  
 
In both countries, post-conflict initiatives commenced at a similar time, 1995 in 
Bosnia and 1997 in Sierra Leone.
9
 As a result, post-conflict reconstruction was based 
on the same principles of good practice and followed similar approaches. Elections 
were held early in the post-conflict phase in both countries. Each country had a 
justice mechanism to address war crimes and crimes against humanity: the hybrid 
Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in Bosnia. As the security sector played a violent role in both conflicts, 
SSR was a key aspect in both post-conflict reconstruction operations. Initiatives to 
address organised crime became a core element in both cases. These elements ensure 
that the two cases are comparable, however there are also several key differences to 
provide insight into the practice of the security-development nexus in two different 
contexts. 
 
Bosnia was formed following a referendum to secede from the post-communist 
Yugoslavia. The legacy of the Communist state structured around nationalities was 
utilised by leaders, resulting in a war fought on ethnic lines. Although the 
international community understood the war to be based on ‗ancient rivalries‘, 
Kaldor (2006: 128) quotes Bosnians that say ‗the war had to be so bloody, …because 
we did not hate each other; we had to be taught to hate each other‘. The conflict was 
ended by an intervention led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 
Despite the presence of UN peacekeepers on the ground, US reluctance to engage 
ground troops ensured that the intervention was primarily carried out through air 
strikes, which endangered civilians (Wheeler 2000). The Dayton Peace Agreement, 
                                                 
9
 A further outbreak of violence in 1999 brought a halt to these initiatives. Reconstruction 
recommenced in 2002. 
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which ended the war in 1995, divided Bosnia into two entities, the primarily Serb 
Republika Srpska, and the Croat and Muslim Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
The Dayton agreement also set out much of the agenda for post-conflict 
reconstruction, leaving little room for local input. The reconstruction effort evolved 
from the provision of assistance to a quasi-protectorate with an internationally 
imposed High Representative able to remove public officials and pass legislation 
(Belloni 2007). However, the High Representative justified these practices on the 
basis of local ownership. Successive High Representatives purported to ‗really speak 
for the people, while the three [political] parties just got in the way‘ (Cox 2001). As a 
result, many initiatives, particularly SSR, were delivered through a top-down, 
imposed process. Chandler (2006) labels this approach ‗empire in denial‘, where 
international actors deny accountability for the exercise of their power by placing the 
onus on local actors through a focus on local ownership. In relation to Bosnia, 
Chandler (2006) notes that power was transferred to Brussels through the EU‘s 
engagement, but the EU distanced itself from this power. 
 
Bosnia had the added difficulty of a non-functional state. The divisions between the 
entities drawn up in the Dayton Peace Agreement created a continued divide between 
ethnic groups that affects many areas. Governance is provided through a rotating 
presidency, which stalls many decisions. Although the SSR process aimed to 
integrate the various police bodies, the result was a continued division between the 
entities. Although there are some institutions at the state level, such as the State 
Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), the Border Police and the Ministry of 
Interior, each entity has its own police force. Within the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, this is further divided with each of the ten cantons having their own 
police department. This creates difficulties for addressing organised crime as the 
different police bodies are reluctant to share information and records. 
 
A former British colony, Sierra Leone was a destination for slaves freed by the 
British armed forces. The capital, Freetown and the rest of the country were 
developed separately and unequally, with different legal systems (SLTRC 2004). As 
the capital was primarily inhabited by the descendants of freed slaves, ‗the divide 
between the two entities bred deep ethnic and regional resentment and destabilised 
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the traditional system of chieftaincy‘ (SLTRC 2004: 9). This was exacerbated by 
multi-party democracy, with parties divided along ethnic lines. However, the primary 
basis of the war was not ethnic tensions, but frustration over governance failures, 
corruption, nepotism, fiscal mismanagement and poverty (HRW 2003; SLTRC 
2004). After several attempts at peace, conflict finally ended in 2002 through a 
British intervention. The intervention was a last minute effort, after British troops 
had been deployed to free UN peacekeepers that had been taken hostage. 
 
Following the intervention, three UK government ministers pushed the urgency of 
reconstruction in Sierra Leone and signed a 10 year Memorandum of Understanding 
with the Sierra Leone government (Grant 2005). DfID took a lead role in post-
conflict reconstruction. Because of limited resources, local actors were given 
responsibility for many aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, Sierra 
Leone is widely cited as a success story of bottom-up practices (White 2008).  
 
The different approach of external actors in the two case studies allows analysis of 
the tensions in the security-development nexus in two different contexts. The top-
down approach of external actors in Bosnia aligns with a traditional security 
approach. However, this approach was justified on the basis of local ownership and 
local needs, which suggests a shift away from traditional approaches. In contrast, 
external actors in Sierra Leone engaged in a bottom-up approach. However, this was 
driven by a lack of resources rather than an interest in the local context. While the 
methods shift away from a traditional security approach, the rationale does not.  
 
The current context of the two cases also differs. Sierra Leone remains a ‗less 
developed country‘, continuing to occupy a low position on the Human Development 
Index (HDI). In contrast, although Bosnia‘s GDP remains low compared to Western 
European states, the country is ranked within the high human development band of 
the HDI
10
, and the World Bank classes Bosnia as an upper Middle Income Country 
(Bank 2014). This may influence the role of development in the two case studies. 
Sierra Leone was considered a ‗less developed country‘ before and after the war. As 
such, it has a long history of engagement from development actors. However, prior 
                                                 
10
 Out of 186 countries, Sierra Leone is ranked 177
th
 and Bosnia is ranked 81
st
 in terms of human 
development (UNDP 2013).  
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to the war in Bosnia development engagement was rare because of the political 
situation in Yugoslavia. While development actors have been engaged in Bosnia 
since the war ended, their presence is still quite new and not always viewed 
positively by locals who do not consider the country in need of development 
assistance.
11
   
 
In both of these case studies, organised crime has become a significant problem in 
the post-conflict context. How organised crime is addressed through post-conflict 
reconstruction raises another key difference between the two case studies. In Sierra 
Leone, initiatives to address organised crime were part of a multi-agency 
programme.  The WACI was developed and implemented by ECOWAS, UNODC, 
UNDPA, Interpol and UNIPSIL. In contrast, initiatives in Bosnia were driven by a 
single actor, EUPM.  
 
Overall, the two case studies have adequate similarities to be comparable. The 
differences in context, and also initiatives to address organised crime discussed 
above will be considered throughout the analysis to determine whether they produce 
salient differences in how security and development come together and how the 
security-development nexus is implemented. Drawing on within case analysis, the 
case study chapters will analyse how each tension affects the integration of security 
and development in Sierra Leone and Bosnia separately, before drawing the findings 
together.  
 
As mentioned above, the most important element of comparability between the two 
case studies arises from the presence of organised crime, and the use of the security-
development nexus as a framework for initiatives to address it. Although organised 
crime manifests differently in both cases, it has become a key element of post-
conflict reconstruction. The following sections will outline the presence of organised 
crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia and how the strategies to address it fit within the 
framework of the security-development nexus. 
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 Interview, local academics, Sarajevo, 17 October 2011. 
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Organised crime in Sierra Leone  
 
West Africa became recognised as a drug trafficking hub in December 2007 
following the release of a UNODC report Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The 
Threat to Stability and Development. However, Ellis (2009) details the key role that 
West Africa has played in drug trafficking since the 1950s, when the region was first 
used by Lebanese smugglers transporting heroin to the US (Ellis 2009). The 1960s 
saw a boom in marijuana trafficking to Europe, primarily by Nigerian and Ghanaian 
smugglers (Ellis 2009). Nigerian and Ghanaian smugglers then expanded into 
cocaine and to some extent heroin (Ellis 2009). Nigeria in particular has a deep 
history of organised crime, with heavy involvement in drug trafficking, oil bunkering 
and financial crimes, such as advance fee fraud (Glenny 2008). The networks set up 
by Nigerian organised crime were crucial in the rise of the region as a valuable 
transit hub for cocaine (Glenny 2008). The increased sophistication of financial 
infrastructure in Nigeria and Ghana, and increasingly other countries in the region, 
has also played a key role (Ellis 2009). 
 
As the pace of cocaine trafficking has increased in West Africa, Mazzitelli (2007) 
has documented three different and complementary trafficking operations in the 
region. The first model is most closely linked to traditional organised crime 
structures. Latin American organisations have set up branches in some West African 
countries and coordinate the transit of cocaine through them (Mazzitelli 2011). This 
model also allegedly has links to the Sicilian mafia, as mafia boss Giovanni Bonomo 
was arrested for drug trafficking at Dakar airport, Senegal (Berticelli 2007). As local 
operators ‗have developed a stronger capacity for taking over a more ambitious and 
lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners and final buyers‘, the cocaine 
trade is increasingly becoming controlled locally (Mazzitelli 2011: 5). This has given 
rise to the second form of organised crime, where local trafficking networks are paid 
in kind in exchange for logistics, or purchase consignments directly from the 
traffickers for onward transportation into Europe (Mazzitelli 2007). In many cases 
this results in multinational trafficking networks. For example, in 2008 a network 
was dismantled in Togo with members from Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, South 
Africa, Ghana and Togo (Mazzitelli 2011). The increasing availability of wholesale 
cocaine has also fostered a third model, where ‗freelance‘ traffickers buy a few 
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kilograms of cocaine and transport it independently to Europe (Mazzitelli 2007). 
These models differ from those employed by ‗classic‘ organised crime, such as 
Italian, Russian, Japanese and Chinese organised crime networks. Mazzitelli (2011: 
33) argues that it ‗represents a new challenging and successful model of an organised 
crime network‘. 
 
Sierra Leone is not the most significant transit country for cocaine trafficking. Ghana 
and Nigeria have maintained their status as a destination for drug traffickers and 
Guinea-Bissau and Mali have received significant flows, with Guinea-Bissau 
regularly labelled Africa‘s first narco-state (see for example Shaw and Reitano 
2013). However, Sierra Leone has witnessed significant interdictions. In June 2007, 
2.5 tonnes of cocaine were seized in Venezuela on a plane bound for Sierra Leone 
(UNODC 2008a). In July 2008, 700kg of cocaine was seized at Lungi airport in 
Freetown (UNODC 2008a). With limited capacity to patrol territorial waters, there 
are concerns that much more has passed through the country undetected. Illicit trade 
also played a significant role during the Sierra Leonean war. Diamond smuggling 
funded the operations of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the group 
smuggled weapons into Sierra Leone as well as drugs to control child soldiers 
(SLTRC 2004). As such, trafficking is not a new phenomenon for Sierra Leone. 
However, Sierra Leone‘s obscurity in the larger scheme of drug trafficking means 
that the structures are not as well understood as those in Nigeria or even Guinea 
Bissau. Given the country‘s history, drug trafficking could have a destabilising 
effect. As Buchert and Walker (2013: 165) note ‗observers have been quick to 
forewarn that widespread organised crime could bring recovery in Sierra Leone to an 
abrupt halt‘. 
 
Cocaine is entering Sierra Leone through shipping containers and by air via Lungi 
airport and unmarked airstrips throughout the country. Increasing numbers of flights 
to London, Paris and Brussels have also created a gateway to Europe for cocaine 
traffickers, although there has been a preference to move drugs overland or by sea to 
Guinea for onward shipment (Wikileaks 2009c). Between January and October 2008, 
there were 17 drug seizures in Sierra Leone, totalling 743.5kg of cocaine and 
10,602kg of cannabis (Wikileaks 2009c). Sierra Leone has also had a number of 
successful prosecutions. Following the 2008 interdiction at Lungi airport, 17 
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narcotics cases were pursued in the High Court with 15 convictions, including two 
police officers and one officer from the Office of National Security (ONS) 
(Wikileaks 2009c). In April 2009, a number of West African narco-traffickers were 
extradited to the US for prosecution including the high profile Sierra Leonean 
Gibrilla Kumara, who had allegedly been active in the recruitment of South 
American organisations (Wikileaks 2009a). 
 
At present ‗West Africa has not witnessed the high levels of violence associated with 
the drug trade in Latin America, or the high levels of consumption in Europe and 
Latin America‘ (CIC 2012). However, there are reports that local consumption is 
rising. Sierra Leonean elites are purchasing cocaine, while crack cocaine is being 
traded on the street (Boas and Hatloy 2005). There were also allegations of 
politicians using drugs to recruit youth to intimidate opposition supporters in the lead 
up to the 2012 election (Saidu 2011). While locals view exploitative practices in 
Sierra Leone, such as diamond smuggling and illegal logging, negatively, drug 
smuggling is not. Organised criminals are seen to be ‗providing a service‘ (Mazzitelli 
2007: 1085). As Sierra Leone has primarily been a transit country, there is a common 
perception that locals should benefit from the trade.
12
 However, as local consumption 
rises, there is potential for this to change. As drug trafficking in the region becomes 
better understood, concerns are also being raised about increasing violence. In a 
letter to the Security Council ahead of a discussion on organised crime, the Togolese 
President expressed concern over the potential for inter-cartel violence similar to 
Mexico (UN Security Council 2012b). These concerns contributed to the 
development of the WACI to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and the West 
Africa region.  
 
The Adoption of the Security-Development Nexus 
 
Although it is not one of the primary trafficking hubs, addressing organised crime in 
Sierra Leone became a priority due to its potentially destabilising influence. Along 
with Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Cote D‘Ivoire, Sierra Leone was one of the pilot 
countries for the WACI. A multi-agency initiative to address organised crime, the 
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 Interview, UKFCO, Freetown, 27 January 2012 and Talking Drum Studios, 27 January 2012. 
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WACI adopted the security-development nexus as a framework. Based on the 
ECOWAS Political Declaration on Drug Trafficking and Other Organised Crimes in 
West Africa and its associated regional action plan, the WACI was developed by 
UNODC. UNODC recognises a two-way relationship between development and 
organised crime in West Africa: organised crime ‗constitutes a major threat to peace 
and security and an impediment to development‘ and ‗state fragility and poor 
governance have opened the way for criminal networks‘ (UNODC 2008b).  
 
As a result, the WACI Project Document that sets out the strategy, objectives, 
outputs and indicators of the project in Sierra Leone acknowledged that poverty, 
weak institutions, high youth unemployment and Sierra Leone‘s low position on the 
HDI provide ideal conditions for organised crime (UNODC 2010c). The document 
also recognised that ‗a post-conflict environment, fragile political and state 
institutions, coupled with increased drug abuse, a growing crime rate and weak law 
enforcement agencies all combine to have the potential to derail Sierra Leone‘s 
tentative steps toward recovery and development after decades of political instability 
and violent conflict‘ (UNODC 2010c: 2). These statements highlight how the WACI 
aimed to integrate security and development, as organised crime raises many 
concerns beyond the state. Various strategies were invoked to address organised 
crime. For example, development was employed as a strategy to address its impact.  
 
Youth were a particular focus of the policy approach to organised crime in Sierra 
Leone. The WACI was linked with Priority One of the UN Joint Vision for Sierra 
Leone, which aimed to consolidate peace and stability, as well as Priority Three, 
which focused on the economic and social integration of youth (UNODC 2010c). 
The focus on youth is particularly important. Rather than just addressing how 
organised crime affects the state, in line with a security approach, the role of youth, 
and in particular unemployed youth is recognised. Youth unemployment provides an 
entry point for organised crime, as many young people are willing to take the risks 
associated with drug trafficking in order to make money. Unemployed youth are also 
the most likely to be negatively affected through the increased availability of drugs 
in Sierra Leone. The focus of policy makers on youth clearly highlights the 
integration of security and development in their approach to organised crime, as it 
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overcomes the preoccupation with the state and engages with the impact of organised 
crime on individuals. 
 
Within the WACI organised crime was understood as a threat to development, thus 
recognising the impact of organised crime on individuals and communities. 
Underdevelopment was also viewed as a factor conducive to organised crime. This 
suggests that underdevelopment needs to be addressed in order to prevent organised 
crime. Poverty, weak institutions and high youth unemployment were viewed as 
particular problems that encourage organised crime. This perspective supports the 
assumption that the security-development nexus integrates security and development 
into a new and comprehensive approach to organised crime. 
 
The Security-Development Nexus in Practice 
 
Although the security-development nexus framed the policy of external actors 
addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone, the integration of security and 
development in practice was less clear. 
 
External actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone recognised the need to 
address development problems, particularly youth unemployment. As noted above, 
the WACI was linked to social and economic integration of youth as set out in the 
UN Joint Vision (UNODC 2010c). The ONS also recognised the importance of 
youth. The key to addressing organised crime is ‗to make the youth, who is the key 
courier for organised crime to be better catered for, in terms of employment, in terms 
of even scholarships to university and other welfare issues, to make sure they turn 
their attention to something that is legal‘.13 While the importance of development 
issues such as youth unemployment were recognised in the WACI and by local law 
enforcement, the implementation of the WACI did not match. 
 
Many of the processes of the WACI remained security focused. One of the key 
processes to reduce drug trafficking and organised crime in Sierra Leone was the 
establishment of the Transnational Organised Crime Unit (TOCU) to ensure effective 
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 Interview, Office of National Security, Freetown, 24 January 2012. 
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cooperation among all law enforcement agencies in Sierra Leone (UNODC 2008b). 
The unit brought together all law enforcement agencies that address organised crime, 
as well as the ports authority, the maritime agency and airport control. The WACI 
also aimed to adopt and upgrade legislation on money laundering and build the 
capacity of the Bank of Sierra Leone to conduct financial investigations. There was 
also a broader focus on capacity building. International actors aimed to build 
capacity in the areas of law enforcement, including drug interdiction, forensics, 
intelligence, border management, money laundering and criminal justice (UNODC 
2010c). These elements continue to adhere to a traditional security approach. 
 
External actors also sought to build the capacity of security agencies to reduce illegal 
activities in Sierra Leone‘s territorial waters through patrol activities (UNODC 
2010c). Similarly anti-trafficking and anti-organised crime activities at Lungi airport 
were also enhanced. A subsequent element of the WACI launched in January 2012 
aimed to improve border control, address illicit drugs and organised crime and 
further enhance airport security (UNDP 2012b). Strengthening border control was 
achieved by providing technical equipment and training for immigration staff. 
International initiatives to address illicit drugs and organised crime directly funded 
the operations of TOCU, but also improved intelligence gathering and processing by 
working on practical case investigations and real-time field operations. Airport 
security was enhanced by improving security standards and engaging in an 
awareness raising campaign to deter organised crime. These processes focused on the 
technical aspects of addressing organised crime, including intelligence collection and 
analysis, surveillance, investigations, tactical operations and international 
coordination, which maintained a security focus.  
 
The WACI did, however, move beyond a traditional security approach. Goudsmid et 
al. (2011: 164) argues that as well as the security elements, ‗development initiatives 
have been attached to the programme to support local communities and reverse the 
vicious cycle of crime, insecurity and underdevelopment‘. This was particularly 
evident through the anti-drugs programme. An anti-drugs officer based at UNIPSIL 
developed a drug users register and used radio campaigns to raise awareness of the 
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dangers of drug use.
14
 UNIPSIL also worked in collaboration with local NGOs to 
provide sensitisations on drug use to communities.
15
 In line with a development 
approach, these programmes shift the focus to individuals affected by drug 
trafficking. However, they also have elements of a security approach. ‗When we 
intend to engage at the community level firstly it is to get them to understand drug 
abuse, what the law prohibits and the negative health effects and how it increases 
criminality... on three fronts: drug abuse can impede health, can impede agricultural 
security and it can add to criminality. If we can get them to understand that, we could 
get their cooperation‘.16 
 
The external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone perceived their 
processes to be connected to development. The initiatives to improve border control 
were prioritised because ‗the situation has particularly adverse effects on the 
country‘s social and economic development agenda‘ (UNDP 2012b: 5). Furthermore, 
the project aimed ‗to contribute to the strengthening of the security sector 
governance, institutional build up of the department of immigration, fight against 
organised crime and development agenda‘ (UNDP 2012b: 4). Organised crime was 
prioritised because of the risk it places on ‗governance structures and the stability of 
the country and the sub-region‘ (UNDP 2012b: 8). These statements suggest that 
addressing organised crime will create space for development. Goudsmid et al. 
(2011) contend that the success of the WACI contributed to an enhanced economic 
environment, citing rising capital investment and interest from Chinese and 
European companies. However, this does not constitute a shift towards 
emancipation. Security processes are seen to create space for development rather 
than development processes adding useful tools to address organised crime. 
 
Some elements of the WACI were more closely aligned to development processes. 
For instance, Goudsmid et al. (2011: 161) argue that ‗awareness and knowledge of 
illicit drugs among certain groups of youngsters have been increased, fostering a 
better sense of community and shared concerns about threats of development‘. While 
raising awareness is a viable strategy, when economic opportunities particularly for 
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 Interview, UNIPSIL Official, Freetown, 26 January 2012. 
15
 Interview, UNODC Official, Freetown, 26 January 2012. 
16
 Interview, Office of National Security, Freetown, 24 January 2012. 
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youth continue to be lacking, it is unlikely to have a significant impact. Dr Edward 
Nahim who works on drugs and mental health issues in Freetown states that drug use 
‗is more common amongst the unemployed vagrants because they don‘t have any 
work to do‘ (Trenchard 2013). Reports also suggest that drug use among youth, 
particularly in Freetown is increasing (Lupick 2013). However, there was no 





The processes employed to address organised crime in Sierra Leone appear to be 
one-sided, as they primarily focus on law enforcement, which is linked to traditional 
security approaches. Rather than contributing to an integrated approach, elements of 
development were ‗attached‘ to security approaches to organised crime, such as the 
anti-drugs programme. Within the WACI, security and development focused 
initiatives did coexist, but there was limited coordination, as they were understood to 
address different areas of organised crime. Beyond the anti-drugs project which 
engaged with local NGOs, there was no engagement with other actors engaged in 
development programmes connected to organised crime, such as UNDP‘s work on 
youth unemployment. One UNIPSIL officer noted ‗where I rub shoulders with them 
[UNDP] is on elections‘18 and UNDP didn‘t view their programme in connection 
with organised crime.
19
 However, the WACI programme document specifically 
identified youth unemployment as a problem. This suggests that processes followed a 
traditional security approach, with elements of development added on. 
 
Although the project document that informed the WACI recognised the importance 
of both security and development to address organised crime in Sierra Leone, this 
does not appear to have translated into practice. This research aims to determine 
what in practice inhibits the integration of security and development into a nexus. 
 
Organised crime in Bosnia 
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 Communication with UNDP, Sierra Leone. 
18
 Interview, UNIPSIL Official, Freetown, 26 January 2012. 
19
 Communication with UNDP, Sierra Leone. 
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Organised crime formed a key element of the Bosnian war, including the smuggling 
and trafficking of people, arms, drugs, timber, fuel and cigarettes (Friesendorf et al. 
2010). Andreas (2004: 38) notes that ‗the outbreak, persistence, termination and 
aftermath of the 1992-1995 war cannot be explained without taking into account the 
critical role of smuggling practices and quasi-private criminal combatants‘. In part, 
smuggling networks were formed out of necessity, as trade sanctions placed a strain 
on the survival of civilians and combatants. There were also economic functions as 
smugglers supplied all sides of the conflict (Andreas 2004). Criminal gangs were 
also involved in the war militarily, initially because they had the best weapons and 
ammunition. The varied roles of criminal actors meant that they ‗robbed and abused 
those they were supposed to be defending… The sheer diversity of actors and 
activities involved in the smuggling economy suggests there were many shades of 
grey blurring the distinctions between patriots and profiteers‘ (Andreas 2010: 186-
187). 
 
The end of the war did not mark the end of organised crime, rather it provided new 
opportunities. In 1996, Bosnian newspaper Oslobođenje noted that ‗before our eyes, 
the new class is being born in this war, the class of those who got rich overnight, all 
former ―marginals‖‘ (cited in Alibabic 1996: 73). These ‗nouveau riche‘ are 
connected to figures in government and political parties, converting their criminal 
capital into political capital (Andreas 2004: 44). Wartime smuggling networks and 
their close ties to political actors has left an ‗expansive postwar smuggling economy 
based on political protections and informal trading networks‘ (Andreas 2004: 31). 
 
War was not the only influencing factor on the growth of organised crime in Bosnia, 
or the Western Balkans region as a whole. As Communism gave way to open 
markets, individuals began to rely increasingly on personal networks, which 
bolstered organised crime. ‗Suddenly people who have been guaranteed security 
from the cradle to the grave are forced to negotiate an unfamiliar jungle of inflation, 
unemployment, loss of pension rights and the like. At such junctures, those personal 
networks from the Communist period become very important‘ (Glenny 2008: 74). In 
many post-Communist states, organised crime has taken over the patronage networks 
of the party. This has made organised crime a major challenge for the Western 
Balkans region (European Commission 2008). 
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The Western Balkans region is a ‗crucial crossroads for criminal networks spanning 
the four continents of Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas‘ (Montanaro-Jankovski 
2005: 9). The region is also marked by criminal groups that operate across borders 
(Montanaro-Jankovski 2005). The Southeast European Times reports that ‗in 
international police circles, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is recognised as one of 
the most important links in the narcotics smuggling chain that leads from 
Afghanistan and Turkey to the European Union‘ (Dragojlovic 2013).  
 
Organised crime groups operating in the Western Balkans can be roughly divided 
into three levels.
20
 The first are based on the ‗old Yugoslav mafia style, they tend to 
be violent‘, and involved in drug trafficking, extortion rackets and theft.21 These 
groups do not have strong political connections, and ‗if they do something too stupid 
they get arrested‘.22 One example is Joca Amsterdam, who was arrested after 
allegedly arranging the murder of journalist Ivo Pukanić.23 The second level are 
sophisticated drug dealers and money launderers. ‗They have deals with high level 
oligarchs and they have a lot of money… so they have less problems, but they‘re 
more high profile, so people know they‘re out there‘.24 The third level is political 
organised crime, well-known political or business figures connected to organised 




While Bosnia is not as significant a case for organised crime as some of its 
neighbours, in particular Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, it continues to be a 
conduit for illicit goods. Bosnia remains part of the ‗Balkan route‘ for heroin 
entering Europe from Afghanistan and increasingly for precursor chemicals and 
cocaine travelling in the other direction (EUROPOL 2005). Bosnia has also become 
known for economic crimes including the smuggling of high excise goods such as 
cigarettes, fuel and alcohol, document counterfeiting, customs fraud, tax evasion, 
money laundering and fraudulent privatisation (Friesendorf et al. 2010). 
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 Interview, international NGO, Sarajevo, 27 March 2012. 
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 Interview, international NGO, Sarajevo, 27 March 2012. 
22
 Interview, international NGO, Sarajevo, 27 March 2012. 
23
 Interview, international NGO, Sarajevo, 27 March 2012. 
24
 Interview, international NGO, Sarajevo, 27 March 2012. 
25
 Interview, international NGO, Sarajevo, 27 March 2012. 
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Structural factors make Bosnia an enticing country for organised crime networks. 
The country is a major crossroads in the region with numerous border crossings. 
OCCRP reports that smuggling ‗is so robust that criminals have built their own 
private roads around border crossings‘ (OCCRP 2008). Continuing divisions 
between the two entities – Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – mean that police networks rarely share information, making 
investigation of organised crime difficult as it rarely stays in one entity.
26
 Similarly, 
Republika Srpska and the Federation have different penalties for organised crime 
(Anastasijevic 2010). Corruption is high and links to political actors reduces the rate 
of prosecution. Bosnia also has a primarily cash base and unregulated economy, 
which is advantageous for organised criminals (Montanaro-Jankovski 2005). 
 
Diverse criminal activities continue to occur in Bosnia. Accurately measuring 
organised crime remains difficult, as the more effective criminals are, the less 
identifiable they become (see van Duyne et al. 2004; van Dijk 2007). As a result, 
evidence remains anecdotal and based on cases that have actually been pursued by 
law enforcement. There have been several high profile cases pursued in Bosnia. 
Between 2004 and 2007, the State Court convicted 19 people for involvement in 
organised crime (Friesendorf et al. 2010). In 2005, a group of 30 people were 
arrested in Republika Srpska for involvement in the theft and trafficking of stolen 
vehicles (Friesendorf et al. 2010). In January 2008, Muhamed Ali Gasi, known as 
‗the capo of the Albanian mafia in Bosnia‘, was arrested with four associates 
(Sarjanen 2008; Hopkins 2012). In late 2011, Zoran Ćopić and two Bosnian 
associates were arrested in Republika Srpska in connection to money laundering for 
Montenegrin drug lord Darko Šarić (OCCRP 2012). 
 
An ongoing operation, Operation Lutka, intended to target Nasser Kelmendi, resulted 
in a number of arrests, including 32 indictments in August 2013 for gang members 
accused of murder and armed robbery (Sito-Sucic 2013). In September 2013, several 
high ranking customs officials were arrested accused of tax evasion, customs 
evasion, accepting bribes and money laundering (Associated Press 2013). A number 
of prosecutions were also made in 2013. Gang leader Zijad Turkovic and four 
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 Interview, local academic, Sarajevo, 21 March 2012. 
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accomplices received prison sentences for murder, attempted murder, narcotics 
trafficking, weapons trafficking, extortion, theft and money laundering (Jukic 2013). 
 
Initially, organised crime was not a priority for post-conflict reconstruction in 
Bosnia. However, it quickly became recognised as ‗one of the major obstacles to the 
establishment of a stable, peaceful and democratic Bosnia‘ (Friesendorf et al. 2010: 
266). Not everyone agrees that organised crime is the most pressing police problem 
in Bosnia (see Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011). One EUPM official noted that 
the focus on organised crime was not just about tackling the problem; ‗looking at it 
from a technical point of view, if you are able to conduct an investigation into 
organised crime, which is the most complex, then you are capable of any other kind 
of investigation‘.27 In contrast, the EUFOR Commander David Leakey claimed that 
organised crime was the ‗main impediment to security and democracy in Bosnia‘ 
(cited in Friesendorf et al. 2010: 271). Despite debates over the size of the problem, 
it is clear that organised crime is present in Bosnia and it has continued to be a key 
focus for external actors. 
 
The Adoption of the Security-Development Nexus 
 
Addressing organised crime and corruption became the main priority of the EU 
Police Mission (EUPM) in its final two phases. As the integration of security and 
development has become a firm priority of EU policy, initiatives to address 
organised crime were implemented under the framework of the security-development 
nexus. The EU Report on Policy Coherence for Development (2005) states ‗no one 
questions anymore the importance of security for development and the role that 
development plays for preventing conflicts, ensuring durable exits from conflicts and 
for accompanying crisis management through protective, confidence-building and 
crisis-alleviating measures. The security-development nexus has been firmly 
established in the EU‘s political priorities‘. The Council Conclusions on Security and 
Development (EU 2007) state that ‗the EU is addressing insecurity, and conflicts and 
their root causes, through a wide range of instruments. Inter-linkage between security 
and development should be seen as an integral part of the ongoing EU efforts‘. As 
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 Interview, EUPM Official, Sarajevo, 21 March 2012. 
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such, the security-development nexus has been established as a framework to guide 
external engagement in EU policy. 
 
Organised crime is recognised as an aspect of broader SSR programmes within EU 
policy. In Bosnia, the police were seen to protect criminal networks, and with 
organised crime viewed as a serious threat to future peace in the country, reform of 
the security sector was a strategy to address organised crime (Muehlmann 2008). 
Despite early resistance from European development mechanisms, it is perceived 
that within the EU ‗SSR embodies the nexus between security and development‘ 
(Muguruza 2008: 107). Albrecht, Stepputat and Anderson (2010) consider EU 
engagement through the security-development nexus as the ‗developmentalisation of 
security‘. ‗Characterised as ―holistic‖ in scope and ―politically sensitive‖ in 
approach, SSR is ultimately developmental, focusing on the governability of a 
country‘s internal and external security institutions and democratic accountability‘ 
(Albrecht et al. 2010: 75). 
 
Addressing organised crime is also specifically acknowledged as a security and 
development issue. The 2005 Enlargement Strategy for Bosnia considered organised 
crime to be ‗a major threat for Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s stability and overall socio-
economic development‘ (Commission of the European Communities 2005: 20). 
EUPM acknowledged that ‗organised crime is holding back BiH by preventing 
foreign investment, economic growth and slowing down European integration 
(Osmanović-Vukelić 2012: 44). The Croat member of the Bosnian Presidency from 
2006 referred to organised crime as the biggest obstacle in Bosnia‘s development 
(Osmanović-Vukelić 2012). He also noted that ‗the work of security agencies in BiH 
and the bodies that support their work, one of which is the EU Police Mission, is of 
key importance for the future progress and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina‘ 
(Osmanović-Vukelić 2012: 100). Accordingly, EUPM was a cross-pillar instrument, 
which brought together a focus on long-term development, short-term security and 
justice and home affairs (Juncos 2007). Identifying organised crime as a threat to 
development in policy ensured that it was not understood merely as a security threat 
to the state, but also has implications for individuals and communities. 
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EUPM was influenced by EU policy on the security-development nexus, where 
‗inter-linkage between security and development should be seen as an integral part of 
the ongoing EU efforts‘ (EU 2007). As in Sierra Leone, organised crime was 
understood as a threat to development. As such, the impact of organised crime on 
individuals and communities was also acknowledged. This suggests that the 
integration of security and development through the security-development nexus was 
expected to achieve a new and comprehensive approach to organised crime in 
Bosnia. 
 
The Security-Development Nexus in Practice 
 
As with Sierra Leone, the adoption of the security-development nexus to frame 
approaches to organised crime in Bosnia was more evident in policy than practice. 
 
Although the EU has a detailed policy on the security-development nexus and EUPM 
had a strong mandate that combined security, development and organised crime, 
processes tended to prioritise security elements. The primary focus of initiatives to 
address organised crime in Bosnia focused on law enforcement and criminal liability. 
As Stephen Goddard (2009: 138), the Chief of the Anti-Organised Crime Department 
noted, ‗with the fragmented and confusing structure that exists in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina this is one of the main problem areas that the international community 
is assisting the law enforcement and judicial agencies to improve‘. The key tasks of 
EUPM included the strengthening of operational capacity and joint capability of the 
law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime and 
corruption; assisting and supporting the planning and conduct of investigations in the 
fight against organised crime and corruption; assisting and promoting the 
development of criminal investigative capacities; enhancing police-prosecutor 
cooperation and police-penitentiary cooperation; and ensuring a suitable level of 
accountability (EU 2012). In the final two phases of EUPM, when the focus was 
solely on organised crime and corruption, the processes of the mission fell into five 
priority areas: capability, capacity, coordination, cooperation and communication.  
 
EUPM‘s first priority focused on improving capability ‗to assist to improve 
operational efficiency as well as build increased capability to identify, investigate 
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and dismantle organised crime networks within an enhanced legal framework‘ 
(EUPM 2010c: 1). The processes focused on assisting law enforcement to enhance 
capabilities in specific areas, such as organisational structures and systems, linking 
IT systems, information gathering, recording and sharing, intelligence analysis, 
investigative methods, and the identification of legal deficiencies requiring reform or 
harmonisation (EUPM 2010b). These activities were undertaken in partnership with 
local law enforcement by conducting a needs analysis as cases were being pursued.
28
 
However, at times the EU provided expert advice. 
 
The second priority was improving capacity. The aim was ‗to assist in building an 
increased ability to plan and implement measures that are designed to fight organised 
crime and corruption within corruption resistant organisational structures‘ (EUPM 
2010c: 1). The focus of these processes was to assist local law enforcement in 
implementing strategies to address organised crime and corruption. This included the 
implementation of national strategies as well as the production and implementation 
of strategies within their own organisation or jurisdiction to address organised crime 
and corruption (EUPM 2010b). EUPM also assisted their local counterparts to use 
intelligence to inform the development of strategies and ensure they had adequate 
resources and capacity for effective implementation. 
 
The third priority addressed coordination, ‗to assist in the further development of 
strategic and tactical coordination mechanisms in the fight of organised crime and 
corruption‘ (EUPM 2010c: 1). To do this, EUPM assisted local counterparts to 
improve cooperation by improving their ability to work together to plan and 
implement effective joint investigations and operations and developing strategic 
coordination mechanisms (EUPM 2010b). 
 
The fourth priority focused on cooperation, seeking to ‗facilitate greater 
collaboration to improve the efficacy of the overall competence to disrupt the 
activities of organised criminals‘ (EUPM 2010c: 1). EUPM aimed to improve 
cooperation at a range of levels, between national and international law enforcement 
and judicial cooperation, regional cooperation initiatives and operations as well as 
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operational agreement with EUROPOL (EUPM 2010b). The Mission also sought to 
enhance the sharing of intelligence, links and best practice. 
 
The final priority was communication. EUPM aimed ‗to assist in the establishment 
of functional information exchange mechanisms to identify and progress organised 
crime and corruption investigations‘ (EUPM 2010c: 1). EUPM worked with local 
counterparts to ensure that formal communication channels were established to 
facilitate information exchange, cooperation, coordination, as well as improving the 
flow of information and intelligence (EUPM 2010b). These strategies sought to 
overcome distrust, particularly between entity bodies, to enhance organised crime 
investigations. ‗Where successes have been gained it‘s been an informality of 
exchanging data. So they‘re prepared to do that when they can see the initial reward 
of exchanging data, but just having a silo of information that they have no control 
over once they give it in, there is serious distrust‘.29 
 
The processes of EUPM were innovative and locally centred. EUPM officers were 
co-located with counterparts allowing them to monitor, mentor and advise at all 
levels, including local entity and state bodies (EU 2012). However, the processes 
were very security focused as they sought to enhance law enforcement. Ioannides 
and Collantes-Celador (2011) raise concerns that the security focus detracts from the 
development oriented benefits. ‗The overreliance on the transfer of skills and 
technologies to fight organised crime and corruption also bring to the fore questions 
over EUPM‘s commitment to local ownership and sustainability, two of its identified 
goals as early as 2003‘ (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 2011: 432). Activities such 
as specialist training, the implementation of effective technology to record and share 
information and expert assistance for intelligence analysis and covert evidence 
gathering techniques enhance technical aspects of approaches to organised crime but 
not developmental elements. While security and development were integrated in 
some areas, the processes overwhelming adhered to a traditional security approach 
that prioritised law enforcement.  
 
                                                 
29
 Interview, EUPM Official, Sarajevo, 22 March 2012. 
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EUPM did engage in other areas that go beyond law enforcement. The mission had a 
strong focus on gender. Local police were trained on gender equality, and the role of 
women in the police was promoted (EUPM 2010b). However, this was not directly 
linked with initiatives to address organised crime. EUPM also engaged in public 
information campaigns to raise awareness of organised crime and corruption, a crime 
hotline was set up and the public were surveyed on their opinion of organised crime 
and corruption (EUPM 2010b). While these initiatives were focused directly on 
organised crime and corruption, they were not included in the five key priorities of 
the Mission. As one EUPM official noted, the mission engaged in these activities, 
‗gender, human rights activities, outreach, public information, but that‘s rather 
horizontal and marginal to what the activity is‘.30 While EUPM did engage in a 
diverse range of activities, the main processes to address organised crime were 
security oriented. 
 
The focus on law enforcement in Bosnia suggests that EUPM adhered to a security 
approach in practice. However, the mission did engage in other areas, such as 
gender. Despite the top-down approach of EU engagement, EUPM personnel worked 
in partnership with their local counterparts, encouraging the development of local 
solutions. Local law enforcement were treated as agents in the fight against 
organised crime, however they were expected to adhere to EU policy. While local 
personnel were empowered to contribute to the programme, it was within boundaries 
set by the EU. This indicates the beginnings of a shift away from traditional security 
approaches. However, law enforcement remained the priority. This research 
investigates what inhibits the full integration of security and development. However, 
it also assesses where integration has taken place. 
 
The Primacy of Law Enforcement 
 
In both Sierra Leone and Bosnia, initiatives to address organised crime have 
prioritised law enforcement approaches. Law enforcement can be linked to some 
conceptualisations of the security-development nexus, which view security as a 
precondition for development. This is often one of the arguments behind SSR. 
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 Interview, EUPM Official, Sarajevo, 18 October 2011. 
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Schnabel and Farr (2011: 45) contend that ‗if SSR assures that security providers are 
prepared to meet security threats and do not themselves compromise the security of 
the population, or societies‘ ability to meet their own welfare and development 
needs, it makes a critical contribution to building and consolidating a stable, just, 
inclusive, secure and well-to-do societies‘. The fact that law enforcement approaches 
prioritise security over development suggests that the two concepts are not integrated 
in practice. 
Shaw and Reitano (2013: 17) argue that law enforcement is ‗woefully inadequate‘ as 
it is merely responding to the problem of organised crime rather than the factors that 
encourage organised crime. Cockayne (2011) also argues that law enforcement does 
not address the problem, but shifts it elsewhere. This is supported by law 
enforcement professionals: ‗if it doesn‘t pay and constantly gets disrupted, you give 
up and go somewhere else‘.31 Cockayne (2011: 3) notes that ‗efforts to control 
cocaine production and trafficking in Central America and the Caribbean have led to 
significant ―balloon‖ effects... displacing major cocaine flows to West Africa‘.  
 
It is these criticisms of law enforcement that have led to calls for a more 
comprehensive approach to address organised crime. Naim (2012: 108) argues that 
‗fighting transnational crime must mean more than curbing the traffic of counterfeit 
goods, drugs, weapons and people; it must also involve preventing and reversing the 
criminalisation of governments‘. Felbab-Brown (2010) advocates for the inclusion of 
socio-economic elements. In policy, initiatives to address organised crime are framed 
by the security-development nexus, emphasising corruption, unemployment and 
weak governance as important contributing factors that need to be addressed. 
However, practices on the ground continued to adhere to a security approach. 
 
In both Sierra Leone and Bosnia, there was a lack of concerted engagement with 
development aspects of responses to organised crime. In Sierra Leone there is 
potential for organised crime to become more of a problem than it is currently. 
Young people on the streets of Freetown selling mobile phone credit and exchanging 
money are eager to engage in drug trafficking to earn a higher income.
32
 However, 
the WACI did not engage with this aspect of organised crime. Internationals 
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 Interview, UNIPSIL Official, Freetown, 26 January 2012. 
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 Interview, Office of National Security, Freetown, 24 January 2012. 
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supported the pursuit of drug smugglers. However, when a long line of unemployed 
youth are willing to engage in drug trafficking, the risk of arrest is not a deterrent. 
UNDP delivered programmes to address youth unemployment, but they were not 
connected to strategies to address organised crime.  
 
While EUPM did engage in activities to address corruption in Bosnia, it didn‘t 
extend into broader attempts to address weak governance, which allows organised 
crime to take root. Cox argued in 2001 that ‗unless significant institutional 
development takes place, breaking the hold of nationalist parties will not lead to 
better governance‘ (Cox 2001: 8). Governance remains a serious problem. Between 
October 2010 and December 2011, the country suffered from political stagnation, as 
there was no national government (USAID 2012). In 2012 Bosnia was ranked in the 
bottom 20% of countries in terms of government effectiveness (UNDP 2012a). As a 
result, political and business elites have capitalised on weak governance to engage in 
illicit practices. Pugh (2005) argues that privatisation within Bosnia became a 
criminalised process. Domm (2011: 62) contends that ‗the politico-criminal nexus 
that took root in the 1990s has given rise to a generation of business and political 
elites who see their economic interests threatened by a rationalised, effective legal 
and institutional state framework‘. By adhering to a security approach, EUPM‘s 
approach to organised crime is reactive, responding to the problems created by weak 
governance, but not addressing weak governance directly. 
 
Although initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia are 
framed by the security-development nexus in policy, this hasn‘t been accompanied 
by a significant shift in practice. Through immanent critique, this research seeks to 
understand why the security-development nexus does not fulfil its potential - it 
examines what inhibits the integration of security and development into a nexus. 
While the discussion of the case studies points to the continued dominance of 
security, it also indicates the beginning of a shift away from a traditional security 
approach, with development playing a more active role. As such, analysis of the 
tensions also identifies where integration has taken place and why. 
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Chapter 3: Tensions in the Security-Development Nexus: 
Sierra Leone 
 
In Sierra Leone, organised crime was addressed as a multi-agency initiative through 
the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI). The project document that defined the 
project was framed by the security-development nexus. However, as outlined above, 
the implementation of the project was very security focused. Drawing on empirical 
evidence from interviews conducted in Sierra Leone and official documentation of 
external actors addressing organised crime, this chapter examines in detail how the 
four hypothesised tensions influence the integration of security and development 
within initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone. It analyses how the key 
external actors – the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN 
Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) understand security and development, how security 
and development are applied and the linkages between them, the institutional 




The security-development nexus brings together two highly contested concepts. 
Although it can be argued that security and development have become closely related 
through parallel shifts towards human security and human development, there are 
many other, potentially conflicting understandings of security and development that 
influence the type of nexus that emerges. By bringing together the plethora of actors 
active in West Africa, from ECOWAS, the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) 
and Interpol, with the key implementing agencies in Sierra Leone – UNODC and 
UNIPSIL, the WACI instituted a multi-stakeholder approach. This approach 
combined expertise to address the ‗scope and complexity of increasing threats to 
security and stability in West Africa posed by transnational organised crime‘ 
(UNODC 2008b: 1). However, the involvement of different actors raised the 
potential for diverse, and contradictory understandings of security and development. 
This section examines how the three key actors, ECOWAS, UNODC and UNIPSIL, 
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understood security and development. The key documents that informed the WACI 
and each actors approach are analysed to determine the referent object and locus of 
their initiatives, which reveals how security and development are understood. What 
drives these understandings will be analysed in the section on the motivational 
tension. The understandings of security and development are mapped on the diagram 
presented in chapter 1 (see Figure 1, p. 59). The first section of this chapter will 






The foundations of the WACI were derived from the ECOWAS Political Declaration 
on the Prevention of Drug Abuse, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organised Crime in 
West Africa and its accompanying Regional Action Plan. As such, these documents 
had a strong influence on how the WACI was implemented. They recognise 
organised crime as a problem for both security and development. While these 
documents provide an avenue to determine how ECOWAS understands security and 
development, they also reveal a tension in ECOWAS‘s engagement with the 
security-development nexus. 
 
Some sections of the ECOWAS Political Declaration have a strong focus on the 
security of member states, which places the state as the referent object. For example: 
‗illicit drug trafficking… and other organised crime are serious threats to the regional 
and national security... of member states‘ (ECOWAS 2008b: 1). Similarly, the 
Regional Action Plan seeks to redefine ‗the drugs problem and all related organised 
crime facing the region as threats to regional and national security‘ (ECOWAS 
2008c).  
 
Other sections of the Political Declaration focus on the security of individuals, 
suggesting a referent object at the other end of the spectrum. The declaration 
recognises the ‗right of citizens of the community to live in safety and security 
without the threats posed by drug abuse and trafficking and other organised crime‘ 
(ECOWAS 2008b). The focus on regional and national security is also closely linked 
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to public health. While this can be connected to state based concerns, as the risk to 
public health would pose a significant burden on the state, it also addresses the effect 
of drug trafficking on the population, which points to the individual as the referent 
object. The focus on individual needs within these documents is connected to a 
broader shift within ECOWAS. Aning (2004: 533) notes that ‗ECOWAS, through its 
increasing involvement in sub-regional security, seeks to shift emphasis away from 
traditional regime centred security to more people-centred approaches‘. This 
suggests that understandings of security within ECOWAS follow the trajectory from 
traditional security to human security. 
 
When it comes to translating the Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan into 
action through the WACI, the interests of Member States played a much stronger 
role. The perspectives of Member States are outlined in the WACI Freetown 
Commitment drafted in 2010. The Freetown Commitment was signed by the four 
countries participating in the WACI, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D‘Ivoire and 
Guinea, restating the goals of the initiative and reiterating their dedication. Drafted 
by representatives of the participating countries, it outlines their understanding of the 
programme, and their understanding of security, development and the security-
development nexus. Within the WACI Freetown Commitment, illicit drug trafficking 
and organised crime are recognised for their contribution to corruption, money 
laundering, and the movement of small arms. The document also recognises that 
drug trafficking and organised crime ‗undermine the rule of law, democratic 
institutions and governance in our states‘, and are an ‗impediment to economic 
development‘ (ECOWAS 2010: 3).  
 
The effect of drug trafficking and organised crime on rule of law, democratic 
institutions, governance and economic development has an impact on individuals. 
The WACI Freetown Commitment also recognises the ‗harmful effects of illicit 
drugs and organised crime on our respective population‘ (ECOWAS 2010: 5). For 
instance, corruption undermines democratic governance as politicians benefitting 
from organised crime have the means to stay in power even when they do not 
represent the needs of their constituents. The impact of organised crime on rule of 
law, democratic institutions and governance affects citizens by limiting access to 
justice and other services provided by the state. However, these factors also have a 
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significant impact on the stability and security of the state. Money laundering 
undermines the stability of the economy, while corruption undermines the stability of 
the regime, and the movement of small arms can foster conflict. The effect of 
organised crime on rule of law, democratic institutions and governance also threatens 
the stability of the regime, and in post-conflict states can contribute to renewed 
conflict. Within the WACI Freetown Commitment, the threat organised crime poses 
to state stability and security was the key focus, as strategies focused on ‗the threat 
posed to our states by the scourge of drugs and crime‘ (ECOWAS 2010: 5). For 
member states, the state was the referent object. 
 
Although ECOWAS sought to shift towards a people centred approach, member 
states remained preoccupied with state level security. As such, there is inconsistency 
within ECOWAS regarding the understandings of security. At the Commission level, 
where the Political Declaration and Regional Action Plan were drafted, drug 
trafficking and organised crime can be considered in a more abstract way, as 
Commissioners are required to put their State interest to one side and consider how 
issues affect the region as a whole. As a result, the focus is on individuals and people 
as the referent object. The focus on individuals is also connected to a push within the 
Commission to become more people-centred. When it comes to implementation, the 
concerns of member states, and their own security come to the forefront. The 
emphasis on state security will be examined in more detail in the discussion on the 
motivational tension, as it suggests that state security is the primary objective, with 
the expectation that this will benefit individuals within the state. In contrast to the 
ECOWAS Commission, the focus on state security points to the state as the referent 
object.  
 
Within ECOWAS there are different perspectives on the referent object, but the 
locus of initiatives still remains the same. Within the Regional Action Plan the focus 
is institutional reform addressing rule of law. The WACI Freetown Agreement also 
emphasises institutional reform. As such, initiatives are implemented at the state 
level. As a result, understandings of security within ECOWAS straddle the divide 
between quadrant A: top-down benevolence and quadrant B: hard security/ economic 





The ECOWAS Regional Action Plan has been translated into practice by UNODC 
through the WACI. The WACI Project was initially part of UNODC‘s 2008-2011 
strategy on Rule of Law. Rule of law is prioritised as it ‗is the basis for providing 
justice and security for all‘ (UNODC 2008c: 10). The attention given to rule of law 
suggests a focus on the needs of individuals. However, organised crime is also 
understood as a threat to national security. While UNODC recognises that it is rare 
for organised criminals to overthrow governments or make areas ungovernable, it is 
considered more likely in West Africa (UNODC 2008a). As such, ‗the security 
implications... go to the core of the states ability to maintain its sovereignty and 
integrity‘ (UNODC 2007a: 1).  
 
UNODC‘s focus on rule of law also reinforces the emphasis on national security. 
Without rule of law there is potential for lawlessness and chaos to ensue. While this 
affects individuals, it also threatens the regime in power and the stability of the state, 
with implications extending regionally and internationally. The concern for regional 
and international spillover is reiterated as UNODC seeks ‗solutions to threats that do 
not respect borders‘ (UNODC 2008c: iii). Combined with the concern for national 
security highlighted above, rule of law programming points to the state as the 
referent object of security. Building on the Regional Action Plan, UNODC seeks to 
address organised crime through institution building, placing the locus of initiatives 
at the state level. This situates UNODC‘s understanding of security within quadrant 
B: hard security/ economic development. 
 
UNIPSIL 
Within Sierra Leone, the UN Peacebuilding Office, UNIPSIL, was the driving force 
behind the WACI. UNODC had staff members located within the UNIPSIL 
compound working in partnership with UNIPSIL‘s Senior Police Advisor. 
UNIPSIL‘s police and security unit aimed to support the Sierra Leonean government 
in national security through capacity building, training, mentoring and monitoring 
the Sierra Leone Police. This focus on national security ensured that the primary 
referent object of security was the state. However, there was also an interest in 
regional and international security. UNIPSIL noted that ‗strengthening Sierra 
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Leone‘s security forces in facing the threat of international organised crime has both 
a capacity building as well as a wider political aspect‘ (UN 2009: 5). This is 
connected to the interest of particular countries, specifically those affected by drug 
trafficking through West Africa, in addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone. As a 
result, initiatives to address organised crime targeted state institutions to prevent spill 
over to the regional and international level. The locus of UNIPSIL‘s initiatives were 
at the state level, as they worked through the Transnational Organised Crime Unit 
(TOCU), which brings together police, the Office of National Security (ONS), the 
National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and other state bodies 
connected to organised crime. This places the understanding of security within 
quadrant B: hard security/ economic development. 
 
Although there is inconsistency in how ECOWAS understands security, UNODC 
and UNIPSIL have a similar understanding, both fitting within quadrant B (see 
figure 5). By focusing on state and international security, and with a locus at the state 
level, these understandings adhere to a traditional security approach. As a result, the 
inclusion of development within the security-development nexus has not influenced 




While development plays a key role in initiatives to address organised crime for 
ECOWAS, UNODC and UNIPSIL, there is no consensus on how it is understood.  
 
ECOWAS 
Within ECOWAS there is a strong emphasis on the development aspects of 
organised crime. Throughout the Political Declaration and the Regional Action Plan, 
the impact of drug trafficking and organised crime on development is recognised 
alongside the security threat. The Final Communiqué of the ECOWAS Commission 
Heads of State Meeting considered initiatives to address organised crime within the 
context of human development (ECOWAS Commission 2008). This implies that 
initiatives to address organised crime focus on individuals as the referent object. 
However, the preamble of the Political Declaration emphasises the ‗need to promote, 
foster and accelerate the economic and social development of our states in order to 
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improve the living standards of our peoples‘ (ECOWAS 2008b). This denotes a top-
down approach as development at the state level is expected to have benefits that 
flow down to individuals.  
 
A top-down approach that has benefits for individuals points to primary and 
secondary referent objects. The state is the primary referent object, with benefits 
expected to accrue to individuals as the secondary referent object. However, there is 
no guarantee that the needs of individuals will be met by the state, particularly as 
‗trickle down‘ approaches have been widely criticised (see Stiglitz 1998). 
Furthermore, placing individuals as a secondary referent object assumes that all 
individuals will benefit equally from state level development, disregarding the 
potential for unequal distribution. As a result, this understanding of development fits 
within quadrant B, as it is disconnected from individuals and communities.  
 
ECOWAS‘s understanding of development has parallels with the perspective of 
member states. Although the WACI Freetown Commitment engages with issues that 
affect individuals, such as the impact of organised crime on rule of law, democratic 
institutions and governance, the primary focus is on economic development. 
However, as with security, the ECOWAS Commission seeks to shift understandings 
of development into quadrant A. Through the long-term development agenda, Vision 
2020, the President of ECOWAS seeks to transform the organisation from an 
‗ECOWAS of States‘ to an ‗ECOWAS of Peoples‘ (Gbeho 2011; ECOWAS 2012). 
As a result, understandings of development also straddle the divide between 
quadrants A and B, with different interests from the ECOWAS Commission and 
member states pulling in different directions. As with security, the Commission 
seeks to ensure that strategies are more people-centred. However, when it comes to 
implementation, member states are more concerned about their own development, 
which is expected to benefit their own citizens. 
 
UNODC 
Development is also a key element of UNODC‘s response to organised crime. 
UNODC recognises that addressing drug trafficking and organised crime ‗requires a 
comprehensive and engaged development strategy with economic support‘ (UNODC 
2010d: 3). However, UNODC primarily engages in alternative development 
 125 
strategies that seek to ‗reduce opportunities and incentives for illicit activities and 
gains‘ (UNODC 2008c: 3). Some of these strategies are focused at the community 
level. For example, UNODC seeks to engage in community centred prevention, 
assistance to victims, juvenile justice, treatment and rehabilitation and HIV/AIDS 
prevention and care. While this approach addresses health issues connected to drug 
users, it targets the community level to prevent further threats to the state. ‗The 
overall Programme objective is to contribute and support the efforts of the Member 
states in West Africa, as well as those of regional organisations and civil society to 
respond to evolving health and security threats‘ (UNODC 2012a: 5). These strategies 
seek to prevent individuals from engaging in organised crime rather than protecting 
individuals from the impact of organised crime. This places UNODC‘s 
understanding of development in quadrant D: containment. 
 
UNIPSIL 
The development aspect of UNIPSIL‘s response to organised crime had parallels to 
UNODC‘s understanding of development. UNIPSIL focused on drug demand 
reduction, treatment, prevention and rehabilitation. As with UNODC‘s approach, 
while this appears to address the needs of individuals, the primary referent object is 
the state, as the aim was ‗to respond to the threat posed by illicit drug trafficking and 
organised crime in Sierra Leone‘ (UNIPSIL 2012a). However, these initiatives were 
located at the local level through engagement with civil society and NGOs, seeking 
to encourage a local response. While engagement at the local level suggests a 
locally-centred understanding of development, the emphasis on the state as reference 
object indicates that locally based initiatives were implemented to contain security 
problems. As such, the understanding of development fit within quadrant D: 
containment. Drug demand reduction, treatment, prevention and rehabilitation 
contain problems connected to drug trafficking in order to ensure state security and 









Figure 5 Understandings of Security and Development in Sierra Leone 
 
Among actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone, the security and 
development aspects of organised crime are acknowledged. While this ensures that 
the WACI is implemented within the framework of the security-development nexus, 
conceptual tension emerges from the different perspectives on what this means. 
Figure 5 plots how the three key actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone 
understand security and development.  
 
As noted above, the propensity for understandings of security, in what is supposed to 
be the security-development nexus, to fit within quadrant B suggests that the nexus 
does not result in a shift away from a traditional security approach. Quadrant B 
aligns with a state centric worldview based on the primacy of military power 
(Newman 2010). The conceptual tension reveals the difficulty of a shift towards a 
comprehensive approach that engages with human security when security is 
understood in these terms. 
 
The adherence to a traditional security approach is reinforced by understandings of 
development. Understandings of development point to an approach that is designed 
to support security, rather than enhance the wellbeing of individuals. The ECOWAS 
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Commission has embraced principles of people-centred development, but this is held 
in check by member states that maintain an interest in economic development and 
the wellbeing of the state. UNODC and UNIPSIL have incorporated community 
level strategies to address organised crime through demand reduction, treatment, 
prevention and rehabilitation. While this appears to engage with individual needs, it 
merely seeks to ensure state security and limit the affect on international security. 
This is far from the transformative approach to development elaborated by Sen 
(1999) and Cornwall (2007). From this perspective, development does not bring a 
‗humanising‘ influence to the security-development nexus as it is employed to 
achieve security outcomes.  
 
These understandings influence the type of nexus that emerges. Rather than a 
comprehensive approach that shifts away from a preoccupation with the state to also 
acknowledge the needs of individuals, a security-development nexus based on the 
understandings of security and development outlined above still focuses on state and 
international needs. However, the inclusion of development does result in a shift in 
how organised crime is approached. UNODC and UNIPSIL initiatives at the 
community level, although contributing to international security also engage with the 
needs of individuals. The consequences of the motives behind this will be explored 
in the discussion of the motivational tension. Although ECOWAS‘s approach still 
primarily focuses on the state, this is driven by a desire to improve the wellbeing of 
citizens.  
 
The different understandings of security and development among actors addressing 
organised crime also ensures there is no consistency within the WACI. With referent 
objects and the loci of initiatives spanning three quadrants, the security-development 
nexus has different meanings for the different actors involved. However, the WACI 
seeks to benefit from an inter-agency approach to operationalise the objectives put 
forward by ECOWAS. While all of the actors involved can discuss their initiatives 
within the framework of the security-development nexus, they are referring to 
different referent objects and loci. This has implications for the comprehensiveness 
of the approach, as activities implemented by different actors do not necessarily 





A second tension arises from the divergent understandings of the causal relationship 
between security and development, in short, how they influence each other. As with 
understandings of security and development, questions regarding cause and effect are 
rarely answered explicitly beyond stating that security needs development, and 
development needs security. As a result, the International Peace Institute argues that 
there is a ‗panoply of theory, policy, and practice on the interplay between security 
and development‘ (IPA 2006b: 2). This section examines how security and 
development are applied in Sierra Leone – whether they are an end state or the 
process to achieve a desired end state. It also examines how the linkage between 
security and development is perceived – whether the relationship is separate or 
integrated. This reveals how external actors understand the causal relationship 





Security and development can be applied in different ways – as a process that 
suggests an active and reflexive approach, or as an end state, which suggests a fixed 
and potentially predetermined condition to be achieved through international 
involvement. These different applications affect whether security and development 
are a cause or effect. As a process, security and development are a direct cause on the 
desired goal of external involvement, whereas as an end state, security and 
development are an effect of external involvement. Whether security and 
development are a cause or effect has consequences for the relationship between 
security and development and thus their integration.  
 
Traditionally, security has referred to an end state where the referent object is secure. 
External actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone all perceive security as an 
end state. The Political Declaration that informs the WACI notes the consequences 
of organised crime on peace and security, and the ‗negative impact on the security of 
member states‘ (ECOWAS 2008b). This perspective views security as a tangible 
state that is negatively affected by organised crime. As a result, security is 
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considered to be an end state, not a process to achieve a desired end state. The threat 
of organised crime is also applied to ‗citizens ability to live in safety and security‘ 
(ECOWAS 2008b). Although addressing different referent objects, these references 
engage with security as an achievable condition that is negatively affected by 
organised crime.  
 
For UNODC, the threat organised crime poses to security is mentioned regularly 
(UNODC 2009; UNODC 2010c; UNODC 2012a). For example, the Regional 
Programme for West Africa states that ‗the criminal behaviour and corruption that 
travel alongside the cocaine are seriously affecting the security of countries in the 
region‘ (UNODC 2010d: viii). UNODC also views approaches to address organised 
crime as designed to ‗ensure internal and sub-regional security‘ (UNODC 2010c: 3). 
As a condition that is threatened by organised crime, security is viewed as an end 
state that needs to be protected, rather than a process to address organised crime. 
 
Similarly, UNIPSIL acknowledges that ‗the arrival of illicit drugs in West Africa, 
particularly cocaine, poses a serious threat to the youth and ultimately the security of 
the nation‘ (UN 2009: 5). UNIPSIL‘s mandate is to establish national security and 
the UN Joint Vision discusses ‗access to security‘ and ‗maintaining security‘ (UN 
2009: 10-11). These references all refer to security as a condition experienced by the 
state and individuals. In particular the focus on achieving national security directly 
implies that security is an end state that can be achieved through international 
engagement. The emphasis on threats also refers to security as an condition that can 
be undermined by organised crime. However, UNIPSIL recognises that security is 
not evenly distributed; access to security for some still needs to be provided. As 
such, security is an end state or condition that needs to be restored, put in place or 
protected, it is not a process to address organised crime. 
 
In contrast to security, the application of development has been more variable. It has 
been perceived as a process that responds to local needs, or the desired end state of 
international involvement. In Sierra Leone, the Political Declaration discusses the 
‗need to promote, foster and accelerate economic and social development of our 
states‘ (ECOWAS 2008b). This reference can be taken to mean the need to promote, 
foster and accelerate progress towards the end goal of development, or it may refer to 
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the process of achieving social and economic progress. When the aims of the 
Political Declaration were reiterated by Member States in the WACI Freetown 
Commitment, organised crime was seen as an ‗impediment to economic 
development‘ (ECOWAS 2010: 3). Viewing organised crime as an impediment 
suggests that the application of development is perceived in the same way as security 
– as a condition that is undermined by organised crime. The focus on economic 
development also points to a specific end state. However, this statement could also 
refer to the threat organised crime poses to ongoing economic development. The 
WACI Freetown Commitment also refers to ‗the need to encourage and accelerate 
the economic and social development of our states in order to improve the living 
standards of our people‘ (ECOWAS 2010: 3). Within ECOWAS the application of 
development is not clearly defined as either process or end state. 
 
This lack of clarity continues with UNODC and UNIPSIL. UNODC views 
development as both a condition and a process. UNODC notes that organised crime 
has ‗the potential to derail Sierra Leone‘s tentative steps towards recovery and 
development‘ (UNODC 2010c: 2). This implies that development is an end state that 
Sierra Leone is working towards. However, there are also references to the 
implementation of ‗robust development strategies‘ (UNODC 2010c: 3). Perhaps 
because UNIPSIL is tasked with supporting the Sierra Leone government, 
development is viewed primarily as a process. The mandate of UNIPSIL includes the 
promotion of development, and the UN Joint Vision on Sierra Leone discusses 
‗development programmes‘ and the promotion of sustainable development (UN 
2009: 1,8; Gbeho 2011). However, the 2013 mandate renewal is more ambiguous, 
referring to long-term development, but also ‗development priorities‘ and ‗goals‘ 
(Biondo et al. 2013). As such, development is not clearly articulated as a process or 
end state in relation to approaches to organised crime in Sierra Leone. 
 
In terms of how security and development are applied in Sierra Leone, security 
continues to adhere to the traditional perspective where it is considered to be an end 
state. This undermines a shift towards an emancipatory approach, as the end state can 
be predetermined by external actors rather than defined in collaboration with local 
actors. This likelihood is reinforced by the focus on the international level as referent 
object outlined above. The ambiguity of development fits in with the broader lack of 
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consensus on how development is applied. As the application of development is not 
clearly articulated by any of the actors, it suggests that they are not familiar with 





The different applications also raise questions around the integration of security and 
development into a nexus. The ambiguity on the application of development suggests 
that it is easier to be integrated into a circuitous relationship where development 
processes directly contribute to security outcomes, while achieving development as a 
condition also enhances security. While the achievement of security as an end state 
can make space for development, it indicates a continued disconnect between the two 
concepts. 
 
With security perceived as an end state, and development as a process, this may 
imply that development processes seek to achieve conditions of security. As a 
process, development is expected to address organised crime, which will result in the 
end goal of security. These applications point to a one-sided nexus. The causal 
relationship between security and development will be explored in more depth in the 





External actors have different perspectives on the linkages between security and 
development, which also affects the causal relationship. As noted in chapter 1, these 
different perspectives can be mapped on a spectrum from separate to integrated. 
Within this spectrum the linkages between security and development may be 
interdependent, sequential, hierarchical, mutually constitutive or synonymous. These 
different linkages influence the form of integration between security and 
development and how the nexus is put into practice. This section examines how 
external actors in Sierra Leone perceive the linkage. 
 
                                                 
33
 This will be explored in more detail in the examination of the institutional tension. 
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Among the actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone, there are diverse 
perspectives on the linkage between security and development. Within the ECOWAS 
Political Declaration, organised crime is viewed as a threat to both security and 
development. ‗Illicit drug trafficking… and other organised crimes are serious 
threats to the regional and national security, political, economic and social 
development of Member states‘ (ECOWAS 2008b). This statement acknowledges 
that both security and development are threatened by organised crime. Accordingly, 
addressing organised crime would have benefits for security and development 
conditions. However, effectively addressing organised crime does not require an 
integrated response. This perspective suggests that if organised crime was effectively 
addressed through a security approach, there would be a positive outcome for both 
security and development in Sierra Leone. 
 
Underdevelopment and insecurity are also viewed as factors that allow organised 
crime to flourish. ‗Poverty, illiteracy, inadequate resources and limited law 
enforcement and criminal justice capacity contribute significantly to the region being 
used for transhipment of drugs‘ (ECOWAS 2008b). Viewing both underdevelopment 
and a lack of security as contributors to organised crime means these factors both 
need to be addressed to prevent the threat of organised crime to regional and national 
security, and political, social and economic development. This indicates a closer 
relationship where both underdevelopment and insecurity need to be addressed to 
limit the threat of organised crime. However, these strategies still do not need to be 
integrated, because they can be pursued separately. As a result, the ECOWAS 
Political Declaration perceives the linkage between security and development to be 
separate rather than integrated. 
 
The WACI Freetown Commitment acknowledges the threat organised crime poses to 
both security and development. While the document refers to economic development 
specifically, the threats are otherwise bundled together (ECOWAS 2010). The 
signatories acknowledge the ‗threats posed by organised crime, illicit drug 
trafficking and drug abuse‘ (ECOWAS 2010: 3). By not separating these into threats 
to security or development, the document identifies a wide range of threats 
connected to both security and development. The document identifies the movement 
of small arms and light weapons, violence, money laundering, corruption, public 
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health problems and other factors as threats. As such, security and development 
threats are closely related and perhaps indivisible. However, viewing organised 
crime as a threat to both security and development, does not necessarily mean the 
two concepts are integrated. Rather the implication here is if the ‗threat‘ is 
effectively addressed it will have benefits for both security and development in 
Sierra Leone. This means that the linkages between security and development in the 
WACI Freetown Agreement fits within the separate category. 
 
ECOWAS takes the linkages between security and development further. The 2000 
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security recognises that ‗economic and social 
development and the security of peoples and states are inextricably linked‘ 
(ECOWAS 2000: 4). This goes beyond the recognition that organised crime 
threatens both security and development to acknowledge a more connected 
relationship. These linkages are expanded in the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention 
Framework, which ‗adopts a comprehensive approach to social, economic, political 
and security challenges in West Africa… based on the perspective that addressing 
these issues simultaneously would help in preventing conflicts‘ (ECOWAS 2008a: 
2).  
 
Furthermore, definitions of security and development have become intertwined in 
ECOWAS policy. ‗Human security refers to the creation of conditions to eliminate 
pervasive threats to peoples and individuals rights, livelihoods, safety and life, the 
protection of human and democratic rights and the promotion of human 
development‘ (ECOWAS 2012: 7). While it appears as though this comprehensive 
approach seeks to prevent insecurity, ECOWAS recognises a two-way relationship 
between security and development. ECOWAS‘s long-term development strategy, 
Vision 2020 notes that ‗peace and security as a transnational and cross-sector issue is 
both a prerequisite for realising the new vision and one of the long term benefits‘ 
(ECOWAS Commission 2008: 6). From this perspective, ECOWAS policy places 
the linkages between security and development in the mutually constitutive category.  
 
UNODC‘s strategy to address organised crime is situated within the UN‘s efforts 
towards peace, security and development. Organised crime is recognised as a threat 
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to both security and development: there is ‗potential for transnational organised 
crime and illicit trafficking to undermine the stability and development of the West 
African region‘ (UNODC 2010d: vii). As with the ECOWAS Political Declaration, 
this does not point to an integrated approach, as addressing organised crime would 
have benefits for security and development. However, the linkages between security 
and development expand beyond this, as UNODC notes that ‗organised crime plays a 
role in perpetuating both the poverty and the instability of the region, while poverty 
and instability provide optimum conditions for organised crime‘ (UNODC 2009: 9). 
Taking poverty and instability as features of underdevelopment and insecurity, 
UNODC perceives a two-way relationship of organised crime with security and 
development. While this implies that addressing insecurity and underdevelopment 
will address organised crime, it does not necessarily require an integrated approach. 
 
When it comes to implementing the security-development nexus in Sierra Leone 
through the WACI, the linkage becomes clearer. The WACI Project Document notes 
that ‗Sierra Leone needs the support of the international community to make security 
and justice the platforms of future development‘ (UNODC 2010c: 5). This does not 
imply integration. Rather this statement notes that security is a precondition for 
development. As such, the linkages between security and development are perceived 
to be sequential, where security will create space for development. 
 
The Joint UN Vision for Sierra Leone, which seeks to improve coordination between 
all UN agencies, is the driver behind UNIPSIL‘s approach to organised crime. The 
UN Joint Vision effectively combines security and development concerns. The five 
aims of the Joint Vision are to consolidate peace and stability; integrate rural areas 
into the national economy; economic and social integration of youth; equitable and 
affordable access to health; and accessible and credible public services (UN 2009). 
While all of the five aims, in particular equitable and affordable health, seek to 
address the development needs of individuals, the majority of the aims also seek to 
prevent renewed conflict. The consolidation of peace and security overtly seeks to 
prevent conflict. However, other goals also contribute to this aim. Integrating rural 
areas into the national economy seeks to address the ‗deteriorating social climate‘ 
created by the gap between urban and rural communities through agriculture and 
economic development (UN 2009: 2). The economic and social integration of youth 
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seeks to address the ongoing marginalisation of youth, which was a significant factor 
in the onset and continuation of violent conflict. Accessible and credible public 
services also seek to consolidate peace and security and ‗lay the foundation for 
economic development‘ (UN 2009: 34). As such, security and development are 
integrated within UN policy in Sierra Leone, fitting within the mutually constitutive 
category. 
 
Despite the strong linkages, there is still a disconnect between security and 
development in UNIPSIL‘s approach to organised crime in Sierra Leone. UNIPSIL 
had a political and development mandate. The political mandate of the mission can 
be equated to security as it involves ‗providing political support to national and local 
efforts for identifying and resolving tension and threats of potential conflict‘ 
(UNIPSIL 2012b). The mission also focused on other political reforms to remove the 
threat of conflict and consolidate peace (UNIPSIL 2012b). While many of the factors 
set out in the Joint Vision are considered to have both development and political 
elements, organised crime does not. The UN Joint Vision notes that decentralisation 
and the integration of youth have developmental and political aspects (UN 2009). 
However, strengthening the security forces to address organised crime is viewed as a 
capacity building and political aspect, removing the development focus (UN 2009). 
Although UNIPSIL has integrated many security and development issues, organised 
crime is viewed primarily as a security issue. While there are some interconnections, 
in relation to initiatives to address organised crime, security and development remain 
separate. 
 
External actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone recognise some 
connection between security and development. However, there are varying 
perspectives on this relationship. For ECOWAS, security and development have 
become closely related, but the implementation of the WACI is less integrated. 
While UNODC viewed the relationship as integrated, the relationship was sequential, 
where security is necessary in order to create space for development. A sequential 
relationship suggests that security is the cause, but development is not necessarily the 
effect. As security merely makes space for development, it does not directly 
contribute to it. UNIPSIL‘s broader policy views security and development as 
integrated. However, when it comes to organised crime the two areas are 
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interconnected but separate. Although not stated directly, this may align with 
UNODC‘s approach of creating space for development.  
 
Local law enforcement have certainly adopted this perspective on the linkage 
between security and development. For example, the Transnational Organised Crime 
Unit (TOCU) believes that ‗if we try and mitigate the level of organised crime it will 
open up ways for development to come into this country‘.34 Similarly the TOCU 
states that ‗if we improve security measures, it is going to positively reflect 
development‘.35 Perhaps this approach has ensued from DfiD‘s earlier approach to 
security sector reform within the framework of the security-development nexus. 
DfiD followed a ‗security first‘ approach based on the assumption that ‗a 
democratically run, accountable, competent, effective and efficient security sector 
helps to reduce the risk of conflict and enhance the security of the citizens of the 
country, and in the process helps to create the necessary conditions for development‘ 
(UK Government 2004: 4). As DfID worked closely with local law enforcement, this 
perspective has translated into their practices also. 
 
DfiD‘s perspective points to a sequential, or ‗security first‘ relationship, where 
security creates space for development. Within Sierra Leone external actors are 
attempting to address organised crime by strengthening security and law 
enforcement; a strategy that seeks to mitigate insecurity. This is based on the belief 
that successful prevention of further insecurity would limit negative effects on the 
current state of development. Local and external actors also believe that this will 
open the door for investment and thus economic development.  
 
External actors addressing organised crime do not actually engage with development 
though. UNIPSIL does engage in anti-drugs programmes by funding local 
organisations raising awareness of the health risk of drug use and providing support 
to drug users, but this only addresses the side effects of organised crime. Although 
UNODC identifies the social and economic integration of youth as a priority in its 
work on organised crime, problems such as youth unemployment are not directly 
confronted. UNDP and other development actors are addressing youth 
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 Interview, local law enforcement, Freetown, 25 January 2012. 
35
 Interview, local law enforcement, Freetown, 25 January 2012. 
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unemployment in Sierra Leone. However, this is not linked in to initiatives to 
address organised crime. Among the external actors engaged with organised crime in 
Sierra Leone, security and development are not understood to be mutually beneficial. 
Security is necessary for development, but the reverse is not recognised. By not 
directly addressing underdevelopment and poverty, external engagement does not 
address the role of underdevelopment in creating an increased risk of insecurity.  
 
Although there is no direct causal relationship between security and development, 
the relationship still reveals a shift in the approach of external actors. The sequential 
relationship highlights that creating space for development is now an objective of 
their engagement. Although this is not the same as directly engaging in development, 




Security and development actors have traditionally had different institutional 
architecture; they have understood problems in different ways and taken different 
approaches to address them. Although these institutional factors are rarely 
articulated, they continue to influence the engagement of external actors pursuing 
joined-up approaches. Drawing on ideal type analysis, this section examines whether 
external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone continue to be influenced 
by the institutional underpinnings of security or development, or whether the 





Key contributors and donors influence the inception and creation of initiatives to 
address organised crime in Sierra Leone. The contributors and donors play a key role 
in developing the mandate and objectives of external actors. As such, the background 
of these actors, and whether they come from a security or development perspective 
shapes the institutional architecture of initiatives to address organised crime. 
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As a multi-agency initiative, there are a wide range of external contributors that 
influenced the inception and creation of the WACI. As previously outlined, the 
WACI was developed in response to the ECOWAS Political Declaration on Drug 
Trafficking and Other Organised Crimes in West Africa and its associated Regional 
Action Plan, which was the outcome of a ministerial conference attended by 15 
ECOWAS member states. The WACI Freetown Commitment, signed by 
participating governments, reiterated the key concerns set out in the Regional Action 
Plan and confirmed the involvement of the four pilot countries, including Sierra 
Leone. As the contributors to the Regional Action Plan and the WACI Freetown 
Commitment were member states of ECOWAS, the WACI seeks to advance the 
concerns of member states arising from organised crime. For example, the WACI 
Freetown Commitment raises concerns over the potential for organised crime to 
‗undermine the rule of law, democratic institutions and governance‘. Although these 
factors also influence citizens, Ayangafac and Cilliers (2011: 135) argue that the 
commitment of states often becomes ‗premised on the quest for regime (not human) 
security‘, as their priority is often their own survival. As noted previously, the 
ECOWAS Commission seeks to shift the focus of the organisation towards human 
security, however the concerns of member states over their own security has 
remained dominant. 
 
The implementation of the WACI is a joint initiative between the UNODC, DPKO, 
UNOWA/DPA and INTERPOL to ‗assist the ECOWAS through a coherent inter-
agency approach‘ (UNODC 2008b: 1). As such, the objectives of the WACI are also 
influenced by the objectives of these agencies. UNODC‘s approach to drug 
trafficking involves technical projects to build the capacity of law enforcement 
agencies to counteract organised crime (UNODC 2007b). While the primary focus of 
UNODC‘s approach to organised crime is security oriented, development activities 
also play a role. 
 
UNODC has also recognised the importance of development, and engaged in 
alternative development programmes and initiatives to address drug use (UNODC 
2007b). In 1998, UNODC stated that ‗alternative development programmes now aim 
at elimination or prevention of the production of illicit crops through a methodology 
encompassing a broader conception of rural development aimed at improving the 
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overall quality of life of the target population by addressing not only income but also 
education, health, infrastructure and social services‘ (1998: 1). For example, in 
Colombia and Peru, UNODC engaged in crop replacement programmes, 
encouraging the production of coffee, palm oil and palm cabbage, which supported 
the livelihoods of thousands of households (UNODC 2005a). As such, UNODC‘s 
contribution brings experience of combining security and development elements. 
 
Although UNODC, UNOWA and INTERPOL are involved in the WACI, 
implementation of the project was managed by DPKO through UNIPSIL. While the 
WACI is  
founded by UNODC, they don‘t actually have a field office here, I don‘t 
think they ever will, they‘ve been trying for a few years, their regional 
headquarters is based in Dakar. So they are the UN organisation that is 
pushing that initiative. UNOPS is the procurement organisation, but on the 
ground here, it is the police component of UNIPSIL that makes it happen. 




As such, the implementation of the WACI is influenced by the mandate of 
UNIPSIL‘s National Security Unit, which seeks to support the Government of Sierra 
Leone in ensuring national security. The mandate of UNIPSIL‘s National Security 
Unit suggests that security influences dominate the implementation of the WACI. 
 
The security perspective is amplified by the personnel engaged in implementation of 
the WACI. The UNIPSIL team responsible for the WACI all come from a policing 
background. The head of the team is the Senior Police Advisor. The Senior Police 
Advisor who served the mission between 2006 and 2011 had previously been a 
police officer for 24.5 years with the Austin Police Department, including as 
Assistant Chief of Police (Boutellis 2008). While a skilled police officer, 
knowledgeable on policing and rule of law, he had no prior experience of 
peacebuilding or development, making it difficult to bring in a development 
perspective. This is compounded by a lack of training in development and post-
conflict reconstruction. In an interview for Princeton‘s ‗Innovation for Successful 
Societies‘ series, the former Senior Police Advisor noted that  
this was my first mission ever. A lot of experience in policing, but this was 
the first time I ever worked for the UN in a mission. I only had three 
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 Interview, UNIPSIL official, Freetown, 26 January 2012 
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days—it was a whirlwind orientation. I can‘t say it was an induction 
training, it was just an orientation. When I arrived here in Sierra Leone you 
received just the check-in. There was no type of training. There was no real 
induction training whatsoever (Boutellis 2008: 4).  
The Senior Police Advisor in post between 2011 and 2013 did have experience 
working internationally, bringing more direct experience of the post-conflict 
context.
37
 However, these roles were also in policing and maintained a security 
focus. 
 
Other staff engaged in the WACI also originate from a policing background, drawn 
from their national police forces or INTERPOL. The terms of reference for the 
National Project Officer for the WACI required a ‗university degree in the fields of 
criminology, law, public administration or equivalent education from a recognised 
national police, customs or another staff learning college with specialisation in 
criminal justice, crime prevention or law enforcement‘ and ‗at least five (5) years of 
relevant work experience …in national and/or international law enforcement, 
investigation, police, drug control, judiciaries and/or crime prevention, including a 
sound knowledge of criminal intelligence processes‘ (ECOWAS 2008a). The WACI 
staff also includes counter-narcotics advisors and an anti-drugs officer drawn from 
international and national police forces.
38
 As staff are primarily derived from 
policing or law enforcement backgrounds, it is difficult to bring elements of 
development into the programme.  
 
As with the contributors, the donors to the WACI influence which elements are 
prioritised. The WACI is completely funded by international donors. The 
government covers the expenses of the security agencies that make up the TOCU, 
but not programmatic expenses.  
Police have their own budget, ONS has its own budget, the Ministry has its 
own budget, but that‘s for their day-to-day running. When it comes to 
TOCU, there is nothing government provided unfortunately, so what is 
running TOCU is what the international partners are providing. We are 
trying to get government to own it, and of course it owns it as the agency, 
                                                 
37
 The Senior Police Advisor between 2011 and 2013 had previously been Contingent Commander 
and Head of the War Crimes Unit for the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
(2003-4) and as a senior investigator in the UN International Independent Investigation Commission 
in Lebanon (UNPOL 2012). 
38
 Interview, UNIPSIL official, Freetown, 26 January 2012 
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With funding primarily coming from international donors, there is a risk that 
priorities will focus on their interests, such as concerns over the drug market in their 
own country. This is evident in the focus on cocaine trafficking, rather than the 
increase in cannabis production within Sierra Leone.
40
 Such an approach would 
adhere to the security ideal type as the donor retains control over the objectives of 
the programme. 
 
The majority of funding for the WACI is channelled through UNODC. As a result, 
UNODC maintains significant influence over the direction of the programme. 
Although the WACI sought to operationalise the ECOWAS Political Declaration and 
Regional Action Plan, UNODC developed the mandate, objectives and activities of 
the programme. As such, the approach taken by the WACI may be informed by 
UNODC‘s strategic interests. Carrier and Klantschnig (2012) argue that UNODC‘s 
approach is influenced by its own donors – primarily the US, Sweden and Japan, 
who prioritise law enforcement over softer interventions. Despite UNODC‘s 
experience in alternative development programmes, the influence of the US, Japan 
and Sweden ensures that a law enforcement approach is prioritised, which adheres to 
the security ideal type. 
 
Other donors also support the WACI through specific projects. The new headquarters 
of TOCU was funded by the US government.
41
 The Netherlands government is 
providing funds for the procurement of equipment for TOCU (UNODC 2011). There 
are also: 
funds for equipment and training from the US Africa Command, funds for 
mobile border crossing inspection teams from the German government, 
funds for interdiction and investigation of illicit drug smuggling from the 
UK‘s Justice Sector Development Program, and training from the UK 
Serious Organised Crime Agency, the US Embassy, the German 
Development Cooperation, and the Italian government (Stimson 2012: 7).  
Many state-based donors contributing to initiatives to address organised crime in 
Sierra Leone are those affected, either directly or indirectly, by the cocaine trade. 
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 This point will be explored in more depth in in the next section, which examines the motivations of 
donors. 
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 Interview, UNIPSIL official, Freetown, 26 January 2012 
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With funding coming directly from government donors, either through UNODC or 
for specific projects, the donor retains some influence over how their funds are spent. 
As such, funding is driven by the security interests of donors. This adheres to the 
security ideal type. 
 
The keen interest of international donors, particularly those affected by cocaine 
trafficking through Sierra Leone removes the independence of the WACI and the 
freedom to engage with issues that are important locally. Some external contributors 
bring experience in development. For example, UNODC has sought to bring 
development into their approach to organised crime through alternative development 
strategies. However, the actors that contributed to the inception and creation of the 
WACI are primarily state-based actors that maintain direction and control over the 
initiative. As such, the contributors to the WACI align with the security ideal type. 
As a result, the WACI starts from a security perspective and seeks to bring 
development into initiatives to address organised crime. 
 
Understanding of Organised Crime 
 
How external actors in Sierra Leone understand organised crime can be established 
by analysing the language adopted. The language of the WACI is technical, focusing 
on the tasks to be achieved by the programme rather than the beneficiaries. The 
Project Document sets out that:  
the vulnerability of states in the West African sub-region to the threats of 
illicit drug trafficking is due largely to insufficient counter-trafficking 
measures, poorly trained human resources, insufficient equipment to 
support effective operations and a limited understanding of the full extent 
of the illicit drug trafficking problem. Moreover, the permeability of 
national institutions to corruption, the porosity of borders and structural 
deficiencies that prevent effective control over their territories and the 
enforcement of the rule of law, all combine to make West Africa attractive 
to international organised criminal networks (UNODC 2010c: 3).  
This passage identifies the threats posed by organised crime and the current deficits 
in addressing it. The focus is on deficits in law enforcement capacity rather than 
human factors such as poverty and unemployment. The result is a clear set of tasks to 
address organised crime more effectively, focusing on those objectives, rather than 
the needs of citizens.  
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The language outlining the focus of the TOCU is also technical. The TOCU is 
responsible for ‗intelligence collection and analysis, surveillance, investigations, 
tactical operations and international coordination‘ (ECOWAS 2008a: 5). By 
invoking the language of law enforcement, the approach of the TOCU is aligned with 
the security ideal type, and responds to incidents of organised crime. Such an 
approach raises the importance and urgency of organised crime. However, by setting 
out specific tasks, it leaves little space for local law enforcement to determine their 
own mandate. The language is task oriented and focuses on specific capabilities, 
prioritising security measures to respond to and address organised crime. Language 
also adopts terms related to security. For example, the WACI seeks to ‗combat drug 
trafficking and organised crime‘ (UNODC 2010c: 5, emphasis added). The technical 
language of the WACI, and the focus on law enforcement thus adheres to the 
security ideal type. 
 
Despite the security focused language, the WACI Project Document highlights 
avenues to prevent organised crime as it engages with the factors that ‗make West 
Africa attractive to international organised criminal networks‘ (UNODC 2010c: 3). 
This preventative focus arises as Sierra Leone is not the most significant case for 
organised crime within West Africa.
42
 However, UNIPSIL argues that it should be a 
priority because ‗once you get crack cocaine coming through here big time, you‘ll 
get all the gangster problems that go with that and your police force won‘t be able to 
cope‘.43 The focus on prevention shifts away from the reactive focus of the security 
ideal type, as it engages with organised crime before it takes root. The preventative 
approach has created problems in ensuring that the Government of Sierra Leone is 
committed to supporting TOCU in the long term given more pressing concerns such 
as poverty and weak governance. This suggests that the urgency applied to security 
has been removed. 
 
While the preventative approach appears to adhere to the development ideal type, 
initiatives to address organised crime do not seek to transform structures that allow 
organised crime to take hold, such as poverty and youth unemployment. Prevention 
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 UNODC considers Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and Nigeria urgent cases for organised crime in West 
Africa. While Sierra Leone remains important, it is not considered on the same scale as these 
countries (UNODC 2010b). 
43
 Interview, UNIPSIL official, Freetown, 26 January 2012. 
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is advanced by building capacity to respond to cases of organised crime to deter 
criminal networks from using Sierra Leone as a transit point. UNIPSIL notes that ‗if 
it doesn‘t pay and it constantly gets disrupted, you give up and go somewhere else‘.44 
As a result, the approach is more closely aligned with the security ideal type, where 
organised crime needs to be ‗contained through reactive bargaining and coercion‘ 
(Cockayne 2011: 5). However, the prevention aspect takes the containment of 
organised crime to another level, integrating development elements to a certain 
extent through anti-drug campaigns and demand reduction. While UNIPSIL‘s 
understanding of organised crime is primarily security oriented, elements of 
development are woven in. 
 
The WACI project document also discusses the importance of capacity building. 
These references become less technical and focus on achieving long-term goals that 
are locally specific. This aligns with the language of development actors, and takes a 
long-term perspective on addressing organised crime. However, even capacity 
building is used to refer to capacity in drug interdiction, forensics, intelligence, 
border management, money laundering and criminal justice (ECOWAS 2008a). As 
such, the language of development is mobilised for security purposes. Language 
related to the anti-drugs programme is more closely aligned with the development 
ideal type. The programme identifies ‗stakeholders‘, referring to citizens and civil 
society and seeks to engage in ‗sensitisations‘ (UNODC 2011). ‗Sensitisation‘ has 
become a popular buzzword in Sierra Leone among civil society and NGOs. 
Although referring to awareness raising it suggests a one-way flow of information, 
disregarding the potential for local knowledge to inform approaches to organised 
crime, or local perspectives on drug use that could be tapped into.  
 
While the WACI employs language linked to both security and development, they 
are not connected. The primary goals and tasks of the WACI are closely aligned with 
security language, whereas specific aspects of the initiative, such as capacity 
building and the anti-drugs project are aligned with development. While security and 
development elements have been brought in, they refer to separate areas of 
engagement. However, the use of development language does result in a shift away 
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from the security ideal type. This aligns with the broader understanding of organised 
crime within the WACI. External actors have taken a preventative approach, which 
also shifts away from the security ideal type. However, the preventative approach 
still aims to achieve security. The analysis of how organised crime is understood 
indicates that the institutional underpinnings of external actors addressing organised 
crime in Sierra Leone are informed by security, with elements of development 
woven in to the implementation of initiatives. 
 
Approach to Organised Crime 
 
UNODC and UNIPSIL, the key actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone, 
had a different approach to problems. Cockayne (2011: 6) notes that the WACI 
‗reflect[s] ―local‖ innovation in response to a pressing problem of peacebuilding‘, as 
it is based on regional priorities set out in the ECOWAS Political Declaration and 
Regional Action Plan. While the objectives of the WACI were based on local 
innovation and regional priorities, UNODC‘s approach still resembled the security 
ideal type. One of the key goals of the WACI was to institute TOCU‘s in the four 
pilot countries. However, the implementation of the TOCU in Sierra Leone ignored 
existing institutions as UNIPSIL had already set up the Joint Drug Interdiction 
Taskforce (JDITF). The US embassy noted that ‗donors have sent assessment teams 
who appear to want to fit their project model to a Sierra Leone context, rather than 
understand the context and create the model‘ (Wikileaks 2009a). Compared to the 
JDITF, the TOCU has ‗the same personnel, just change in name and direction a little 
bit, more funding and more agencies involved‘.45 While the difference does not 
appear to be significant, the growth in mandate resulted in tensions between the 
TOCU and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). 
 
‗Rivalries between agencies are well known‘ in West African law enforcement 
systems (UNODC 2012b). However, in setting up TOCU‘s in West African 
countries, the WACI has amplified these rivalries rather than alleviated them. In 
Sierra Leone the NDLEA is constitutionally mandated to address organised crime, 
while TOCU is not. Yet TOCU receives external funding and support to carry out the 
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work of the NDLEA. The significance of the NDLEA‘s complaints are debatable. A 
leaked US embassy cable noted that  
the NDLEA has not been empowered (possibly by design) to carry out its 
functions. As noted, the Agency's operating budget this year was USD 
125,000, which has not gone far towards staffing, equipping, and 
operationalising the Agency. The NDLEA‘s Executive Director has the 
right to second officers for enforcement purposes, but this has not been 
exercised (Wikileaks 2009a).  
Within this context, UNODC‘s decision to focus on creating the TOCU may have 
been an attempt to avoid the politics within law enforcement agencies in Sierra 
Leone. However, the remaining rivalry between law enforcement agencies suggests 
that this could have been managed better by engaging with local law enforcement. 
By implementing objectives developed at headquarter level, UNODC‘s practices are 
more closely aligned with the security ideal type, as they are based on the priorities 
of donors. 
 
Aside from the establishment of the TOCU, the WACI also seeks to enhance the 
capacity of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute complex crimes 
and reduce illegal activities within Sierra Leone (ECOWAS 2008a). These objectives 
move beyond the practices of the security ideal type, which aims to restore security 
and withdraw. The WACI aims to build local capacity to address organised crime in 
the long-term. Despite the emphasis on capacity building, there continues to be a 
focus on technical assistance. For instance, building judicial capacity involves 
upgrading organised crime related legislation (ECOWAS 2008a: 5). This implies that 
some elements of the programme need to be done by internationals to pave the way 
for local action on organised crime. 
 
Capacity building is primarily undertaken on the ground by UNIPSIL. One UNODC 
officer based within UNIPSIL ‗works with the proactive side and sees where the 
gaps are in training and equipment‘.46 Another UNIPSIL officer ‗works on the anti-
drugs programme with citizens‘, raising awareness of the dangers of drug use.47 
UNIPSIL passes intelligence on to TOCU members and provides assistance and 
advice where needed to ensure that local law enforcement can effectively pursue 
cases. The UNIPSIL team also refrains from directly guiding the TOCU, preferring 
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them to identify where they need to focus their energy independently. For example, 
UNIPSIL notes that ‗the element that needs to come into TOCU, and they‘re only 
just waking up to it, is financial investigation‘.48 Rather than external actors directly 
recommending work on financial investigation, TOCU is encouraged to identify gaps 
in their investigation independently. This approach shifts practices closer to the 
development ideal type as it encourages local solutions rather than imposing 
internationally defined objectives.  
 
While the WACI has engaged in capacity building with law enforcement seconded to 
the TOCU, other levels of government remain unable to address organised crime. 
Security agencies involved in TOCU have developed effective investigation skills to 
pursue organised criminals. However, regular police have been causing problems 
with investigations. An interdiction involving Nigerian nationals resulted in police 
arresting any Nigerians they encountered in Freetown.
49
 The problems extend 
upwards also. Political actors sideswipe cases to look good politically, putting out 
calls to arrest all individuals being investigated, which compromises the case. 
Political actors have also been known to stall actions to disguise their involvement in 
organised crime.  
 
By working with state institutions, the WACI adheres more to the security ideal type. 
Although the WACI aimed to improve the security environment to benefit 
individuals, the target groups of the project are law enforcement agencies and the 
judiciary, including Sierra Leone Police, National Revenue Authority, the 
Immigration Department, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the Joint 
Maritime Committee, the Office of National Security (ONS), the Central Intelligence 
Security Unit and the Financial Investigations Unit.  
 
Partnerships with law enforcement created problems for direct linkages with 
civilians.  Through DfID‘s earlier SSR programme the Sierra Leone police have 
shifted away from ‗traditional policing‘ towards a ‗new landscape in policing‘ which 
has much more community engagement through community policing visits to 
communities and schools, and the creation of Local Police Partnership Boards, 
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provincial and district security committees, which included local leaders.
50
 An 
alliance of NGOs including Conciliation Resources, Talking Drum Studios and 
Mano River Women‘s Peace Network delivered programmes to promote trust 
between the police and local communities. However, it remains a taut relationship, 
which limits the potential shift away from the security ideal type. 
 
The police also engage with local communities on organised crime through their 
media office, telling communities to be aware of organised crime.
51
 ‗We have radio 
programmes where they talk about these issues, organised crime, advising the public, 
but also if it comes into the country to be aware of certain people‘.52 The ONS is 
setting up a hotline for citizens to report early warning signals of organised crime, 
such as large shipments coming across the border, or planes landing at unmarked 
airstrips in rural areas.
53
 They are also using traditional leaders to transmit messages 
to local communities.
54
 ‗The police turns up and talks to them, they see them as part 
of the problem, but if we have traditional leaders joining us it transmits the message, 
we will get it though more effectively‘.55 These examples highlight a hierarchical 
relationship between security agencies and local communities where citizens are not 
seen as agents that can play a role in addressing organised crime.  
 
The lack of direct engagement with local communities limits the shift away from the 
security ideal type. It also creates a lack of understanding of local perspectives of 
organised crime. Some respondents indicated that there is a common perception that 
Sierra Leoneans should benefit from the cocaine trade.
56
 While illicit activities such 
as illegal logging and diamond smuggling are viewed negatively as they exploit 
Sierra Leone‘s natural resources, the cocaine trade is viewed differently as it just 
uses Sierra Leone as a transit hub.
57
 If this is the case, then citizens would be less 
likely to report incidents of trafficking that they witness in and around their 
communities. 
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The priority given to national security agencies over civil society also neglects the 
issues important to civilians. A number of civil society organisations are working on 
issues connected with organised crime. The Centre for the Coordination of Youth 
Activities (CCYA) runs a project aimed at bike riders
58
 to encourage them not to get 
involved in organised crime.
59
 The Foundation for Democracy and Development 
Sierra Leone (FDIDSL) conducts seminars, awareness raising and other activities on 
organised crime and drug use.
60
 There are also several organisations providing 
services and treatment to drug users (UNODC 2011). While many of these 
organisations receive support and funding from both national and international 
actors, their work is not viewed as part of the strategy to address organised crime.  
 
There is also reluctance from civil society when engaging with state bodies. Civil 
society sees their role as making noise, being an intermediary between citizens and 
the government.
61
 Once they have been heard they do not continue to engage or 
participate in decision-making or implementation. State structures may not be 
conducive to civil society involvement in these areas. However, there is space for 
civil society to be more proactive. Instead roles in civil society are often viewed as a 
pathway to a secure government job. As such, many individuals are reticent to 
challenge government too much as it may reduce their employment potential. 
 
With partners primarily located at the state level, the WACI adheres to the security 
ideal type with an emphasis on law enforcement. Engagement with civil society and 
citizens seeks to further the objectives and activities of the WACI, which focus on 
the investigation and prosecution of organised crime cases and a decrease in cases. 
This further prioritises a law enforcement approach to organised crime, limiting the 
role of development. 
 
The structure of UNODC and UNIPSIL also influences how organised crime is 
approached. While UNODC has staff working in Sierra Leone, they are based within 
UNIPSIL as UNODC does not have its own office within the country. As a result, 
UNODC provides the programme objectives remotely. UNIPSIL acts as a mediator 
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through its presence in the country, coordinating international support to address 
organised crime to minimise duplication and to ensure resources are tailored to the 
local context.
62
 UNODC‘s role in the WACI adheres to the security ideal type, but 
UNIPSIL brings in development aspects as they are closely connected to local actors 
and have built strong relationships (UNPOL 2012).  
 
The relationship between UNIPSIL and local actors remains hierarchical to a certain 
extent as UNIPSIL controls the resources, but there is an attempt to break this down. 
UNIPSIL provide intelligence and advice on interdictions primarily through a 
mentoring relationship. For example, in 2011 UNIPSIL received intelligence that a 
shipment of nappies coming through Sierra Leone contained cocaine. The 
intelligence was shared with the TOCU, and UNIPSIL supported their response. 
‗They were really good, they sat down and said ―okay, we‘ve got this intelligence, do 
we build on that a bit more, or is it just intelligence, do we go and hit the ports‖, also 
recognising the port is another mini-village where everyone knows everyone, ―can 
we put someone in there‖‘.63 While some agencies could be more effective, 
UNIPSIL finds TOCU‘s approach to organised crime ‗sophisticated‘,64 as they know 
what questions to ask and what to consider when approaching a situation. Problems 
still arise with the Sierra Leonean government wanting to take control of a case to 
look good politically. When this happens, UNIPSIL plays a key role in supporting 
the TOCU. 
 
Local and international actors come together through fortnightly coordination 
meetings. Representatives from UNIPSIL, the British High Commission and the US 
embassy attend to provide mentoring and technical support.
65
 However, the primary 
aim is to enhance coordination between local law enforcement agencies. Member 
agencies report that the meetings have improved ‗camaraderie and organisational 
usefulness to each other‘.66 The relationship between locals and internationals is still 
not equal, suggesting a hierarchical structure. As the Sierra Leone government is not 
funding the TOCU, international actors have a significant influence on the mandate 
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of the unit. ‗They are the ones with the money, our government is not really owning 
things. So really, they are driving the process‘.67 For example, as noted earlier, 
although cannabis is a major concern for local law enforcement, international actors 
are primarily concerned with cocaine trafficking. 
 
Despite this imbalance, UNIPSIL‘s structure moves beyond the security ideal type 
by working in partnership with local law enforcement. This emphasis on partnerships 
between international and national actors displays a merging of security and 
development. However, the structure is still primarily designed to achieve security 
outcomes, particularly those of interest to donors, as it remains difficult for external 
actors to move away from their traditional activities. Regarding the approach to 
problems, all of the agencies engaged in the TOCU are from the law enforcement 
sector. There is no link to other actors that are addressing social and economic 
concerns related to organised crime. While UNIPSIL‘s practices, such as capacity 
building, have become closely aligned with the development ideal type, this is only 
one element of the WACI. Other elements, such as the creation of the TOCU 
continue to adhere to the security ideal type.  
 
Although the approach to organised crime in Sierra Leone brings together elements 
of security and development, security is a clear priority. As contributors and donors 
are state-based actors, the institutional architecture of the WACI closely adheres to 
the security ideal type. However, other factors have shifted away from a pure 
security focus. How organised crime is understood has engaged with elements of 
development. External actors have acknowledged the need for prevention in their 
approach to organised crime. The language employed in Sierra Leone to address 
capacity building and the anti-drugs programme was linked more closely to the 
development ideal type. However, other language employed by external actors was 
aligned with the security ideal type, as it was technical and task oriented. While the 
language adopted within the WACI aligns with both security and development, this 
was not a merging of the two, as the elements remained separate. The approach to 
organised crime did move beyond the security ideal type, as the emphasis was on 
capacity building. This brought in development elements by seeking to achieve long-
                                                 
67
 Interview, local law enforcement, Freetown, 24 January 2012 
 152 
term outcomes. The structure of the WACI also moved beyond the security ideal 
type by ensuring a collaborative approach between international actors and local law 
enforcement 
 
These factors highlight that the adoption of the security-development nexus has been 
influenced by the institutional underpinnings of external actors. In several areas the 
institutional division between security and development actors has been broken 
down. However, underlying each of these innovations was a continued focus on 
security. The emphasis on deterrence to prevent organised crime aimed to strengthen 
law enforcement rather than engaging with the underlying influences that allow 
organised crime to flourish. Capacity building also focused solely on law 
enforcement. Despite the collaborative approach, the security interests of external 
actors were still prioritised. While these factors demonstrate an attempt to integrate 
security and development, the security based institutional architecture of the WACI 





A final tension emerges from the motivations of external actors addressing organised 
crime in Sierra Leone. The motivational drivers of external actors influence why 
security and development are being integrated and which elements are prioritised 
within the nexus. This problem has already been raised in the analysis of the other 
tensions. Analysis of the conceptual tension highlighted how understandings of 
security are often framed by each actors concern over their own security. Analysis of 
the institutional tension raised questions over whether the primacy of security in the 
institutional underpinnings of security actors is driven by international security 
concerns or a lack of understanding among security actors of how to bring 
development into their initiatives. This section probes the motivations in more depth, 
analysing why organised crime is prioritised and by whom; the balance between 
international and local priorities; and how development is included in initiatives to 




Prioritising Organised Crime 
 
Organised crime is transnational by nature, which suggests that external actors may 
be addressing it out of self-interest. This section analyses whether this is the case, or 
if international involvement is driven by other factors. 
 
The interest in international security is evident in the approach of external actors 
addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone. At the regional level in West Africa, 
ECOWAS has expressed concerns over the security threat posed by the presence of 
organised crime within Member States. The Political Declaration on Drug 
Trafficking and Other Organised Crimes in West Africa notes that ‗drug abuse, illicit 
drug trafficking, diversion of chemical precursors and other organised crimes are 
serious threats to the regional and national security, political, economic and social 
development of Member States‘ (ECOWAS 2008b). Although ECOWAS is a 
regional actor, the focus here is on the threats that extend beyond the countries 
directly affected by organised crime. The WACI that emerged from this declaration 
prioritised Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Cote D‘Ivoire, which are 
considered the most unstable countries in the region. This suggests that organised 
crime is viewed as a further destabilising force. As a result, organised crime is 
prioritised to prevent security threats that will spread regionally. 
 
The motivations of external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone are 
also focused on the threat to international security. The US Government has 
committed significant funds to the WACI as ‗the proceeds of cocaine trafficked 
through West Africa flow back to the same organisations that move cocaine to the 
United States, reinforcing their financial strength‘ (US Department of State 2011: 
50). The UK and other European governments have also committed funds to stem 
cocaine flows in Sierra Leone before it reaches Europe. 
 
Donors concerned about cocaine being trafficked to their home country are eager to 
have a presence in Sierra Leone. ‗When you‘re dealing with a fragile state with 
corrupt officials you want to know you have your own person on the ground‘.68 Key 
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personnel within UNIPSIL came from the UK and Spain, two of the primary 
destinations for cocaine trafficked through West Africa. When the term of the 
Spanish counter-narcotics officer ended, he was replaced by another Spaniard, 
‗because from the point of view of the proactive policing they do, or joint agencies, 
we want to keep the intelligence going between the countries that have a vested 
interest‘.69 The US also has a presence as trafficking through West Africa fuels Latin 
American cartels that are also active in cocaine trafficking to the US (US Department 
of State 2011).  
 
The presence of particular international actors in Sierra Leone can also be connected 
to specific cases. When the UK Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) 
withdrew from Sierra Leone, they were eager to maintain a British presence to 
monitor certain cases. This contributed to the recruitment of a British national as the 
Senior Police Advisor within UNIPSIL in 2011. SOCA had been tracking Mohib 
Shamel, a Lebanese-British citizen active in the Sierra Leonean mining sector who 
allegedly had links to Daniel Kinahan, an Irish businessman involved in 
narcotrafficking throughout Europe (Wikileaks 2009d). Similarly, the Spanish 
government also had a significant interest in Sierra Leone. Spain is one of the 
primary destination countries for drugs trafficked through Sierra Leone. The Spanish 
Drug and Organised Crime Unit had also been tracking a Sierra Leone flagged vessel 
involved in human smuggling and narcotics trafficking (Wikileaks 2009d). 
 
A UNIPSIL representative noted that ‗donors who are suffering from the drug 
market will put up a certain amount‘.70 As such, the key donors to the WACI, 
including Germany, the Netherlands and the US were driven by concerns of cocaine 
or cocaine-related revenue entering their own country. The interests of international 
actors in Sierra Leone is recognised by local law enforcement.  
The current Senior Police Advisor is British. So while she is UN, she also 
has British interests. The counter-narcotics officer is Spanish, he also has 
Spanish interests. The representative of the US embassy that comes to 
meetings makes sure US interests are met. The US Africa Command, 
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The presence of external actors directly affected by cocaine trafficking implies that 
international security concerns are the primary motivation. External actors seek to 
address or contain the problem within Sierra Leone before it reaches their shores. 
However, these concerns can also result in a better response. Spanish intelligence is 
more likely to share information with their Sierra Leonean counterparts if it assists 
their own counter-narcotics operations. Having a Spanish officer based in the country 
also enhances trust between the two countries. An approach that engages with local 
needs will have benefits for international security, as organised crime would be 
addressed in a sustainable way rather than just responding to incidents of organised 
crime. The balance between international and local priorities is explored in the next 
section. 
 
Disjuncture between International and Local Priorities 
 
Analysing how external actors negotiate between international and local priorities 
reveals the extent of their self-interest, but also whether they are willing to take a 
long-term approach that meets both local and international needs. 
 
A disjuncture between international and local priorities is evident in Sierra Leone. As 
noted earlier, although illegal exports of timber and diamonds are viewed negatively 
by locals because they exploit local resources, drug trafficking is not.
72
 Many Sierra 
Leoneans believe the country should benefit from the revenues of drug trafficking, 
particularly as the country is primarily a transit country.
73
 This may change as 
increasing amounts of cocaine are consumed locally. Current government policy 
does not directly counter organised crime, as all funding is derived from international 
donors. The lack of government funding suggests implicit support for organised 
crime and drug trafficking. A UNIPSIL officer stated, ‗the government says it 
supports [TOCU], and it hasn‘t done anything to stop it; but it hasn‘t done anything 
at all to ensure its continuity‘.74  
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The lack of government engagement to address organised crime may arise because 
initiatives are currently adequately funded by internationals. This is implied by the 
Government of Sierra Leone‘s support for the ECOWAS Political Declaration and 
the WACI Freetown Commitment, pledging their dedication to addressing organised 
crime. However, the government directly pursues issues of greatest concern to the 
electorate to ensure they remain in power. An officer from the ONS met with the 
President on organised crime:  
I emphatically made it clear that there was a lot more that needs to be 
tackled. If it‘s not tackled it will slow down development and impede the 
successful outcomes of the security agencies. It‘s only when I mentioned 
the elections that I got his attention. He wants to win again, so he wants to 
make sure all the obstacles are clear.
75
 
Government preoccupation with elections further supports the argument that 
organised crime is not a pressing concern locally. If it was, the government would be 
more engaged in order to gain support. 
 
The disjuncture between local and international priorities also arises as local elites 
may benefit from organised crime. Corruption supports the presence of organised 
crime in Sierra Leone. Following the 2008 seizure of cocaine at Lungi airport, 
government officials and security agents were implicated, as well as then Minister of 
Transport and Aviation (Gberie 2010). In 2009, Sierra Leone‘s Foreign Minister 
noted ‗the cartels have not yet corrupted the governments senior levels, but sooner or 
later they will, because they have millions of dollars and you need to be a saint to 
reject them‘ (cited in Kavanagh 2011). When government officials are involved in 
organised crime, they have an interest in keeping it hidden. As a result, citizens may 
not be aware of the magnitude of criminal activity.  
 
While it appears as though external actors are investing resources to address 
problems that are not a concern locally, not engaging with organised crime could 
have disastrous effects for the host country. UNIPSIL acknowledges that Sierra 
Leone is not the most pressing case of organised crime in West Africa. However, 
they recognise that if it is not addressed now, local law enforcement won‘t be able to 
cope if cocaine starts passing through the country at a greater pace.
76
 Although 
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significant advances have been made since the war ended, organised crime has the 
potential to undercut them. With revenues higher than the government, organised 
crime networks have the potential to undermine state control over the economy, 
security forces and rule of law. This would limit further progress, as well as affect 
the wellbeing of citizens. As such, what appears to be an international agenda may be 
focused on local needs. 
 
Factors such as corruption and the discrete nature of organised crime may explain the 
disjuncture between local and international priorities. However, externally driven 
initiatives to address organised crime do not address all elements of organised crime. 
External actors are addressing the elements that have the greatest impact 
internationally. The primary focus of Sierra Leone security agencies is on 
intelligence and operations to target the transport of drugs via air or sea. This means 
that local priorities related to cannabis production and trafficking within West Africa 
are given less priority. 
 
Cannabis production and trafficking is becoming a serious concern for law 
enforcement and government officials within Sierra Leone. A local law enforcement 
officer noted that cannabis had overtaken food production. ‗Food security, which is a 
national goal, national interest, is under serious threat because of this widespread 
cultivation‘.77 Many farmers are switching from food production to cannabis 
production as it is easier and faster to grow and generates a higher income.  
It‘s easy to go across the border to sell in Guinea and Liberia. A bag of rice 
is 200,000 Leones, a bag of cannabis, the same weight, 50 kilos, can give 
you a motorbike and a motorbike is around 5 million Leones. Compare, 




While external actors recognise that cannabis is currently more of a problem than 
cocaine,
79
 it is still not a priority. This primarily stems from the assumption that 
cannabis is ‗relatively harmless since it was intended for the domestic market‘ 
(Wikileaks 2009b). 
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While development actors such as Irish Aid and the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) are addressing cannabis cultivation as part of their food security 
programming, local law enforcement find it hard to maintain a focus on it. Although 
the workplan of the TOCU is decided jointly by local law enforcement and external 
actors, international security concerns tend to dominate.  
There is mutual suspicion you see, in terms of they want us to do things 
according to how they want, to benefit their own countries… They‘re 
trying to increase security here, by pumping money into our agencies. It‘s 
basically to make sure their country is also secure. In the process, we make 
our country secure, because we have our national interest. So cannabis, 
cannabis doesn‘t impact on them, but it does affect us…  If we can do it 
mutually, we develop it so it suits both sides. But at the same time they are 




While addressing organised crime has local benefits, the emphasis on international 
priorities suggests that external actors will address organised crime to the extent that 
it is no longer a threat to their own countries. This suggests a minimal approach that 
seeks to contain organised crime in Sierra Leone, limiting the spread internationally. 
Such an approach does not necessarily engage with the underlying factors that make 
Sierra Leone conducive to organised crime. In the long-term, this approach will 
ensure that organised crime continues to threaten international security even if the 
threat is minimised in the short-term. 
 
The Inclusion of Development 
 
While it is clear that international initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra 
Leone are driven by self-interest, it is this self-interest that resulted in the adoption of 
the security-development nexus to frame international initiatives. As noted earlier, it 
has become increasingly apparent that a pure security approach is inadequate in 
addressing organised crime. This section examines to what extent development 
informs initiatives to address organised crime. 
 
To bring development elements into their approach to organised crime, external 
actors in Sierra Leone had a significant emphasis on capacity building. External 
actors identified gaps in equipment and training, and provided assistance and advice 
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to ensure local law enforcement were able to effectively pursue cases.
81
 The aim was 
to enhance the investigation and prosecution of crimes and reduce criminal activity 
by building capacity in drug interdiction, forensics, intelligence, border management, 
money laundering and criminal justice (UNODC 2010c).   
 
Working with law enforcement to build their capacity in all forms of policing has 
beneficial consequences beyond addressing organised crime. Enhanced capacity of 
the police improves the legitimacy of the state and avoids the potential of renewed 
conflict, particularly in post-conflict countries such as Sierra Leone, where police 
were involved in the war as combatants. As Brinkerhoff (2007: 5) states 
‗unaccountable, corrupt and/or subversive security forces are major barriers to state 
legitimacy, impede the restoration of basic services and often contribute to reigniting 
conflict‘. As such, capacity building of law enforcement agencies contributes to 
broader post-conflict reconstruction. 
 
While initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone have a significant focus 
on capacity building, this does not necessarily equate to the inclusion of 
development. In this context, capacity building refers to the creation of technical 
capabilities in law enforcement. There is no linkage to poverty reduction, governance 
or other elements of development. As such, capacity building is about restoring the 
status quo rather than engaging in transformative development. 
 
The inclusion of capacity building in this context does, however, point to the 
integration of security and development. In the long-term, capacity building provides 
local law enforcement with the skills and knowledge to pursue their own objectives 
as well as those of internationals. Equipped with the necessary skills, law 
enforcement agencies in Sierra Leone would then be able to address the rise in 
cannabis production as well as cocaine trafficking. However, international priorities 
will continue to be used to measure success. It is likely that international support will 
dry up once their objectives have been achieved even if capacity hasn‘t been 
significantly improved. For example, while the US is supporting the WACI, they are 
not too concerned with organised crime in Sierra Leone, but will devote more 
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resources if it becomes more serious.
82
 Unless local priorities are aligned with 
international security concerns, it may be more difficult to obtain necessary funding. 
 
The focus on capacity building also ensures that international security concerns are 
addressed in the long term. UNODC‘s 2009 Transnational Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment of West Africa noted a decline in trafficking through the region that was 
partly attributed to external engagement. However, it also noted that ‗despite 
progress, it appears that at least one billion dollars‘ worth of cocaine continues to be 
trafficked through the region, and the West African distribution network in Europe 
remains intact. Should international attention waver, this region retains all of the 
attractions that drew traffickers here in the first place‘ (UNODC 2009: 3). Building 
the capacity of local law enforcement to address organised crime maintains pressure 
on the flow of cocaine, reducing the likelihood that it will increase. However, this 
statement from UNODC also acknowledges that the other factors that are conducive 
to organised crime have not been addressed, as the ‗region retains all of the 
attractions that drew traffickers‘ to West Africa, including weak governance, high 
unemployment, and a lack of effective border patrols (UNODC 2009:3). 
 
As capacity building is solely focused on law enforcement, it only addresses the 
symptoms of organised crime rather than working with local actors to address the 
causes. The emphasis on building the capacity of local law enforcement enhances 
their ability to respond to cases of organised crime through investigation, interdiction 
and prosecution. However, this occurs after the incident. Some internationals 
understand this strategy to be a deterrent for organised crime: ‗I take the view that if 
it doesn‘t pay and constantly gets disrupted, you give up and go somewhere else‘.83 
However, this underestimates the flexibility and ingenuity of organised crime 
networks. 
 
As noted earlier, UNODC engages in community centred prevention, assistance to 
victims, juvenile justice, treatment and rehabilitation and HIV/AIDS prevention and 
care. Similarly, UNIPSIL focused on drug demand reduction, treatment, prevention 
and rehabilitation. While these initiatives were located at the community level 
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through engagement with NGOs and civil society, they were designed to limit the 
threat posed by organised crime to the state and international security. As such, these 
strategies were also driven by the motivations of external actors. As with capacity 
building, this means that drug demand reduction and treatment may be discontinued 
once external actors decide that Sierra Leone is no longer a threat. Although, once 
initiated these programmes can continue with support from other sources. 
 
Although capacity building is a key strategy of development actors, development 
elements have not been a considerable focus of initiatives to address organised crime 
in Sierra Leone. If development or underdevelopment were a significant concern of 
external actors, initiatives would move beyond law enforcement to address the 
underlying factors that provide a conducive environment for organised crime. As 
discussed in relation to the other tensions, underdevelopment can contribute to 
organised crime through youth unemployment, poverty and weak governance. 
Development is not brought in to address these issues in connection with organised 
crime. Rather, development is tacked on to security approaches when it is useful for 
achieving security. As such, security remains the overarching priority within the 
security-development nexus, which consequently affects the role of development. 
While this undermines a comprehensive approach, it does indicate a shift away from 




Examining the four hypothesised tensions in relation to the practices of external 
actors in Sierra Leone reveals the factors that inhibit the integration of security and 
development into a nexus. External actors have different understandings of security 
and development, which influence the type of nexus that emerges. The conceptual 
tension also creates difficulty for collaboration, which was the aim of the WACI‘s 
multi-agency approach, as different actors imbue the security-development nexus 
with different meaning. External actors also have different perspectives on the causal 
relationship between security and development. This arises from different 
understandings of the linkages between security and development. This tension has 
implications for the form of integration between security and development.  
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The institutional underpinnings of security and development also create a tension 
that influences the integration of security and development. Although the 
understanding and approach to organised crime taken by external actors in Sierra 
Leone has shifted away from the security ideal type, the institutional architecture 
continues to adhere to security, which suggests that organised crime is understood 
and approached through a security lens, bringing in development where needed to 
achieve security outcomes. This becomes more evident in the motivational tension. 
Although development is included through capacity building and other activities, it is 
clear that international security concerns remain the priority, which influences how 
development is brought into the nexus. The consequences of these tensions will be 











Chapter 4: Tensions in the Security-Development Nexus: 
Bosnia 
 
As in Sierra Leone, external actors addressing organised crime in Bosnia readily 
adopted the security-development nexus. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) was a 
cross-pillar instrument, deployed as an European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) mission, which brought together a focus on long-term development, short-
term security and justice and home affairs (Juncos 2007). As such, EUPM was firmly 
situated within the security-development nexus. The main goal of EUPM was ‗to 
establish sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ownership in accordance with best European and international practice, thereby 
raising current Bosnia and Herzegovina police standards‘ (UN Security Council 
2004). In contrast to Sierra Leone, organised crime is more varied in Bosnia. As well 
as drug trafficking, the country also experiences trafficking in many illicit 
commodities, from people to high-excise goods, as well economic crimes. 
 
In the final two phases, EUPM‘s mandate narrowed to support ‗law enforcement 
agencies in the fight against organised crime and corruption, notably focusing on 
state level law enforcement agencies, on the interaction between police and 
prosecutor and on regional and international cooperation‘ (EUPM 2012c). Although 
the security-development nexus framed the mission, many of the practices during 
these phases remained security focused. This chapter examines how the four 
hypothesised tensions influenced the integration of security and development into a 
nexus through its implementation in Bosnia. Drawing on interviews and official 
documentation, the chapter assesses how security and development were understood 
within EUPM and how the causal relationship between security and development 
was viewed; it assesses the institutional underpinnings of EUPM and the motivations 




As previously discussed, the way external actors understand security and 
development can be quite different. These different understandings are rarely directly 
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articulated, but they have a significant influence on how the security-development 
nexus is implemented in practice. In contrast to the multi-agency approach in Sierra 
Leone, organised crime in Bosnia was primarily addressed through EUPM. 
However, the potential for divergent understandings of security and development 
remains, with an influence on the type of nexus that emerges. 
 
This section will examine how security and development were understood within 
EUPM by identifying the referent object and locus of initiatives to address organised 
crime in Bosnia. Based on this analysis, the understandings of security and 
development will be plotted on the diagram presented in Figure 1 (see p. 59). 
Analysis focuses on interviews with actors addressing organised crime and the 
official documentation of EUPM. It also engages with key European policies that 
informed EUPM, such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the European 




The locus of EUPM‘s initiatives was at the state level, as the overarching objective 
was to enhance internal security. The aim was to build the capacity of Bosnian 
security institutions, from regular police to specialised agencies such as the State 
Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and the Border Police, to provide a 
secure environment. As a result, the understanding of security fits within quadrant A 
or B, depending on the referent object. 
 
The emphasis on law enforcement bodies suggests a state level referent object, as the 
aim was to strengthen national security. However, strengthening law enforcement 
may also be a strategy to enhance people‘s security, by ensuring there are 
mechanisms in place that reduce the impact of organised crime. The rationale behind 
the focus on organised crime also points to the international level as the referent 
object of security. ‗Bosnia and Herzegovina, geographically located on the infamous 
Balkan Route, is the last bastion in the fight against all forms of organised crime, 
from drug trafficking to car thefts to human smuggling, before this evil reaches the 
European Union‘ (Osmanović-Vukelić 2012). This statement identifies the 
containment of organised crime within Bosnia and the Western Balkan region to 
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ensure European security as a key focus of EUPM. With the international level as the 
referent object and a locus at the state level, this places EUPM‘s understanding of 
security in quadrant B: hard security. 
 
Scholars have argued that the disjuncture between Bosnian and European security 
resulted in ‗strategic vagueness‘, incoherent policies and less effective solutions 
(Schroeder 2009: 500). The division has implications for whether approaches to 
organised crime adhere to a hard security approach, or become more focused on 
human security.  Focusing on EU security suggests a desire to address organised 
crime effectively and efficiently. However, focusing on Bosnian security suggests a 
long-term focus that addresses the concerns of citizens. As Schroeder (2009: 500) 
argues, in Bosnia ‗the EU is torn between its external policy of fostering democratic 
reforms and human security and between pursuing its quest for domestic security 
through fighting crime and stabilising its neighbouring ―ring of fire‖‘. Ioannides and 
Collantes-Celador (2011: 422) argue that the priority often becomes hard security, as 
‗police effectiveness and crime fighting can become more important than longer-
term democratic policing and good governance reforms‘. This suggests that the 
international level remains the primary referent object, as containing organised crime 
is prioritised over individual needs.  
 
In contrast to how security was understood within EUPM policy, mission personnel 
emphasised individual security. An EUPM official noted ‗you want to increase the 
security of the citizens and you want citizens to perceive that they‘re more secure 
and safer... In order to do that you need to make sure that they believe in it, and to do 
that it needs to be more than a military presence. It needs to be that they have 
confidence that the police are working for them not the government‘.84 These 
perspectives influenced the development of the Mission Implementation Plan. The 
result was a focus on developing standards of democratic policing in accordance with 
human rights principles (EUPM 2012b). While the locus of initiatives remained at 
the state level, such an approach shifts understandings of security away from hard 
security measures to focus on individual people as the referent object. Alongside 
policing, EUPM also engaged in thematic areas such as gender balance, gender 
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 Interview, EUPM Official, Sarajevo, 20 March 2012. 
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mainstreaming, media support and rule of law (EUPM 2012b). These programmes 
also shift initiatives to address organised crime away from a hard security approach. 
As such, the understanding of security among EUPM personnel fit within quadrant 
A: top-down benevolence. 
 
As EUPM was designed to contribute to EU policy and peace implementation 
through policing, the understandings expressed at the strategic, or headquarter, level 
also influenced the mandate, objectives and approach of EUPM. For instance, as an 
ESDP mission, understandings of security within the ESDP also influenced EUPM‘s 
approach. The ESDP sought to ‗strengthen security and resolutely combat dangers 
such as …organised crime‘ (European Council 1999: 10). Organised crime is 
considered ‗a major obstacle for the consolidation of law and order in former crisis 
areas‘ (European Council 2004: 2). This suggests that the post-conflict state is the 
referent object of EU involvement. However, the ESDP also noted that ‗Europe is a 
prime target for organised crime (cross-border trafficking in drugs, human beings, 
and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs) and 
external action, inter alia through international police missions, can help improve our 
internal security‘ (European Council 2004: 2). This suggests that ESDP missions 
such as EUPM seek to strengthen capacity to address security threats to limit their 
impact on the EU. This points to the international level as referent object, with 
activities to combat organised crime focused at the state level. The ESDP 
understanding of security extends across quadrant B to include both internal and 
external security. However, it remains focused on hard security approaches. 
 
The European Security Strategy, drafted in 2003 also influenced the mandate and 
objectives of EUPM, as ‗the European Council decided that one of the initial 
priorities for implementation of the EU Security Strategy should be the elaboration 
of a comprehensive policy for Bosnia and Herzegovina‘ (Council of the European 
Union 2004: 2). Security threats and challenges set out in the ESS include terrorism, 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. 
While these threats do impact on individuals, in this context they are considered as 
transnational threats that affect security within the EU. By prioritising European 
security, the referent object is the international level. The EU seeks to identify and 
contain these threats before they affect Member states.  
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In practice, the method of addressing these threats moves beyond a hard security 
approach. The ESS recognises that ‗none of these threats are purely military and 
cannot be tackled by purely military means‘ (EU 2003: 8). The ESS states that the 
‗best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. 
Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human 
rights are the best means of strengthening the international order‘ (EU 2003: 11). 
This suggests that organised crime should be addressed by ensuring good governance 
and rule of law in Bosnia. ‗Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering 
democracy and enabling authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most 
effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU‘ (EU 2003: 7). As the 
ESS is primarily focused on European security, its understanding of security fits in 
quadrant B. The shift away from hard security measures brings security closer to the 
centre, between quadrants A and B, as the ESS perceives good governance and rule 
of law reforms as the most effective strategy to maintain and protect EU security. 
 
While there is some interest in Bosnian security, which suggests a long-term focus 
that engages with the needs of citizens, there is also a significant emphasis on 
containing organised crime before it affects the EU. Among EU personnel, citizen 
security was prioritised. This may suggest that security was not clearly defined 
within EUPM, or that they rejected the mandate and focused more on the needs of 
citizens. Either way, the locus of initiatives was at the state level, as the emphasis 
was on building the capacity of state institutions. This limits the understandings of 
security to quadrants A and B. However, the understanding stretches across both 
quadrants (see figure 6). As a result, EUPM‘s understanding of security began to 




The reference to good governance and rule of law within the ESS brought elements 
of development into initiatives to address organised crime in Bosnia. Good 
governance and rule of law programmes seek to refocus police activities on the needs 
of citizens, ensuring democratic processes and justice mechanisms are in place. This 
implies that the understanding of development fits within quadrant A: top-down 
 168 
benevolence. It acknowledges the need for programmes to benefit citizens, but 
initiatives were still implemented at the state level.  
 
Alongside good governance and rule of law programmes, EUPM also focused on 
economic development. EUPM recognised that ‗organised crime is holding back 
Bosnia by preventing foreign investment, economic growth, and slowing down 
European integration‘ (Osmanović-Vukelić 2012: 44). This reiterates the focus on 
the state level, as the primary concern is investment and growth. While economic 
growth also has benefits for citizens, the primary concern here is state stability. 
However, concerns over state stability also point to the international level as referent 
object, as economic growth contributes to European security. The focus on economic 
development places development within quadrant B, as it is believed that growth will 
enhance the stability of Bosnia, ensuring it is less of a threat to European security. 
 
For many EUPM officials, the primary aim of the mission was security focused as 
they worked with law enforcement agencies across the country. Development was 
understood to be included within European integration and enlargement policies.
85
 
As a potential candidate for accession to the EU, Bosnia has been engaged in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process, as part of the EU‘s enlargement policy. 
Although there have been a number of setbacks arising from difficulties in meeting 
their obligations, Bosnia signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, which 
sets out the conditions required for EU membership in 2008. Membership of the EU 
requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, 
the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union as set out in the Acquis 
Communautaire and the Copenhagen Criteria (European Council 1993). As such, 
development was viewed in the context of broader rule of law reforms and economic 
development. As with good governance and rule of law, the inclusion of 
development suggests that initiatives to address organised crime would focus on the 
needs of citizens, which would place understandings of development in quadrant A. 
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 Interview, EUPM Official, Sarajevo, 18 October 2011. 
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Viewing development as connected to the enlargement process has been criticised by 
development NGOs as it makes the security-development nexus ‗essentially about 
diverting poverty relief into support for Western strategic objectives‘ (Youngs 2007: 
13). While integration and enlargement policies include a focus on development, 
these policies are designed to maintain the stability and integrity of the EU. From 
this perspective development is not focused on individuals needs, but seeks to 
address the international level as referent object. This would place EUPM‘s 
understanding of development into quadrant B. 
 
There is also a lack of clarity on what the enlargement strategy means for approaches 
to organised crime. The 2005 Enlargement Strategy considered organised crime to be 
‗a major threat for Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s stability and overall socio-economic 
development‘ (Commission of the European Communities 2005: 20). Similarly, the 
2011 Enlargement Progress Report recognised that organised crime has ‗a negative 
impact on political structures and the economy‘ (European Commission 2011: 57). 
Addressing organised crime was viewed as the role of EUPM through security and 
law enforcement tasks. This suggests a limited understanding on what development 
strategies can bring to initiatives to address organised crime even though EUPM was 
a cross-pillar instrument. During the final two phases of EUPM, progress towards 
accession was the key focus of the EU Delegation. As such, development was often 
viewed as the remit of the EU Delegation, while EUPM focused on security 
concerns. This suggests that understanding development in relation to enlargement 




Although organised crime in Bosnia was primarily addressed through EUPM, rather 
than a coalition of actors as in Sierra Leone, conceptual tension remains prevalent. 
Despite being a cross-pillar instrument that combines security and development, 
there was no clear understanding of development among actors addressing organised 
crime. The focus on good governance and rule of law suggests both state-level and 
individual referent objects. However, EUPM officials considered development to be 
part of the broader EU Enlargement strategy, reiterating the international level as 
referent object. While enlargement addresses many areas connected to development, 
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 This issue will be examined in more detail in the following section, which analyses the linkages 
between security and development. 
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organised crime is considered as a security problem. As such, there was no 
consistency on how development was understood in relation to EU initiatives to 
address organised crime.  
 
There was also a lack of consistency in how security was understood. At the strategic 
level, the referent object was international security, as EU security was the primary 
concern. This was translated into EUPM policy, which sought to achieve EU security 
by working at the state level. However, EUPM officials also identified individuals as 
the referent object. This suggests that while understandings of security were 
influenced by EU policy, on the ground they became more human-centred. Rather 
than integrating security and development, initiatives focused primarily on security 
elements such as law enforcement. References to development through the 
enlargement strategy suggested a conviction that other actors, such as the EU 
Delegation, would address development aspects. However, as enlargement does not 
directly address organised crime, development was neglected in initiatives to address 
organised crime.  
 
 
Figure 6 Understandings of Security and Development in Bosnia 
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The lack of consensus is evident in Figure 6. This diagram differs from the mapping 
of different actors in Sierra Leone, as it maps different elements of the EU approach. 
In relation to understandings of security, within EUPM there were different 
perspectives from personnel that focus on individual needs, the emphasis on internal 
(Bosnian) security and the emphasis on external (EU) security. EUPM was also 
influenced by two European policies, ESDP and ESS. Although these fall into the 
same quadrant, they are not aligned with the understandings within EUPM. There 
were also varied understandings of development. There was a focus on good 
governance, which primarily falls in quadrant A, although some policies suggest that 
this is to bolster European interests rather than just individual needs. The focus on 
enlargement and economic development remains in quadrant B, relying on economic 
understandings of development. 
 
These understandings influence the type of nexus that emerges. The different 
understandings mean there cannot be a clear security-development nexus across the 
mission. While some parts of the mission, such as EUPM personnel, began to engage 
with individual needs, traditional security approaches remain dominant. With 
understandings of development primarily falling within quadrant B, it is difficult for 
development to have a ‗humanising‘ effect on security, and contribute to a shift 
towards an emancipatory approach. Despite this, there has still been a shift away 




The recognition of the relationship between security and development, and the 
urgency to develop new, comprehensive approaches to complex challenges, suggests 
that the causal relationship between security and development is uncontested and 
viewed in the same way by all actors engaging with the nexus. However, there are 
many different perspectives on the causal relationship. Despite the different 
perspectives, the expected cause and effect between security and development is 
rarely articulated. To determine how the causal relationship is understood, this 
research has examined how security and development are applied by external actors, 
and the linkages between them. This section examines how security and development 
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are applied in Bosnia and how the linkage between security and development is 




This section examines how security and development were applied by EUPM – 
whether they were processes developed in partnership with local actors, or an end 
state that may have been predetermined by external actors. These different 
applications affect the causal relationship between security and consequently how the 
two concepts are integrated. As a process, security and development are a direct 
cause of the desired goal of external involvement, whereas as an end state, security 
and development are an effect of external involvement.  
 
As in Sierra Leone, EUPM‘s perspective on how security is applied adhered to the 
traditional view – security is an end state where the referent object is secure. 
EUPM‘s mandate was to ensure the security of society, as well as maintain EU 
security through initiatives to address organised crime. This implies that security is 
an end state to be achieved through EUPM‘s engagement, whether it is Bosnian 
security or European security. EUPM supported Bosnian law enforcement 
institutions to provide ‗the necessary security to the society it serves‘ (Osmanović-
Vukelić 2012: 31). Part of EUPM‘s approach was to ‗contribute to internal security‘ 
and extend the area of security to potential member states.
87
 These references focus 
on security as an end state that EUPM is working towards. This approach included 
‗increasing the security of citizens‘.88 While this is a less tangible understanding of 
security as it invokes individual perceptions, it still refers to an end state to be 
achieved. EUPM also focused on threats to security and ‗security concerns‘.89 This 
reinforces the view that security is an end state, as it indicates that security is a 
condition that can be undermined by organised crime. Understanding security as an 
end state implies that the goal may be predetermined by external actors. However, 
local needs were brought in to a certain extent, as the mission aimed to increase the 
security of citizens. 
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 Interview, EUPM Official, Sarajevo, 18 October 2011. 
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While security is often understood as an end state, development has been more 
variable. Bosnia differs from Sierra Leone in that it is not a developing country. As 
such, development has played a less prominent role. Despite this, EUPM lamented 
that law enforcement did not meet ‗hopes for the development of BiH‘ in 2009 
(Osmanović-Vukelić 2012). Similarly, organised crime was viewed by EUPM as the 
biggest obstacle in Bosnia‘s development (Osmanović-Vukelić 2012). Helly (2013: 
75) noted that ‗fighting organised crime and curbing corruption are key to lasting 
stability and peaceful development‘. These references to development suggest that it 
was viewed as a desired end state that is undermined by organised crime. 
 
Among the contributing organisations to EUPM, there were different perspectives on 
development, which made its application more ambiguous. For the European 
Commission, development played a more significant role than it did for the Council. 
The Commission‘s approach focuses on institution building and the reform agenda 
put forward by EUPM (Juncos 2007). While the focus on institution building furthers 
the perspective that development is a process, it seeks to achieve specific, predefined 
goals. Such an approach is aligned with arguments that development would be 
enhanced by the accession agenda, which sets out concrete benchmarks that Bosnia 
must achieve before it becomes an EU Member State. 
 
Within EUPM, security was applied as an end state – the goal to be achieved through 
external involvement. This adheres to the traditional perspective of security, which 
suggests that the application of security has not been modified through the security-
development nexus. While there is some ambiguity with development, it appeared to 
be primarily viewed as an end state. With security and development both applied as 
an end state, these understandings do not raise questions of how the two concepts are 
integrated – external engagement seeks to achieve both security and development as 
the end goal. However, given the predetermined objectives, such as the benchmarks 
necessary for accession, viewing security and development as end goals undermines 
the shift away from a traditional security approach towards emancipation, as local 
communities are excluded from decision-making on what the end state of security 






Within EUPM there were also different perspectives on the linkages between 
security and development. As set out in chapter 1, these perspectives exist on a 
spectrum from separate to integrated, with different categories in between, including 
interdependent, sequential, hierarchical, mutually constitutive or synonymous 
linkages. These different relationships influence the form of integration between 
security and development. This section examines how the linkage between security 
and development was viewed within EUPM‘s initiatives to address organised crime 
in Bosnia.  
 
EU policy acknowledges that ‗there cannot be sustainable development without 
peace and security, and that without development and poverty eradication there will 
be no sustainable peace‘ (EU 2007: 1). Yet there remains a lack of consensus on the 
linkages between security and development. In 2007, the Council of the EU stated 
that ‗the nexus between development and security should inform EU strategies and 
policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action‘ (EU 2007: 1). 
As EU policy on external engagement has developed a strong recognition of the links 
between security and development, there was an expectation that this would transfer 
into practice through EUPM. EUPM was a cross-pillar instrument bringing together 
development, short-term security, and justice and home affairs (Juncos 2007). This 
implies that EUPM combined security and development in its approach to organised 
crime in Bosnia. However, as a police mission, EUPM‘s approach to organised crime 
prioritised policing and law enforcement institutions. This suggests that the linkage 
was not integrated. 
 
Many EUPM officials saw the mission‘s objectives as security focused. There are 
‗papers that say that [security and development are linked], but how we actually do 
this, we are very focused on the security sector. So we have horizontal activities, say 
gender, human rights activities, outreach, public information, but that‘s rather 
horizontal and marginal to what the activity is‘.90 While both security and 
development elements were brought in to EUPM‘s approach, they were not 
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connected. However, development institutions fund relevant projects within EUPM 
that have a focus on security.
91
 This suggests a sequential linkage between security 
and development, as the aim was to restore security through policing and law 
enforcement to create space for development.  
 
EUPM‘s prioritisation of security to create space for development was further 
evidenced by the transition of organised crime programmes from EUPM to the EU 
Delegation. Following the withdrawal of EUPM in June 2012, much of the work on 
organised crime moved over to the EU Delegation. This shift was viewed as a 
transition from a crisis management or post-conflict agenda to institution building, or 
enlargement with a focus on the conditions for accession.
92
 These separate phases 
have parallels with a sequential perspective of the security-development nexus. The 
crisis management/ post-conflict phase focused on security issues, whereas the 
accession logic can be considered part of a development approach as it entailed rule 
of law reform and institution building to ensure social and economic cohesion with 
Europe.  
 
The sequential understanding continued with the accession agenda. The EU 
enlargement strategy sees organised crime as a threat to both security and 
development. ‗Organised crime is considered a major threat for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina‘s stability and overall socio-economic development‘ (Commission of 
the European Communities 2005: 20). However, the Stabilisation and Association 
process progress reports address political criteria, economic criteria and European 
standards separately from strategies to address organised crime (European 
Commission 2010; European Commission 2011; European Commission 2012). 
Organised crime is evaluated under ‗Justice, Freedom and Security‘, with a focus 
solely on law enforcement strategies (Commission of the European Communities 
2009). While organised crime impacts on both security and development, it is 
addressed solely through security approaches within the enlargement strategy.  
 
Despite the prioritisation of security on the ground, development has increasingly 
taken a stronger role in EU policy. The Maastricht Treaty noted that in its external 
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relations the EU seeks to ‗contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development 
of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among people, free and fair trade, 
eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights‘ (EU 1992). The Treaty 
also calls for greater cooperation in addressing organised crime (EU 1992). While 
security and development are both viewed as important, article 3 states that ‗the 
Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in 
the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies‘ 
(EU 1992). This implies a stronger linkage, where security and development policies 
are consistent with each other, however it didn‘t extend to integration in Bosnia. 
 
These linkages were consolidated in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, which rearranged 
external engagement to consolidate the different areas of engagement. While the 
Lisbon Treaty removed the pillar structure that kept security and development policy 
separate, they continued to be governed by different actors (Lords 2008). ‗The 
developmental, long-term institution building remit of the Commission is supposed 
to complement the security-focused, short-term crisis management remit of the 
Council‘ (Ryan 2011: 95). Article 208 of the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning 
of Europe, which was amended by the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that development 
objectives have to be taken into account by all EU policies (European Union 2010). 
This implies a much closer integration of security and development policies. 
Sjolinder (2010) argues that increased harmonisation will improve approaches to 
organised crime. These policy changes indicate a shift towards a more integrated 
relationship between security and development in EU missions such as EUPM. 
However, this was not evident in the implementation of initiatives to address 
organised crime in Bosnia. 
 
The European Security Strategy (ESS), which was been a key driver in EUPM‘s 
approach maintained the separation of security and development. The ESS states that 
‗security is a precondition for development‘ (EU 2003: 3). This implies that security 
is viewed with urgency while development comes later. However, the ESS also 
considers development as a strategy to achieve security for the EU. Poverty and 
disease, problems of underdevelopment, are seen to ‗give rise to pressing security 
concerns‘ (EU 2003: 3). These two arguments see security and development as 
interconnected, in that security is necessary for development, and development can 
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be useful to achieve European security. However, they continue to be separate areas 
of focus. The ESS understanding of the security-development nexus is one of 
interdependence rather than integration. This may be changing. The ESS also 
acknowledged that ‗we are stronger when we act together… the challenge now is to 
bring together the different capabilities, European assistance programmes and the 
European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member states 
and other instruments‘ (EU 2003: 14).  
 
While this remains in the context of different institutions working together, rather 
than an integrated approach, the 2008 report on the ESS goes further. By ‗drawing on 
a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. 
We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, 
promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and 
addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity‘ (EU 2008: 2). While this brings 
the two concepts closer together, they remain interdependent, rather than integrated. 
This was the case in Bosnia. EUPM sought to combine a range of EU instruments to 
address organised crime. However, in practice the result was a ‗security first‘ 
approach. As the aim is to create space for development and development actors, the 
linkage between security and development was viewed as sequential. 
 
While the EU appears to have entrenched the security-development nexus in their 
policymaking in external affairs, a divide remained between security and 
development in the practices of EUPM. Security policies such as the ESS assert that 
security is a precondition for development. However, the result is not an integrated 
relationship between security and development. While the two elements are 
connected, they remain separate and sequential. Bosnia‘s ranking as an upper middle 
income country may explain the low priority given to development and poverty 
reduction (World Bank 2004). However, the EU Consensus on Development 
recognises that ‗a large number of the world‘s poor live in [middle income] countries 
and many are confronted with striking inequalities and weak governance, which 
threaten the sustainability of their own development process‘ (EU 2005: 10). 
Unemployment remains a major concern for Bosnians (Prism Research 2012). Other 
issues that tend to fall to development rather than security bodies such as corruption 
also remain a significant factor for organised crime. While EUPM did address 
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corruption, the focus was primarily on the law enforcement and criminal justice 
sectors, rather than the higher levels that facilitate organised crime. While weak 
governance and poverty provide a conducive environment for organised crime, they 
are not addressed in this one-sided approach to the security-development nexus. 
 
Within EUPM there is no direct causal relationship between security and 
development. However, the aim to create space for development creates a shift in the 
approach of external actors. Although this does not equate to the integration of 
security and development, it does indicate the beginnings of shift away from a 




With different institutional architecture, a different understanding of problems and 
different approaches, the actors and institutions that inform the implementation of 
initiatives to address organised crime create an institutional tension that influences 
how security and development are integrated into a nexus. Drawing on ideal type 
analysis, this section examines whether external actors addressing organised crime in 
Bosnia continue to be influenced by the institutional underpinnings of security or 




Before EUPM was deployed, key contributors and donors had a significant influence 
on the mandate and objectives of the mission. These actors played a key role in 
designing the mission, and thus influenced the institutional architecture – in 
particular whether the mission originated from a security or development 
perspective. 
 
As an EU mission, the institutional architecture of EUPM was influenced by EU 
policies. While EU crisis management missions were at the time generally under 
Pillar II, foreign and security policy, EUPM was a cross-pillar instrument, also 
bringing in Pillar I, with a focus on long-term development, and Pillar III, addressing 
justice and home affairs (Hansen 2004; Emerson and Gross 2007). However, the 
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Council Conclusions on Security and Development recognised that ‗the 
responsibilities of development and security actors are complementary but remain 
specific‘ (EU 2007: 1). Gourlay (2004) and Osland (2004) argue that the pillar 
structure is a major barrier to civilian crisis management as mandates, goals and 
financial priorities fall to different pillars. As a result, EUPM was influenced by 
contributors from both security and development perspectives. However, rather than 
merging the two areas remained separate. As Schroeder (2007: 28) notes, ‗first and 
second pillar actors have followed diverging strategies of organisational innovation‘. 
 
The division between development cooperation and security policy is entrenched in 
EU Treaties. Article 209 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU places 
development cooperation within the ordinary legislative procedure, whereby the 
European Commission proposes programmes to be approved by European 
Parliament and the Council of the EU (European Union 2010). In contrast, Article 24 
of the Treaty on European Union provides for unanimous decision making on 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, which includes ESDP and now Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), by the European Council and Council of the 
European Union (EU 1992). Merket (2012: 628) argues that ‗this treaty-based 
distinction between development cooperation and security and defence policy tends 
to jeopardise the intuitive complementarity of both policy fields‘.  
 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council identifies the strategic (security) 
interests and objectives of the Union in terms of external action, supplying the 
political direction and priorities that shape the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(Mix 2011). Overall direction for EUPM is provided by the Political and Security 
Council (PSC), the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management 
(CIVCOM) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). The PSC, 
composed of ambassadors from Member states, monitors and assesses international 
affairs relevant to foreign and security policy, feeds into decision making in these 
areas and monitors implementation (Mix 2011). Within the PSC, CIVCOM provides 
advice on civilian aspects of crisis management, while the CPCC provides guidance 
on the planning, conduct and implementation of Common Security and Defence 
Policy missions (Youngs and Faria 2010). EUPM reported on the implementation of 
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their objectives to the PSC, CIVCOM and the CPCC.
93
 The focus on civilian 
involvement shifts beyond a military approach. However, the focus is still on the 
security sector, specifically policing, rule of law, civil administration and civil 
protection. With its focus on crisis management, the European Council is closely 
aligned with the security ideal type. This ensures that the institutional architecture of 
EUPM was influenced by the security perspective of the European Council. 
 
As well as the European Council, the European Commission also played a role in the 
management and oversight of civilian missions such as EUPM. As the European 
Commission housed European development policy, it was well placed to ensure that 
security and development approaches were connected in initiatives to address 
organised crime. With its focus on the judiciary and human rights, many 
Commissioners saw EUPM‘s mandate within their rule of law programme 
(Matthiessen 2013). Yet while the Maastricht Treaty states that the Commission is 
‗fully associated‘ with decisions on CFSP, in practice this is primarily consultative 
(Derks and More 2009). As a result, security interests remain the overriding priority. 
Although EU Civilian Crisis Management can draw on a wide range of mechanisms, 
Gourlay (2004: 404) argues that the ‗institutional structure and limited approach to 
developing crisis management capabilities within the intergovernmental decision-
making context of the ESDP means that its response to crises is neither integrated 
nor coherent‘.  
 
The security focus is amplified by the contributions of personnel by member states. 
While EU Crisis Management systems have shifted to incorporate civilian elements, 
procedures within Member States haven‘t adapted accordingly.  
When these crisis management centres in countries most of them were set 
up by foreign ministries to second staff from the interior ministries because 
they wanted police officers... If you look at Finland, their crisis 
management centre, they have agreements with all of their ministries; most 
of the good experts that were not from policing came from Finland. They 
sent us prison experts, ex-prison directors; all of our customs and duties 
experts... Whereas if you look at other countries, they‘ve never moved on 
from, well we can send you police officers, so they don‘t have 
arrangements with their ministries of justice, to find you prosecutors.
94
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When EU member states do send police, it‘s often military police. ‗They‘re already 
armed. So they‘ve already got gun training, but they‘re not really police officers 
...their role in their own country is different, and they don‘t have the experience of 
dealing with organised crime and corruption like you would get in England, London 
say. There are different skill sets that you need in these missions‘.95 As such, EUPM 
personnel were primarily drawn from a security background, many without civilian 
training. 
 
While the Commission sought to influence the mandate of EUPM, bringing in 
elements of development, the primary contributor was the European Council, with a 
strong security mandate, and EU Member States, which were keen to address 
organised crime before it reached their borders. As a result, the contributors to 
EUPM were closely aligned to the security ideal type. However, funding for EUPM 
was more diverse, leaning closer to the development ideal type. 
 
Funding for EUPM primarily came from the European Commission, through the 
Directorate of External Relations (DG RELEX). Although the Commission didn‘t 
have significant input into the implementation of EUPM, its contribution in terms of 
funding shifted the mission away from a pure security focus. One EUPM official 
noted that ‗development wasn‘t second fiddle, because it played a huge role in 
European funding of relevant projects‘.96 As a result, ‗some Commission officials 
argued that the mission in fact had ―two chains of command‖: one budgetary to the 
Commission and one political to the High Representative... and the Council‘ 
(Matthiessen 2013: 17). 
 
Although DG RELEX was integrated into the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) in December 2010, the ‗European Commission still plays an important 
role... as it is responsible for drafting the proposal for the EU budget, including 
allocations for Common Foreign and Security Policy‘ (EPLO 2012: 8). As well as 
funding EUPM directly, Commission funds also contributed to other initiatives to 
address organised crime in Bosnia. Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) was used for a project on integrated border 
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management (Flessenkemper 2013). CARDS also funded communication systems 
using voice over internet protocol (VoIP) and terrestrial trunked radio (tetra), and the 
automated fingerprint identification system.
97
 The Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) funded an anti-corruption project and the law enforcement project 
that succeeded EUPM (Flessenkemper 2013).  
 
Some of these projects overlapped with the work of EUPM. As the European 
Commission had limited decision making power over EUPM, these projects can be 
viewed as attempts by the European Commission to ensure that initiatives to address 
organised crime fit within their rule of law agenda, and furthered European 
Commission goals and objectives in Bosnia. While the projects included both 
security and development elements as they approached organised crime from the 
Commissions perspective, their separation from EUPM, and their overlap with 
EUPM projects revealed a deeper disconnect and competition between security and 
development institutions within the EU. Flessenkemper (2013: 60) noted that 
‗towards the last phase of the mission (2010-12), EUPM competed almost directly 
for qualified personnel with Community projects‘. Similarly, Schroeder (2007: 35-
36) noted that ‗the convergence of Council and Commission activities in the field of 
civilian crisis management and peacebuilding has led to a deterioration of their 
relationship rather than to better coordination of their work‘. 
 
Other donors also contributed to EUPM, adding other interests to the mandate and 
approach. Member states provided funding directly to certain projects. For example 
Norway and the UK jointly funded a project on police-prosecutor cooperation that 
was implemented by EUPM.
98
 As a result, Member States also influenced EUPM‘s 
approach to organised crime by pushing particular objectives. This means there were 
a number of influences on EUPM‘s approach to organised crime.  
 
While the key contributor to EUPM was the European Council, which aligns with the 
security ideal type, the European Commission also played a key role as the primary 
donor of the mission. This ensures that development elements are brought in to a 
certain extent. However, the efforts of the European Commission to implement its 
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own projects that overlapped with EUPM initiatives suggests that security influences 
dominate. While development did play a role at this level, analysis suggests that the 
institutional architecture of EUPM was security focused. 
 
Understanding of Organised Crime 
 
Organised crime was given greater priority by EUPM than the local population 
(Juncos 2007). This implies that organised crime was understood as a security threat 
to the European Union, resulting in more attention than the local level criminality 
that concerned citizens. However, some EUPM officials considered the problem 
greater than it appeared.  
You‘ll find some evidence of organised crime and corruption in the Balkan 
route in assessments of Bosnia, but because everyone in the country does 
not have the same intelligence sharing, nobody can give you an overall 
picture. If you want a true picture of it you won‘t be able to find one. Any 
threat assessment of the Balkans will show Bosnia as a bit of not too bad, 
but that only represents a lack of information.
99
  
While this can still indicate that organised crime is a threat to the EU, it also 
highlights that it should be a priority for local actors. 
 
Although EUPM sought to address organised crime before it became visible to 
citizens, it was still understood as a problem that could be addressed through a 
responsive approach, where police come in once a crime has been committed.
100
 
Police became more proactive, developing relationships with communities to avoid 
and prevent problems.
101
 However, police sought to prevent organised crime by 
making it more difficult rather than addressing the underlying factors that make 
organised crime possible and allow it to flourish in Bosnia. The aim of EUPM was to 
enhance the capacity of law enforcement bodies to ensure they were better able to 
respond to incidents of organised crime. This approach maintained a focus on 
coercive strategies. As a result, the understanding of organised crime adhered to the 
security ideal type. 
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The language adopted by EUPM also indicates that organised crime is understood in 
security terms. The mission location was referred to as the ‗theatre‘.102 This has 
become common in military operations and peacekeeping missions, it is linked to 
Clausewitz (1832), who used ‗theatre‘ to ‗denote properly such a portion of the space 
over which war prevails‘. Staffing was referred to as ‗force generation‘ 
(Flessenkemper 2013). Even the term ‗mission‘ is usually reserved for security 
programmes, being employed by NATO and the UN to refer to security operations to 
end and manage violence and maintain peace. 
 
The language employed by EUPM was technical and task oriented. The focus was 
primarily on the pursuit of organised crime networks, addressing ‗investigative 
capacity‘ (EUPM 2010a: 1). As with Sierra Leone, EUPM also included a focus on 
capacity building. However, language related to capacity building was also task 
oriented, focusing on specific objectives. The aim was ‗to assist in building an 
increased ability to plan and implement measures that are designed to fight organised 
crime and corruption within corruption resistant organisational structures‘, and 
increase ‗capability to identify, investigate and dismantle organised crime networks‘ 
(EUPM 2010b: 1). The language employed by EUPM is closely linked to the 
security ideal type, as it suggests that security threats need to be addressed in the 
most efficient way. 
 
Although EUPM sought to engage with local priorities, and employed capacity 
building to achieve their objectives, organised crime was understood in security 
terms. EUPM responded to incidents of organised crime rather than seeking to 
transform the structures that allow organised crime to flourish. This understanding is 
supported by the technical, security focused language employed by EUPM.  
 
Approach to Organised Crime 
 
The EU‘s objective in Bosnia was ‗to upgrade national capacities and intraregional 
cooperation and to support the ―hot pursuit‖ and arrest of criminals who cross 
country borders‘ (Montanaro-Jankovski 2005: 22). However, EUPM did not seek to 
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achieve these objectives and withdraw. Because of the Europeanisation agenda, EU 
engagement was more long-term than other missions that are ‗based on an in-and-out 
model‘ (Emerson and Gross 2007: 6), resembling the security ideal type. Initially the 
focus was very technical. The emphasis was on ‗technical assistance and 
professionalising the police, it was institution building mostly, with a lot of training 
on different technical aspects of police, surveillance, so setting up systems‘.103 The 
focus on institution building ‗provided expert advice and monitored the creation and 
strengthening of various institutions (the Ministry of Security, SIPA, SBS and 
Interpol) to increase the local capacity‘ (Juncos 2007: 59). 
 
EUPM gradually shifted from a policing mission to a rule of law mission and the 
practices became more strategic.
104
 The mission aimed to promote effectiveness and 
accountability and build the capacity of local law enforcement. This was often done 
through a needs analysis.  
We would work on these particular cases that we select as the most 
difficult and we work with them to overcome the problems, but we use that 
process as a needs analysis and gap analysis to identify in that process 
what doesn‘t work and how we can help and we can then work on the 
technical side with training.
105
  
Some EUPM officials perceived the emphasis on organised crime as a broader 
attempt to improve the capacity of the police force overall. ‗Looking at it from a 
technical point of view, if you are able to conduct an investigation into organised 
crime, which is one of the most complex, then you are capable of any kind of 
investigation‘.106 
 
Despite debates over the rationale for the focus on organised crime, EUPM aimed to 
work in partnership with local law enforcement. Penska (2008: 29) notes that ‗on the 
basis of its mandate [EUPM] utilised a bottom-up, functional approach‘, identifying 
areas of focus in collaboration with local counterparts. An EUPM official stated that 
this was put in practice by respecting ‗that these are police officers, they know their 
job, so go in at a level where you are there to support them as opposed to telling 
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them how it should be done‘.107 This wasn‘t always the case. The same official added 
‗I‘m not saying internationals didn‘t try and come over to individually impose things, 
but it wasn‘t an EUPM position to impose things‘.108 EUPM was not an executive 
mission, so it was unable to impose decisions: ‗we‘ve got no policing powers and if 
they don‘t do it properly we can‘t do it for them, we don‘t have the power to, we‘ve 
just got powers of persuasion‘.109 This means it was in the best interests of EUPM to 
develop strong collaborative relationships with local counterparts. Such an approach 
shifts away from the security ideal type, which aims to directly implement 
programmes. 
 
Problems with high-level corruption often made it difficult for local authorities to 
directly pursue some cases. One respondent noted that Bosnian police and 
prosecutors fear dealing with corruption more than death; ‗they are not willing to 
deal with organised crime where people get killed over links with corruption‘.110 In 
these cases, international involvement can be useful. Some members of local law 
enforcement state that they ‗need support from the international community to 
strengthen their approach‘.111 ‗There‘s relatively little interest in the Bosnian 
government in fighting corruption and organised crime. That said when pressure 
comes from the outside, especially in the form of task forces, or other countries, 
neighbouring countries that are particularly interested in arresting someone they 
sometimes will act, so there is activity, but the systemic organised crime that exists 
in the country, that‘s not an outside force, they tend not to do a whole lot‘.112 
 
While international assistance is useful, without an executive mandate EUPM did not 
always achieve successful outcomes. An EUPM official noted that corruption 
extends from organised crime to the highest level. ‗For us, when we are trying to 
implement something without imposition, you have to make sure it‘s strong enough 
to make an impact but weak enough to not get opposition‘.113 With powerful interests 
blocking initiatives, it was difficult to achieve reform. ‗The things we wanted to 
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achieve that we haven‘t achieved is because the politicians don‘t want it – money 
laundering laws, intelligence sharing between police agencies, coordination and 
cooperation‘.114 
 
In some instances these challenges resulted in a stronger partnership between EUPM 
and their local allies. During needs analysis, when problems were discovered, EUPM 
and local law enforcement identified the most effective way to achieve their goals.  
If we discovered a problem with SIPA on how they worked when we were 
working on a case, we ask ―why don‘t you speak to your chief of 
investigation‖, and they say ―pfft‖, we would speak with them. We would 




However, there is a risk that this approach generates reliance on internationals to do 
the difficult tasks. 
 
Despite being a police mission, EUPM‘s practices did not strictly adhere to the 
security ideal type. This becomes apparent when comparing EUPM to the EU‘s 
military force – EUFOR Bosnia. ‗Several operations were launched by the EUFOR 
to support local law enforcement to combat illegal activities such as weapons and 
drug smuggling, human trafficking and illegal logging... by participating actively in 
operations against organised crime‘ (Juncos 2007: 59). Rather than supporting local 
law enforcement, EUFOR engaged directly in pursuing organised crime. EUFOR 
had an executive mandate to provide a safe and secure environment, whereas EUPM 
aimed to build the capacity of local law enforcement to address organised crime 
themselves. Although EUPM still sought to achieve security outcomes, the practices 
moved beyond the security ideal type. In this regard, EUPM‘s approach to problems 
demonstrates a merging of security and development. 
 
Although EUPM aimed to achieve a joint approach with local law enforcement, the 
structure of the partnership remained hierarchical. ‗EUPM has stepped in with 
training and seminars and conferences and taken members from the police force 
away to see how it could be done differently, more for a joint approach than 
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changing it, to see what has worked in other places‘.116 The focus on training and 
exchanges implies that internationals brought expertise that was lacking locally. This 
perspective was amplified by the mentoring relationship between EUPM and local 
law enforcement. EUPM aimed to achieve their objectives by co-locating European 
police with local law enforcement as mentors. At its peak co-location was 
widespread.  
We had a relationship with every police agent at every level; we had field 
officers that worked not only in different locations but different offices and 
different agencies in those locations. So if there‘s a field office of the 
border police in Bijeljina, we had a team working in the field office in 




Referring to the mentoring relationship, one EUPM official noted ‗I think the 
stipulation is that you have 15 years service to mentor, but the mentee may have 25, 
and it‘s not to say you‘re lacking, because you could have technically been doing 
that job for 15 years, but it‘s the level of respect‘.118 An Italian officer serving in 
Banja Luka noted ‗if someone had come to me in Italy and said you had to do it like 
this, and if I didn‘t agree, or I didn‘t respect them, or they didn‘t come in at my level, 
I‘d have my back up‘.119 The hierarchical relationship was compounded by the lack 
of domestic capacity to drive changes. ‗Institutions are immature, internal plans are 
still evolving. They are not at the stage where they can tell donors what‘s needed‘.120 
As a result, local law enforcement was influenced by the aims of EUPM. 
 
The focus on partnerships with local law enforcement did result in a shift away from 
the security ideal type however, particularly as co-location and mentoring aimed to 
support local actors to find solutions. Despite this shift, a number of problems arose 
from working with government bodies. Many advances in addressing organised 
crime were blocked because of corruption or a lack of political will. Several EUPM 
officials expressed frustration over political blockages that prevented them from 
fulfilling their mandate. In particular, politicians blocked money laundering laws, 
international sharing between the police agencies, and initiatives to enhance 
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 Political blockages also prevented different police 
bodies from working together effectively. ‗It‘s the political and …state level 
corruption that is not facilitating that wheel to turn properly‘.122 As these influences 
are not always apparent it can create false hypotheses of what needs to be addressed 
within the police bodies. ‗When international agencies target the police, they don‘t 
get the results that they envisaged, because there were other factors that they weren‘t 
aware of, or didn‘t acknowledge they were so strong‘.123  
 
As EUPM was not an executive mission, personnel relied solely on the powers of 
persuasion to improve policing in Bosnia. One EUPM official noted that 
the mandate of missions …need to be far more detailed and agreed – we‘re 
working towards this, this is the overall end vision and this is what needs 
to be done to achieve that and we‘ll come and do that if you sign up to the 
fact that you want us to do it, but you‘re responsible for getting all your 
local counterparts to sign up to that too and not to block us so we‘re not 
fighting them all the time.
124
  
However, the international community did not necessarily take their lead from local 
institutions. The Republika Srpska Ministry of Security requested support to develop 
new databases and train police on how to use them. Their request was turned down, 
so they raised funds to do it themselves.
125
 It took several years before an adequate 
number of police were trained to use the new databases, but once they were it was an 
effective policing tool.
126
 In response, the international community supported the 




EUPM aimed to shift the approach of the police from protecting the state to 
protecting citizens. However, when it comes to law enforcement and ministries 
engaging with civil society, problems arise. Government bodies now have a 
responsibility to hold public hearings on new legislation to get feedback from civil 
society. However, civil society is rarely involved in preparing legislation, this is left 
to ministry staff and experts.
128
 This suggests that the knowledge and expertise of 
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civil society is not valued. When juvenile delinquency became an issue of concern in 
Bosnia in recent years, a local academic who had worked on two major studies of 
juvenile delinquency in Bosnia contacted the Ministry of Security offering to make 
the data available.
129
 The Ministry did not respond, but instead contacted an 
American academic for advice on doing their own research; the American academic 





Some bodies have improved their relationship with civil society. The Ministry of 
Security has been particularly effective in this area. When developing the anti-
corruption strategy:  
the ministry of security was inviting NGOs to participate in the working 
group that was working on the anti-corruption strategy and action plan and 
the law that would set up the anti-corruption agency… There was some 
hesitation in the beginning, sometimes their relationship is a conflictual 
one by nature, between the NGOs wanting to see some progress and the 
authorities that are moving slow, so in this regard they had to overcome 
some even mutual prejudices… the NGOs also saw how difficult it is to 
get consensus among the different institutions really to agree on 
something, so it was a learning process and the authorities saw that the 
NGOs are not unreasonable, just criticising, that they want to have a 
constructive part in the whole process.
131
  
However, as corruption is a key element of EU accession, the EU Delegation heavily 





The Ministry of Security remains hesitant on civil society engagement in relation to 
organised crime. There was uncertainty over what information was classified and 
how much could be shared with civil society.
133
 The relationship with civil society 
and the Ministry of Security remains difficult. Civil society worked to create a 
relationship with the ministry as commentators. They have then fed into policy-
making and become part of implementation. However, they are then less likely to 
criticise implementation. There is also a fluid relationship between the Ministry and 
civil society, with movement of staff between the two bodies. Civil society wants to 
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keep their funding, and requires approval from the Ministry to continue to operate. 
As such, they require buy-in from the Ministry, which dilutes the capacity of civil 
society to criticise the Ministry.
134
  
Civil society is seen as a stepping-stone to state institutions. You get 
involved in civil society, you get to know the people, get to know the 
institutions that you working with and ultimately get a big job in state 
institutions. Because that is seen as a secure job and something you can 





EUPM attempted to encourage activism at the civil society level. For example, the 
head of EUPM, Stefan Feller, discussed corruption on a TV show filmed in front of a 
live audience that were mostly students.  
All the young people said what are you going to do about corruption and 
Stefan said, well what are you going to do about corruption, this is your 
country, we‘re doing what we can. So they formed a group, we invited 
them back to our building, gave them lunch, had an all day conference 
where they all discussed it, okay what are you going to do about it, and 




With EUPM‘s support and encouragement, the group launched a campaign to 
encourage citizens to take action on corruption through roundtable discussions, 
presentations and media events (EUPM 2012a). 
 
While these relationships extended beyond law enforcement and a traditional 
security approach, they still aimed to further the security objectives of EUPM. There 
was no link with programmes that engage in development activities to address 
factors that contribute to organised crime. Several development actors have 
addressed weak governance in Bosnia. USAID engaged in a democracy and 
governance project that aimed to make government institutions more functional, 
transparent and accountable and focused on meeting the needs of citizens (USAID 
2012). The programme aimed to enhance the effectiveness of judicial, executive and 
legislative branches of government and increase citizen participation in governace 
(USAID 2012). UNDP also addressed weak governance. ‗The social inclusion and 
governance cluster assists BiH central, entity and local governments to achieve 
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higher standards of governance effectiveness through better planning, budgeting, 
provision of public goods to citizens and accountability‘ (UNDP 2012a). While these 
programmes didn‘t directly address organised crime, they engaged with some of the 
key contributing factors. However, there was no link between these strategies and the 
work of EUPM that directly responded to organised crime. Referring to the work of 
development actors, one EUPM official noted ‗we are aware of what they are doing 
when it impacts on what we do‘.137 As a result, these initiatives coexisted, but they 
were not connected, limiting the integration of security and development. 
 
The EU Crisis Management structures further limited the shift away from the 
security ideal type. The Ministries of Security and Interior of EU Member States 
were reluctant to second their personnel to international missions. ‗No chief 
constable... wants to send their best people away... no one wants to lose someone for 
a year, let alone two or three‘.138 Although officers deployed to an international 
mission develop many new skills, it is not valued as beneficial experience.
139
 As a 
result, EUPM experienced a high turnover of staff. This affected the ability of the 
mission to base their initiatives within the local context.  
 
All international engagement brings individuals that seek to model initiatives on 
programmes that have worked elsewhere, labelled by one respondent as ‗―You know 
what works really well at home‖ trainers‘.140 However, there is often a concerted 
effort to engage with the local context. Short secondments make this difficult. ‗The 
issues are so complex that you don‘t get a handle on them overnight, and you don‘t 
build relationships overnight‘.141 The result is reliance on pre-determined objectives. 
For example some EUPM officers were eager to initiate intelligence based policing. 
However, this would be difficult in a country like Bosnia with 16 police bodies and 
limited coordination and trust between them.
142
 The high turnover of staff also 
affected the mentoring approach of EUPM. ‗We failed in the mentoring... most of 
our seconded people stay for one year. In order to do mentoring you need to create 
interpersonal relationships. In one year you are unable, or if you are then you 
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leave‘.143 While the approach of EUPM moved beyond a security framework, the 
structure remained linked to the security ideal type. 
 
In Bosnia, there was a shift away from the security ideal type in relation to some of 
the institutional underpinnings of EUPM, such as the approach to problems. 
However, security retained a strong influence over EUPM‘s engagement. Although 
the European Commission played a significant role, particularly in funding, the 
security interests of the European Council informed the mandate and objectives of 
EUPM. As a result, the institutional architecture of the mission was security focused. 
While the understanding of organised crime moved beyond the security ideal type to 
acknowledge the need for preventative measures, the focus remained on law 
enforcement. This was amplified by the security-oriented language of EUPM. 
EUPM‘s approach to problems effectively integrated security and development. 
While some challenges remained, such as the potential for dependence, the practices 
were based on a partnership with local law enforcement. Despite this innovation, the 
structure of the mission remained a restricting factor. The hierarchical nature of the 
mission, the unbalanced mentoring relationship and the structure of EU Crisis 
Management were closely linked to the security ideal type. While there were some 
attempts to integrate security and development, the institutional underpinnings of 
security continued to dominate. As a result, the actors and institutions that inform the 
implementation of initiatives to address organised crime influence the extent of 




The motivations of external actors addressing organised crime in Bosnia also affect 
the integration of security and development into a nexus. The motivational drivers 
influence why security and development are being integrated and which elements are 
prioritised. This section examines the motivations of external actors addressing 
organised crime in Bosnia, assessing why organised crime is prioritised and by 
whom; the balance between international and local priorities; and how development 
is included in initiatives to address organised crime. 
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Prioritising Organised Crime 
 
The transnational nature of organised crime suggests that external actors are 
addressing the problem out of self-interest. This section examines why external 
actors prioritised organised crime in Bosnia, particularly as it was not the most 
pressing security threat. Local communities were more concerned with local level 
criminality, such as theft and street crime, rather than organised crime. 
 
European security was clearly a driver behind the EU‘s response to organised crime 
in Bosnia. The ESS considers Europe a prime target for organised crime and lists it 
as one of the 5 key threats to the EU (EU 2003). The prioritisation of organised 
crime within the ESS suggests that external engagement focused on organised crime 
is designed to directly contribute to European security. The ESS goes further to state 
that ‗restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling 
authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of 
dealing with organised crime within the EU‘ (EU 2003: 6). As a result, ensuring 
stability in Bosnia by addressing organised crime was driven by concerns over 
European security. 
 
Self-interest also meant that some member states were more involved than others. 
Dwan (2003) notes that EUPM had a ready supply of organised crime experts as EU 
Member States were eager to address trafficking and transnational crime that may 
affect them. Montanaro-Jankovski (2005) points out that Balkan organised crime 
groups are particularly active and violent in Austria and the Netherlands, both 
countries which had police liaison officers in Bosnia that were directly engaged in 
initiatives to address organised crime. Many internationals referred to self-interest 
when explaining their presence in Bosnia. One EU Member State noted ‗a country 
that close to our borders we want to be under EU control‘.144 Another EU member 
state acknowledged that building the capacity of local police is ‗partly self-servicing, 
getting the bad guys arrested before they leave the country‘.145 The presence of 
internationals seeking to further their own interests is summed up by an EUPM 
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official: ‗the UN Charter should say protection of civilians, but it won‘t because 
people are only willing to politically commit to things when they have an interest‘.146  
 
The self-interest of the EU does not limit the adoption of the security-development 
nexus. An integrated and comprehensive approach that engages with both security 
and development aspects can have benefits for international security. Such an 
approach would go beyond responding to incidents of organised crime to engage 
with the factors that make a country conducive to crime. The next section examines 
whether these factors were addressed in Bosnia by assessing the balance between 
international and local priorities.  
 
Disjuncture between International and Local Priorities 
 
Analysis of the motivational tension needs to go deeper to assess how external actors 
negotiated between international and local priorities. Engaging with local priorities 
aligns with an emancipatory perspective, but also contributes to international security 
by addressing organised crime at its source. However, a continued focus on 
international priorities in the target country adheres to a traditional security approach, 
suggesting that the security-development nexus has not altered the practices of 
external actors. 
 
A disjuncture between international and local perspectives was evident in Bosnia. 
EUPM‘s focus on organised crime as the key issue for policing has been contested. 
Merlingen and Ostrauskaite (2005: 312) argue that the EU‘s estimations of organised 
crime are not accurate as they are ‗as much based on speculation as on empirics‘. 
Claims that organised crime is not a significant problem in Bosnia suggest that the 
EU is addressing issues of concern for European security rather than local security 
needs. Referring to EU approaches to the Western Balkans more broadly, Ryan 
(2009: 328) argues that ‗the EU appears to be creating the impression of internal 
security, while merely engaging in technocratic modifications that affect control over 
the rims of these states‘. Government representatives in Bosnia view the focus on 
organised crime as an international agenda. ‗We‘ve signed and ratified the 
                                                 
146
 Interview, EUPM official, Sarajevo, 20 March 2012. 
 196 
Convention against Organised Crime, so we have certain obligations on this. 
Practically though the initiative came from [internationals]‘.147 Some internationals 
perceive citizens to be more concerned by local level criminality than organised 
crime as it affects them more directly.
148
 However, a 2010 Gallup survey found that 
66% of respondents in the Federation and 46% in Republika Srpska felt affected by 
organised crime ‗in daily life‘ or ‗occasionally‘ (Gallup 2010). 
 
The difficulty with organised crime is that it is not always visible. An EUPM official 
noted that ‗if you look at threat assessments for organised crime its like a 
photographic negative. Where it looks like you have no problem, especially the 
smaller the area because the smaller places tend to be more corrupt anyway, it tends 
to be where the biggest problems are‘.149 As such, citizens may not be aware of the 
extent of the problem, which influences how they view the importance of initiatives 
to address organised crime. As outlined earlier, EUPM noted that ‗any threat 
assessment of the Balkans will show Bosnia as a bit of not too bad, but that only 
represents a lack of information‘.150  
 
Organised crime can also remain hidden when local elites benefit, as they have an 
interest in keeping it hidden. In Bosnia, EUPM notes that there are ‗a number of 
different high level criminal organisations working with particular people in high 
level political parties for their own good‘.151 The most prominent example is the 
alleged links between Nasser Kelmendi, a key organised crime figure in the Western 
Balkans, and Fahrudin Radončić, owner of Dveni Avaz newspaper, head of the 
‗Union for a Better Future‘ political party and since 2012, Bosnia‘s Minister of 
Security (Hopkins 2012). As such, politicians and elites with beneficial ties to 
organised crime are reluctant to acknowledge or address organised crime networks. 
They are more likely to downplay the presence of organised crime so that it is not 
addressed. 
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EUPM‘s focus on organised crime in Bosnia emphasised the accession agenda. 
While this focus was based on the argument that organised crime is ‗a major threat 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina‘s stability and overall socio-economic development‘ 
(Commission of the European Communities 2005: 20), its framing as a condition of 
EU membership points to a strategy to prevent organised crime entering the EU. 
Some observers perceive this approach as emerging from the rapid inclusion of 
several Central Eastern European countries into the EU. ‗I think the EU got a real 
wake up call when they let Bulgaria and Romania in, that was pretty much a disaster 
for them and they‘re trying to avoid that in the future... a tremendous amount of 
people took advantage of it‘.152 Once the borders of Eastern Europe opened after 
1989, many criminal networks had already flocked to the region, aided by the visa-
free regime that was in place throughout much of Eastern Europe (Hignett 2004; 
Glenny 2008). At the time these countries gained EU membership, many criminal 
networks were already well established despite attempts to address organised crime 
in the region. 
 
As a result, there was a reluctance to allow a repeat with aspiring members from the 
Western Balkans. More stringent conditions regarding organised crime were 
implemented, and the EU was more actively involved to ensure these conditions 
were fulfilled. As Ioannides and Collantes-Celador (2011: 416) argue ‗EU reforms in 
the area of freedom, security and justice aim at gradually transforming post-conflict 
societies into democratic and rule of law abiding states, but also enable the EU to 
achieve its own internal security objectives‘. By framing responses to organised 
crime as a condition of accession, the EU also had the ability to turn EU priorities 
into local priorities. An EU official noted, ‗the requirement from an accession 
perspective for us should be the same as the interests of the local actors if they have 
an accession agenda‘.153 While this approach seeks to impart local ownership for 
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The Inclusion of Development 
 
Development can play a key role in ensuring that responses to organised crime are 
comprehensive and have a long-term focus, by engaging with the local context and 
addressing the underlying factors that influence organised crime. This shifts the 
focus away from directly fixing the problem, such as EUFOR‘s direct pursuit of 
organised crime, towards long-term sustainability. The inclusion of development also 
balances the motivations of external actors as outcomes that enhance international 
security are based on successes in addressing local needs. However, there is a risk 
that development elements are included superficially, as external actors are 
motivated by concerns of their own security. This section assesses how development 
is included in initiatives to address organised crime in Bosnia. 
 
Bosnia has had much less development engagement than Sierra Leone. It is not a 
developing country, and the political system prior to conflict was not open to 
external assistance. However, development tools were still brought in to EUPM‘s 
approach to organised crime. As in Sierra Leone, capacity building was a key aspect 
of EUPM‘s programming. Working in partnership with local law enforcement on 
specific cases, EUPM conducted a needs analysis to identify gaps in capabilities.
154
 
The aim was ‗to assist in building an increased ability to plan and implement 
measures that are designed to fight organised crime‘ (EUPM 2010b: 2).  
 
As well as ensuring the long-term capability to address organised crime, building 
capacity in relation to organised crime also increased the capacity of law 
enforcement more broadly.  
Looking at it from a technical point of view, if you are able to conduct an 
investigation into organised crime, which is one of the most complex, then 
you are capable any other kind of investigation. So from that point of view 
we were working on organised crime. Organised crime also has particular 
rules, you also have to do some financial investigations on members and 
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By using investigations into organised crime to build the capacity of law 
enforcement, agencies were becoming equipped to address most challenges they are 
likely to face.  
 
While capacity building draws on the experiences and practices of development, in 
this context, the limited focus on law enforcement suggests that it is mobilised for 
security purposes. EUPM defines capacity as the ‗increased ability to plan and 
implement measures that are designed to fight organised crime and corruption within 
corruption resistant organisational structures‘ (EUPM 2010c: 1). Building capacity 
also has specific success indicators, such as implementing national strategies on 
organised crime and corruption, developing action plans, and developing 
mechanisms to identify, address and prevent corruption (EUPM 2010b). Capacity 
building in this context is significantly different from its use in development 
programming. 
 
Glenny (2008) notes that organised crime networks are usually several steps ahead of 
law enforcement. When law enforcement strategies are effective, it merely pushes 
organised crime groups in other directions. For example, in 2008 Bosnian smuggling 
networks had built private roads across the border near Foča and Trebinje to 
facilitate smuggling (OCCRP 2008). Similarly, Cockayne (2011) argues that cocaine 
trafficking in West Africa increased as production and trafficking in Central America 
and the Caribbean came under scrutiny. As such, measures that address the 
symptoms of organised crime by enhancing the capacity of law enforcement are 
unlikely to deter individuals from engaging in organised crime.  
 
While development elements were brought into initiatives to address organised 
crime, development was ‗second fiddle‘.156 This supports the assumption that 
international security concerns are the primary motivational driver of external actors 
addressing organised crime in Bosnia. As a result, development was employed as an 
extension of security practices. Other areas of development that would contribute to 
initiatives to address organised crime, such as attempts to address weak governance, 
but also strategies aimed to increase employment and create sustainable livelihoods 
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were not included. These strategies would make criminal activity less viable, and 




Examination of how organised crime is being addressed in Bosnia revealed attempts 
to integrate security and development. Rather than adhering to a traditional security 
approach, the adoption of the security-development nexus has resulted in changes to 
how EUPM responded to organised crime. Instead of being deployed to address the 
problem directly and withdraw, EUPM engaged in a long-term approach that aimed 
to build the capacity of law enforcement. This was conducted through mentoring and 
co-location, which suggests a partnership approach. 
 
The analysis of the four hypothesised tensions revealed a number of factors that 
continue to inhibit the integration of security and development. Within EUPM there 
are diverse understandings of security and development. This ensures that there 
cannot be a clear security-development nexus across the mission, and it also raises 
questions about how security and development are integrated. With development 
primarily understood in terms of economic development, it is particularly difficult 
for development to have a ‗humanising‘ influence on security. The causal 
relationship between security and development is also viewed differently by different 
actors. Security and development were applied in the same way - as an end state that 
is achieved through international involvement. This undermines the emancipatory 
potential of the security-development nexus as the end goal may be predetermined by 
external actors. The linkages between security and development were primarily 
understood to be sequential. This further undermines the ‗humanising‘ influence of 
development, as external actors view security initiatives as a strategy to create space 
for development. 
 
In Bosnia, the adoption of the security-development nexus had some influence in 
breaking down the institutional divisions between security and development. 
Although the institutional architecture of EUPM was security oriented, development 
played a key role in how problems are understood and approached. However, the 
motivations of external actors suggest that the inclusion of development was 
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designed to achieve international security priorities. As a result, international 
involvement will continue to focus on international priorities and may withdraw 
before local needs are addressed. The implications of these four tensions on the 





Chapter 5: Inhibiting Integration? 
 
External actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia have 
recognised that a comprehensive approach that integrates security and development 
is necessary. In Sierra Leone it was recognised that organised crime was a threat to 
security and development, but also that poverty, weak institutions and youth 
unemployment were key contributing factors to the presence of organised crime. In 
Bosnia, organised crime was viewed as an impediment to development, and 
corruption and weak governance were understood as barriers in addressing organised 
crime.  
 
The recognition of the benefits of an integrated approach is part of a broader trend in 
post-conflict reconstruction. Building on the lessons and challenges of the post-Cold 
War interventionist phase, external actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction 
have acknowledged the need for comprehensive approaches that engage with the 
diverse challenges that arise in the post-conflict period. In particular, the connections 
between security and development have been recognised. In response, external actors 
have drawn on traditionally separate epistemological approaches, and created new 
tools and policies to inform their engagement with post-conflict reconstruction. The 
integration of security and development is expected to result in a comprehensive 
approach. Such an approach is understood by external actors to be more sustainable 
as it engages with the full range of challenges in a balanced way, but also seeks to 
achieve local ‗buy in‘ as it shifts away from a focus on the state to engage with the 
needs of individuals and communities. 
 
While security and development have been enthusiastically merged in policy, 
integrating the two areas into a nexus in practice raises a number of challenges. The 
adoption of the security-development nexus to frame initiatives to address organised 
crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia has resulted in a shift in approach. However, it 
does not equate to an emancipatory approach as defined by human security. The gap 
between policy and practice in relation to the security-development nexus has been 
the focus of critical scholars, who argue that the nexus is one-sided, resulting in the 
securitisation of development. While this may reflect the outcome of the security-
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development nexus, it does little to elucidate what inhibits the integration of security 
and development into a nexus. The examination of the four hypothesised tensions 
provided insight into the barriers to integration.  
 
By investigating the tensions in the two different case studies, the analysis aimed to 
identify contextual factors that may influence the integration of security and 
development. Although Sierra Leone and Bosnia were comparable in terms of their 
approach to post-conflict reconstruction and organised crime, there were several key 
differences. Processes in Sierra Leone were implemented in a bottom-up approach. 
Although this was primarily driven by limited resources, it suggests a shift in 
approach. Combined with the history of development engagement in the country, it 
could be expected that initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone would 
be less security focused. However, the multi-agency approach does raise the risk of 
diverse approaches within the broader initiative. In comparison, Bosnia did not have 
a history of development engagement, and processes were implemented in a top-
down approach. However, it was claimed that a top-down approach was necessary to 
address local concerns. In contrast to Sierra Leone, the EU‘s approach in Bosnia 
points to the continued dominance of security, which is likely to be consistent given 
implementation was driven by EUPM. 
 
This chapter brings together the analysis of the four tensions, in particular 
highlighting the similarities and differences between the two case studies. It then 
considers what this reveals about the security-development nexus as a framework to 
address organised crime. 
 




The first tension arises from the varied understandings of security and development. 
The integration of security and development into a nexus that aligns with human 
security relies on understandings of the two concepts that fit within quadrant C of 
figure 1 – human development/ human security. Yet, it is evident that there is no 
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clear understanding of the security-development nexus among actors adopting the 
concept, as external actors have different understandings of security and 
development. Although security and development have become closely related 
through parallel shifts towards human security and human development, the concepts 
remain highly ambiguous. How external actors understand security and development 
is rarely articulated directly. To determine how external actors addressing organised 
crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia understand security and development, the thesis 
has identified the referent object and locus of their initiatives.  
 
The two cases represent different approaches to organised crime – Sierra Leone was 
a multi-agency initiative, whereas EUPM was the primary actor addressing organised 
crime in Bosnia. The Sierra Leone case highlights the difficulties of collaborating 
under the security-development nexus framework. ECOWAS created the documents 
that served as the foundation for the WACI. Despite inconsistency between the 
ECOWAS Commission and member states, there was a shift towards quadrant A: 
top-down benevolence in the ECOWAS understanding of both security and 
development. However, ECOWAS‘s understanding of security and development 
differed from that of UNODC and UNIPSIL. Although security and development 
had different loci, they were both focused on the state/ international level as the 
referent object. As UNODC and UNIPSIL seek to operationalise the Regional Action 
Plan on drug trafficking and organised crime, the different understandings of security 
and development suggest that implementation of the WACI is significantly different 
from the aims of the ECOWAS Commission in drafting the Regional Action Plan. 
While ECOWAS aims to move towards people-centred understandings of security 
and development, UNODC and UNIPSIL‘s understandings of security and 
development moved implementation in the other direction, adhering closely to a 
traditional security approach. 
 
Bosnia provides a different insight. As initiatives to address organised crime were 
driven by a single actor, the EU, there is an expectation that understandings of 
security and development will be more consistent. Despite a strong EU policy on the 
security-development nexus, this was not the case in practice. There were varying 
understandings of security, both on the ground and in EU policy. There was a lack of 
clarity on how development contributes to initiatives to address organised crime. As 
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a result, there were different perspectives on the referent object of development. 
Although EUPM is a cross-pillar instrument of the EU, tension remains in how 
security and development are understood. With diverse understandings of security 
and development in two significantly different contexts, it can be implied that 
consistent understandings of security and development among actors addressing 
organised crime is rare. The number of actors – whether one or several – does not 
appear to affect the consistency of how security and development understood.  
 
These different understandings ensure that there is no clear understanding of what 
the security-development nexus is, with implications for the type of nexus that 
emerges. Different understandings of security and development ensure that the nexus 
cannot be defined as adhering to a traditional security approach, or shifting towards 
emancipation as there are is no consistency across the external actors addressing 
organised crime. The ECOWAS Commission seeks a shift towards people‘s security 
and EUPM personnel acknowledged the need for individual security. However, 
understandings of security overwhelmingly fit within quadrant B: hard security. With 
its focus on hard security measures implemented at the state level, and a referent 
object focused on international and state security, quadrant B adheres to a traditional 
security approach rather than a new approach that engages with emancipation as 
defined by human security. 
 
The integration of security and development into a comprehensive approach requires 
collaboration across the two areas. However, the approach is not balanced, as 
development is understood in relation to security. In Sierra Leone, external actors 
implemented a range of development strategies at the community level, including 
drug demand reduction, treatment, prevention and rehabilitation. These initiatives 
address the impact that organised crime has on individuals and communities. 
Similarly, the focus on good governance, rule of law and human rights strategies in 
Bosnia adds a new dimension to initiatives to address organised crime. Rather than 
seeking to address the immediate threat of organised crime, the focus is on strategies 
to achieve long-term sustainable change by drawing on the tools and strategies of 
development. However, these elements were secondary to security concerns. 
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In Sierra Leone, UNODC and UNIPSIL‘s understanding of development fits within 
quadrant D: containment. Although strategies were implemented at the local level, 
they do not seek to address individual and community insecurity. Drug demand 
reduction, treatment, prevention and rehabilitation seek to neutralise the threat drug 
use poses to the state as it can have a destabilising effect that has implications for 
international security. Working to contain the impact of organised crime at the local 
level seeks to limit the spill over of organised crime regionally and internationally. 
From this perspective, development is understood to be secondary to security 
concerns rather than an equally important element. This does indicate a degree of 
comprehensiveness, as development is recognised as an important factor. However, 
development is brought in to enhance security outcomes.  
 
A similar form of integration occurred in Bosnia. Although the focus on good 
governance, social and political reform, corruption, rule of law and human rights in 
Bosnia sought to address the effect of organised crime on individuals, these 
strategies were also designed to bolster the state to limit threats to international 
security. The European Security Strategy understands these strategies as ‗the best 
means of strengthening international order‘ (EU 2003: 10). As such, security took 
precedence over development. 
 
Rather than following the trajectory towards human security, understandings of 
security in the two case studies are aligned with traditional security approaches, as 
the focus is on state and international security. This affects the integration of security 
and development as the urgency of security concerns ensures that understandings of 
development are shaped by security needs. In both case studies, the use of 
development tools and strategies broadens the approach of external actors addressing 
organised crime, as they engage in long-term strategies rather than seeking to 
immediately neutralise threats. However, rather than being understood as an essential 
element of a comprehensive approach because of their contribution to the wellbeing 
of individuals and communities, development tools are deployed to achieve security 
outcomes.  
 
The prioritisation of security influences the type of nexus that emerges. The use of 
the tools and strategies of development to achieve security outcomes will still have 
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benefits for individuals and communities. However, when development is focused on 
international security, these benefits are a positive side effect or end result of external 
engagement. The inclusion of development is primarily designed to achieve state and 
international security. This points to the dominance of security within the security-
development nexus. As a result, the conceptual tension contributes to an explanation 
of why the security-development nexus achieves the outcomes outlined by critics. 
With understandings of security centred on the state/ international level as referent 
object, and with initiatives implemented at the state level, security is not people-
centred, and the inclusion of development initiatives is further side-lined. As a result, 
the nexus adheres to a traditional security approach rather than shifting towards 
emancipation. 
 
The way the security-development nexus is invoked in theory suggests that it is a 
fixed concept that easily merges security and development. However, there are 
divergent understandings of security and development that are not always 
compatible. These divergent understandings inhibit the integration of security and 
development into a nexus. As understandings of security continue to align with 
traditional security approaches, security is deemed to be the most important priority, 
with development goals – improving lives – given less priority. The inclusion of 
development does have benefits for individuals though. However, this is far from a 
comprehensive approach that engages with the needs of both individuals and the 
state. As such, the conceptual tension highlights how external actors can understand 
security and development in ways that inhibit the integration of security and 
development. The result of this kind of nexus aligns with the outcome of 




The second tension emerges from different perspectives on the causal relationship 
between security and development. Security and development are purported to be 
‗intrinsically linked‘, in that there can be ‗no security without development, and no 
development without security‘. However, the cause and effect between security and 
development is rarely defined. To determine how external actors view the 
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relationship between security and development, the thesis has examined how security 
and development are applied and the linkages between them. 
 
An integrated security-development nexus that aligns with human security relies on 
the application of security and development as processes. However, among actors 
addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia there are different 
perspectives on how security and development are applied, whether they are 
processes or a desirable end state. The adoption of the security-development nexus 
has not changed how the application of security is viewed. As Luckham (2007) 
notes, security has traditionally referred to an existential goal. In the two case 
studies, security is universally regarded as a condition to be restored rather than a 
process. As this perspective maintains the traditional view of how security is applied, 
it suggests that security approaches are more rigid and less open to change, making it 
difficult to contribute to a nexus that integrates security and development into a 
comprehensive approach. It also suggests that security is a clearly understood 
condition, which negates a role for local engagement to determine what is most 
important, and how it should be achieved. 
 
The ambiguity of perceptions of development fits in with the broader lack of 
consensus on how development is applied within development policies. However, in 
this context it creates difficulties in defining a specific ‗security-development nexus‘. 
As the application of development is not clearly articulated by any of the actors 
addressing organised crime, it suggests that actors addressing organised crime are not 
familiar with development and there is no direct input by development actors. While 
there is variability among development actors in how development is applied, each 
actor has a clearly articulated approach. Among external actors addressing organised 
crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia, the application of development is only vaguely 
defined in policy texts. This suggests that development is being implemented from a 
security perspective. Security actors are more likely to approach development in a 
similar way to security – considering it as a condition to be restored through their 
engagement rather than a strategy of social transformation.  
 
The variability of how development is applied also raises the question of whether 
and how different applications can be combined into a nexus. With security 
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understood as a condition, and development as a process, this may imply that 
development processes seek to achieve conditions of security. As a process, 
development is expected to address organised crime, which will result in the end goal 
of security. The result would be a one-sided nexus that is preoccupied with security 
in line with the arguments on the securitisation of development. When both security 
and development are conceived as a condition or the end state, it implies the goal of 
the security-development nexus is to achieve both security and development. 
However, this type of goal does not necessarily require a strong linkage between the 
two concepts. Particular activities are seen to contribute to security and development 
conditions, however security and development strategies are not integrated. 
 
Examining how external actors perceive the linkages between security and 
development adds another analytical layer to the application of development, and the 
causal relationship between security and development. Figure 7 sets out the spectrum 
of perspectives on the linkages between security and development. While some 
actors, such as ECOWAS, have recognised an integrated, mutually constitutive 
relationship between security and development, the majority of actors view the 
linkage as separate. This is primarily in the form of sequential linkage, where the 
attainment of security will create space for development. While this approach 
acknowledges the difficulty of achieving development advances in insecure 
environments, it neglects the role that development can play in enhancing security 
and addressing organised crime. Underdevelopment has been identified by all 
external actors as a conducive factor for organised crime. By not engaging with this 
aspect of organised crime, security practices continue to dominate the security-


























As security practices are understood to make space for development, development 
does not play a significant role in addressing organised crime. Rather than engaging 
with the factors that allow organised crime to flourish, initiatives continue to be 
reactive as they respond to incidents of crime. Similarly, by creating space for 
development, the end goal of external engagement is not redefined around the needs 
of individuals and communities, rather it continues to emphasise state and 
international security outcomes. Such an approach is based on the perspectives of 
external actors on how to address organised crime not local needs and priorities.  
 
Viewing both security and development as the end state of external engagement 
implies that an integrated security and development approach is not necessary to 
address organised crime. For example, in the WACI Freetown Commitment, 
organised crime is understood as a threat to security and development. From this 
perspective, responding to organised crime does not require a joint response. Rather, 
it suggests that addressing organised crime will remove the threat to security and 
development. The end goal of initiatives to address organised crime has changed to 
respond to the threat to development and security. However, the processes 
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Figure 7 How external actors perceive the linkage between security and 
development 
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implemented to address organised crime do not need to change. Traditionally, 
responses to organised crime have involved law enforcement, military and policing 
strategies. As long as these strategies effectively address organised crime, they create 
space for development, which will be implemented later. As a result, many external 
actors do not view the security-development nexus as a new approach. As one 
EUPM official noted ‗there are these new words for old things, …as it wasn‘t done 
before?‘157 However, this perspective undermines the integration of security and 
development, as the two concepts remain separate. 
 
In theory, the security-development nexus is based on the ‗virtuous‘ cycle, where 
development ensures security and security creates space for development. However, 
the analysis of how security and development are applied and how the linkages are 
understood reveals that external actors only engage with the second part of this 
dyadic relationship. This points to a one-sided causal relationship, where security 
creates space for development, but development does not play a significant role. This 
inhibits the integration of security and development as they are understood to be 
separate. 
 
Development is understood to be achieved once security is in place. As an end 
product, development does not influence the practices employed to address organised 
crime, as there is no cross fertilisation of security and development. As a result, the 
practices continue to adhere to a traditional security approach. However, a ‗security 
first‘ approach does not necessarily enhance development. The SSR programme in 
Sierra Leone followed a security first approach. At the end of the security focused 
part of the programme, ‗there was security, but there was no development, and whilst 
it was true to say that security now required development, no one was sure how best 
to achieve this‘ (White 2008: 2). While security may be understood to create space 
for development, it does not ensure that development will be achieved. 
 
The causal tension influences the form of the integration between security and 
development. Perspectives on how security and development are applied affect what 
is integrated with what. How external actors understand the linkage between security 
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 Interview, EUPM official, Sarajevo, 18 October 2011. 
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and development affects the balance between the two concepts, and how they come 
together. In both Sierra Leone and Bosnia, security and development are separate 




The third tension arises from the institutional drivers of security and development 
actors. Traditionally security and development have had a different institutional 
architecture, they have had different understandings of problems and thus had 
different approaches. While the adoption of the security-development nexus seeks to 
bring the two areas together, there is a risk that these institutional underpinnings will 
continue to influence the practices of external actors, affecting the extent of the 
integration between security and development. Analysis of the institutional tension 
sought to determine whether the institutional architecture, understanding of 
organised crime and approach to organised crime continued to be informed by 
security or development practices, or whether there was integration between the two. 
To do this, analysis compared the practices of external actors addressing organised 
crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia with security and development ideal types. 
 
The adoption of the security-development nexus by external actors addressing 
organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia has resulted in significant changes in 
their practices. While some factors continue to adhere to the institutional 
underpinnings of security, other factors are more flexible, adopting elements of 
development. The two cases highlight that there is no consistency in which factors 
integrate security and development. In Sierra Leone, elements of development 
contributed, to a varying extent, to the language employed by the WACI, how 
organised crime is understood more broadly, the approach of the WACI, and the 
structure of UNIPSIL. In contrast, in Bosnia the language and structure of EUPM 
were closely aligned to the security ideal type. However, development influenced the 
broader understanding of organised crime and EUPM‘s approach to problems.  
 
These differences highlight the multi-layered institutional tension in the security-
development nexus. Rather than integrating security and development in a consistent 
way, the institutional underpinnings result in an ad hoc and haphazard nexus. 
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Traditionally, organised crime has been addressed by security actors. While 
development is brought into the security-development nexus, it is clear that security 
actors remain dominant as the contributors and donors of the external actors 
addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia primarily adhered to the 
security ideal type. This ensured that the starting point of external actors in both 
Sierra Leone and Bosnia was informed by security. As a result, the inclusion of 
development into initiatives to address organised crime is through a security lens.  
 
Development is implemented as it is understood by security actors. Such an approach 
does not take on the best practice of development as it does not understand the 
evolution behind current practices. For example, EUPM is dominated by security 
actors. From their perspective development is viewed within the context of the 
accession agenda as it focused on economic development, market reforms and rule of 
law reform.
158
 However, Youngs (2007: 13) points out that this approach has been 
heavily criticised by development organisations, as it ‗provides evidence that the 
security-development link is essentially about diverting poverty relief into support 
for Western strategic objectives in middle income states‘.  
 
Although the institutional tension arises from the dominance of security, 
development practice has still had an influence on security. In Sierra Leone, 
UNIPSIL regards local law enforcement bodies as agents of change, empowering 
them to address organised crime and providing training to address any shortfalls in 
skills and experience. However, UNODC takes a different approach. Without a 
presence in the country, the inception of the WACI was not based on local 
knowledge and context. In Bosnia, EUPM worked in partnership with local law 
enforcement. As in Sierra Leone, this approach regarded local law enforcement as 
agents of change and empowered them to identify gaps in addressing organised 
crime. However, the hierarchical relationship between international and local actors 
valued international knowledge over local knowledge and experience. 
 
In both cases, external actors have recognised a need for prevention. While the focus 
remains on coercive strategies, it is still a shift away from responding to the 
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symptoms of organised crime. Rather than directly addressing organised crime and 
withdrawing, there is also an emphasis on capacity building to ensure the long-term 
capability of local law enforcement. This is a key area where the modalities of 
development are brought into initiatives to address organised crime in both Sierra 
Leone and Bosnia. UNIPSIL and EUPM aimed to build the capacity of local law 
enforcement as part of a long-term strategy. Eade (2007: 630) argues that capacity 
building ‗is surely about enabling those on the margins to represent and defend their 
interests more effectively‘. However, in Sierra Leone and Bosnia capacity building is 
being employed to ensure the ability to address and deter organised crime in the 
long-term, an objective that adheres more to international objectives than local 
interests, particularly as organised crime is not viewed as the most pressing concern 
locally in either case. Development actors can also use capacity building in a way 
that is not emancipatory. However, in this context, the use of capacity building 
adheres to the security ideal type as it seeks to ensure security at the state and 
international level. 
 
 The dominance of security in the institutional underpinnings of external actors 
suggests that a hierarchy exists within the three factors examined. This hierarchy is 
displayed in figure 8. External actors have chosen to adopt the security-development 
nexus to frame their initiatives and they have taken steps to merge the two in their 
approach to organised crime. As such, in both case studies it is evident that 
development is influencing how external actors approach the problem of organised 
crime, including their structure. However, the next layer is more difficult. While 
development has been brought into the understanding of organised crime, in both 
cases the understanding remains underpinned by security thinking through a focus on 
coercive strategies. As such, this level is less malleable. Further up the hierarchy, the 
institutional architecture of external actors remains even more difficult. The 
European Commission influenced EUPM to a certain extent. However, the European 
Council and its security interests remained the dominant contributor. This hierarchy 
supports the argument that development is brought in through a security lens, as the 
higher levels remain security focused, with development playing more of a role 




The institutional underpinnings of security and development actors are difficult to 
overcome. Even in ‗joined up‘ approaches, such as the links between DfID, MoD 
and FCO in the UK‘s Conflict Prevention Pools, each institution still maintained its 
own personality and mandate and delivered programmes in line with their traditional 
way of working (Kent 2007). Security and development actors remain two different 
institutional cultures trying to imitate each other. They can adopt the modalities of 
the other, but without the institutional memory and background, the meaning behind 
certain elements is lost and implementation becomes very different. While security 
and development actors may employ the tools of the other, the tools are implemented 
within their own frame of reference, limiting the extent of integration between the 
two concepts. 
 
The ad hoc nature of the integration between security and development revealed by 
the institutional tension also has an unintended effect on external engagement more 
broadly. The lack of a clear and cohesive nexus has generated uncertainty among 
partners in both countries. Despite participating in the larger project to address 
organised crime implemented by EUPM and UNIPSIL, other actors instituted their 
own initiatives that overlapped. In some instances these initiatives employ another 
mix of security and development elements. For example, in Sierra Leone, the FCO 
supported civil society through their small bilateral fund for initiatives to address 
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Figure 8 The influence of development on the institutional underpinnings 
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corruption, promote democracy, human rights and consolidate the rule of law.
159
 The 
US INL has developed the West African Cooperative Security Initiative (WACSI) 
that involves many of the same elements of the WACI and is implemented across the 
region.  
 
In Bosnia, many EU member states are addressing organised crime through their 
own Police Liaison Officers.
160
 One police liaison officer noted that there are ‗a lot 
of countries pumping money in creating negative competition‘.161 In relation to EU 
engagement an NGO noted a lack of cohesion, as there are ‗different police forces 
who are interested in different things‘.162 Even the European Community engaged in 
separate but overlapping projects. Flessenkemper (2013) highlights a number 
overlapping programmes, including a European funded project financed under the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) on corruption; and several projects on 
border management funded under the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS). This suggests that the institutional tension 
in the security-development nexus inspires a lack of confidence, resulting in 
overlapping initiatives to address organised crime that further undermines the 
integration of security and development. 
 
The institutional tension creates problems in the interface between security and 
development. The institutional underpinnings of security continue to wield a strong 
influence over initiatives to address organised crime. As organised crime has 
traditionally been addressed by security actors, the institutional architecture of 
external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia remains 
security focused, which limits the inclusion of development. Although development 
has influenced practices in some areas, security and development elements continue 
to ‗speak past each other‘ (Spear and Williams 2012: 10). Development modalities 
are brought into initiatives to address organised crime through a security lens, to 
achieve security outcomes, without understanding the rationale behind them. As a 
result, the institutional tension influences the extent of integration.  
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The final tension arises from the motivational drivers of external actors adopting the 
security-development nexus. The security-development nexus is expected to enhance 
the effectiveness and sustainability of international initiatives. This may be to 
enhance outcomes for individuals and communities or it may be driven by concerns 
over international security. The different motivations influence why security and 
development are being integrated and the prioritisation of each concept within the 
nexus. As with the other tensions, the motivations of external actors are not explicitly 
discussed. To determine the motivational drivers behind external engagement in 
Sierra Leone and Bosnia, the thesis examined why organised crime was a priority 
and for whom, the balance between international and local priorities and how 
development is included in initiatives to address organised crime. 
 
Arguments on the securitisation of development argue that the adoption of the 
security-development nexus is driven by self-interest. The emphasis on self-interest 
is particularly relevant to initiatives to address organised crime, as organised crime is 
transnational by nature. This is evident in both Sierra Leone and Bosnia. Sierra 
Leone has attracted international attention as it is a transit point for cocaine being 
trafficked from Latin America to Europe. Bosnia has also become a concern for the 
EU and its member states due to its proximity to Europe‘s borders and aspirations for 
accession. While self-interest is one of the key motivational drivers of external 
engagement in both Sierra Leone and Bosnia, it is not necessarily a negative feature. 
By drawing on security and development elements, the security-development nexus 
holds the promise to enhance security by improving lives. 
 
Despite the potential for a mutually beneficial approach, in Sierra Leone and Bosnia, 
the self-interest of external actors ensured that security is prioritised over 
development. In both cases the disjuncture between international and local priorities 
signified that international security concerns were the key priority. In Sierra Leone, 
this limited the focus on cannabis production, despite concerns over food security. In 
Bosnia, initiatives to address organised crime adhered to the accession agenda with 
little room for movement. In both cases, there was limited space for local input into 
what should be a priority. As a result, the approach is disconnected from local 
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concerns, which tend to be focused more on development needs. The approach of 
external actors has shifted away from achieving a specific goal and withdrawing. 
However, with goals centred on international security, external actors may withdraw 
before issues such as unemployment and weak governance that contribute to 
organised crime, are effectively addressed as long as organised crime no longer 
poses a threat to international security. 
 
Rather than resulting in a shift towards an emancipatory approach in Sierra Leone 
and Bosnia, the inclusion of development modalities such as capacity building and 
anti-drugs programmes seek to contain organised crime. As noted in the analysis of 
the conceptual tension, containment is associated with building capacity to address 
challenges locally, ‗the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external 
problems or threats‘ (Chandler 2012a: 217). Containment suggests a people-centred 
approach, as it emphasises locally developed strategies to respond to problems, and 
empowering individuals to take responsibility for security challenges. Such an 
approach links to Sen‘s (1999: xiii) arguments in Development as Freedom, which 
posit individuals as ‗active agents of change, rather than passive recipients of 
dispensed benefits‘. However, the focus is not on addressing problems in 
collaboration with local actors to minimise their impact. The aim is building local 
capacity to respond to ensure that organised crime does not spillover with 
consequences for regional and international security. As such, development is 
brought into initiatives to address organised crime to the extent that it contributes to 
international security outcomes. This approach is far removed from the core mandate 
of development actors. 
 
The emphasis on international security outcomes does not prevent the integration of 
security and development. In actuality, such an approach would ensure security 
problems were addressed more sustainably with benefits for international security. 
However, international security concerns have maintained their grasp on 
international approaches to address organised crime. While external actors frame 
their engagement as ‗enlightened self-interest‘, it is not enlightened at all. As noted 
in previous chapters, elements of development are utilised to enhance security 
outcomes. However, they are only employed superficially. As a result, in both cases, 
the motivational drivers of external actors influence why security and development 
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are integrated. As international involvement is driven by concerns over international 
security, this ensures that security is prioritised, with development brought in only 
when it enhances security outcomes.  
 
While the security-development nexus may appear to equate to a comprehensive 
approach, security and development are not mutually complementary, as the nexus 
does not focus on development outcomes – improving lives. Analysis of the 
institutional tension highlighted that initiatives to address organised crime have a 
security perspective as their starting point. As such, development elements that are 
deemed important for security outcomes are brought into their approaches. However, 
the focus remains on security, and continues to respond to the problem rather than 
taking a comprehensive and balanced approach to organised crime. The security 
focus is reinforced by the motivational tension, which ensures that the drivers behind 
international engagement remain focused on international security needs. This arises 
from Roe (2012: 254) refers to as ‗panic politics: we must do something now, as our 
very survival is at stake‘. The result is an attempt to contain organised crime in Sierra 
Leone and Bosnia before it affects donors rather than directly resolving the problem. 
Such an approach neglects the contribution that development can make to achieve 
international security. 
 
Factors Limiting Integration 
 
By bringing security and development together, the nexus is posited as a new and 
comprehensive approach that shifts away from a preoccupation with the state to also 
recognise the needs of individuals. Analysis of the four hypothesised tensions reveals 
that integrating the two concepts into a comprehensive approach is difficult to 
achieve in practice. External actors have different understandings of security and 
development, and different perspectives on how they are applied and the linkages 
between them. The actors and institutions that underpin the implementation of 
programmes continue to be informed by security approaches, and external actors are 
driven by concerns over international security. The investigation of these four 
tensions revealed two overarching trends that inhibit the integration of security and 
development into a nexus. 
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First, although the nexus is posited as a new and comprehensive approach, it 
continues to prioritise international concerns rather than the concerns of individuals 
and communities in post-conflict countries. Second, despite the enthusiasm of 
policymakers regarding an integrated approach, the security-development nexus is 
dominated by security actors. These factors point to a one-sided security-
development nexus where security dominates. The next two sections review what the 
four tensions reveal about why integration into a new and comprehensive approach is 
inhibited and problematic. 
 
Prioritising International Concerns 
 
Initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia continue to 
prioritise international concerns. This was highlighted most prominently by the 
motivational tension. By its nature organised crime is transnational, which creates a 
desire to address it at its source or in transit countries before it reaches donor 
countries. However, organised crime also has a negative effect on transit countries – 
from encouraging corruption, to undermining legitimate business activities, and in 
the case of drug trafficking, increasing local consumption. As a result, addressing 
organised crime has benefits for both recipient and donor countries.  
 
The interest of countries affected by organised crime at the end of the supply chain 
ensures that resources are devoted to addressing organised crime in source and transit 
countries. This explains the presence of external actors that are directly affected by 
organised crime flows in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. However, in both countries there 
is a disjuncture between international and local priorities. Organised crime is not 
viewed as the most pressing security concern in either Sierra Leone or Bosnia, and 
initiatives to address organised crime emphasise the elements that are most likely to 
affect donors. In Sierra Leone the cocaine trade was the key priority, despite the 
effect cannabis production and trade has on food security. In Bosnia, initiatives were 
closely tied to the accession agenda to ensure that the EU was not exposing its 
borders to traffickers. In neither case did initiatives address the conditions that make 
Sierra Leone and Bosnia conducive to organised crime, which would reduce the 
impact of organised crime on the two countries. Instead initiatives responded to 
instances of crime, building capacity for interdictions, arrests and prosecutions. This 
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approach attempts to contain the problem in Sierra Leone and Bosnia before it 
affects donors rather than addressing the impact of organised crime on post-conflict 
countries. 
 
The continued prioritisation of international concerns was also evidenced by the 
conceptual tension. ECOWAS‘s involvement in addressing organised crime in Sierra 
Leone represents an outlier, as there is an attempt to adopt a people-centred approach 
to security. However, member states retained a focus on state security. For the two 
international actors – UNODC and UNIPSIL – concerns extended to international 
security. UNODC was concerned about Sierra Leone‘s capacity to maintain rule of 
law and sovereignty in the face of organised crime, which would threaten state 
stability with regional and international implications. UNIPSIL sought to build the 
capacity of Sierra Leone‘s security forces to prevent spillover to the regional and 
international level. This highlights the aim of external actors to contain organised 
crime before it poses a risk to international security. Similarly, in Bosnia, while 
EUPM officials aimed to enhance individual security, the policy of the mission was 
to strengthen state level institutions to prevent organised crime crossing into the EU 
and negatively effecting EU security. As such, initiatives to address organised crime 
in Sierra Leone and Bosnia were driven by concerns over international security. 
 
The causal tension also highlights the continued prioritisation of international 
security concerns. Through the security-development nexus, the application of 
security has remained unchanged. It is still understood as an end goal to be achieved 
through international involvement. While this end goal could focus on what security 
means locally, analysis of the conceptual tension revealed that security is primarily 
understood in terms of state and international security. As such, it can be implied that 
the end goal is the containment of organised crime to limit the threat it poses to 
international security. 
 
Within this context, the expectation of a comprehensive approach seeks to link 
international security with local development. The linkages between security and 
development were often understood as sequential, where the attainment of security 
will create space for development. With security focused on the state and 
international level, this suggests that the security-development nexus is used to 
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justify international self-interest, as addressing international security concerns will 
create space for local development. However, international security concerns remain 
the overarching priority. 
 
Another common understanding of the relationship between security and 
development viewed organised crime as a threat to both security and development. 
From this perspective, if organised crime is addressed, security and development will 
improve. This perspective leaves limited space to engage with local security and 
development concerns, and assumes that these issues will be easily achieved once 
organised crime is addressed. However, organised crime is rarely ‗addressed‘. Even 
European countries with effective law enforcement and rule of law continue to be 
affected by organised crime. In 2013, Europol identified an estimated 3600 organised 
crime groups active in the EU (EUROPOL 2013). This suggests that local security 
and development are less important than preventing the spread of organised crime to 
donor countries. 
 
The institutional tension also points to the prioritisation of international security 
concerns. In both cases, the contributors and donors to initiatives to address 
organised crime adhere to a security ideal type. Although the European Commission 
provided funding for EUPM, there was limited contribution to decision-making. The 
involvement of security actors suggests that international priorities will remain 
dominant. As Carrier and Klantschnig (2012) point out, UNODC‘s mandate is 
informed by the law enforcement priorities of its key donors. As such, initiatives to 
address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia were heavily influenced by the 
security concerns of contributors and donors. 
 
Within policy, the security-development nexus is adopted on the basis that it will 
contribute to a new and comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. By 
adopting the security-development nexus as a framework to guide their initiatives, it 
can be expected that external actors will combine the security interests of donors 
with the needs of individuals and communities. However, investigation of the four 
tensions reveals that the interests of individuals and communities in post-conflict 
countries are relegated in favour of international security concerns. 
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The Prominence of Security Actors 
 
Although initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia are 
implemented within the framework of the security-development nexus, they are 
primarily implemented by security actors. This was elucidated most clearly in the 
discussion on the institutional tension. In Sierra Leone, the contributors were the 
member states of ECOWAS as well as UNODC and UNIPSIL. All of these bodies 
are state-based actors that sought to address organised crime in response to the threat 
it posed to security. The personnel deployed to UNIPSIL to implement the WACI 
were primarily drawn from a law enforcement background. As such, they sought to 
reinstitute security in Sierra Leone. In line with this, funding for the WACI came 
from donors concerned about the impact of organised crime on their own countries, 
either because it was a destination for organised crime, or the revenue from 
trafficking in Sierra Leone supported cartels that operated in their own territory. 
 
While EUPM was a cross-pillar instrument, it was driven by the security priorities of 
the European Council as part of the EU‘s Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). EUPM‘s operations were overseen by a number of security bodies, 
including the Political and Security Council (PSC), the Committee for Civilian 
Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability (CPCC). As in Sierra Leone, the majority of EUPM personnel were 
seconded from their national police force, and many were from military police 
forces, which adhere more to militaristic strategies than their civilian counterparts. 
Although funding was derived from the European Commission, which is linked to 
EU development policy, the Commission did not have a significant influence on 
implementation. This highlights the security background of the external actors 
addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. As a result, development is 
brought into the security-development nexus through a security lens. 
 
The other tensions also point to the primacy of security actors. The divergent 
understandings of security and development arising from the conceptual tension 
suggest that development is understood through a security lens. In both cases, 
understandings of security adhered to ‗hard security‘, with a focus on the state/ 
international level as referent object. While understandings of development shifted 
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away from quadrant B: economic development, with its focus on the 
state/international level as referent object, and programmes implemented at the state 
level, development was not understood in terms of human development. Security 
perspectives influenced how development was understood. In Sierra Leone, the focus 
on demand reduction, treatment and rehabilitation seeks to contain problems 
connected to drug trafficking to ensure state security. In Bosnia, while some 
elements of development focused on individual needs, it remained a top-down 
process, and these initiatives were seen to contribute to enhanced security. With 
development focused on improving security rather than improving lives, it suggests 
that development has been skewed by the prominence of security actors. 
 
The causal tension displays a similar trend. The ambiguity on how development is 
applied – whether an end goal or a process – suggests a lack of clarity on what 
development can bring. Considering development as an end goal places it in the 
same category as security. This arises as security actors understand development 
through their own frame of reference, rather than understanding development as a 
transformative process. However, it also means that the activities implemented to 
address organised crime do not need to change. As White (2008) noted in relation to 
SSR in Sierra Leone though, this does not mean external actors know how to achieve 
development once security is in place. This issue is raised by the understandings of 
the linkages between security and development also. The majority of actors 
addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia acknowledge a sequential 
linkage, where the attainment of security will achieve development. As such, the 
benefits that development can bring are not recognised, suggesting a lack of 
familiarity with development. 
 
The prominence of security actors is also evident in the analysis of the motivational 
tension. Development actors, such as Denmark and Canada‘s development agencies, 
DANIDA and CIDA, have begun to recognise the role of development in addressing 
international security concerns. For example, the 2005 annual report of DANIDA 
states that ‗development assistance is useful, if necessary for our own security‘ 
(DANIDA 2005: 15). Similarly, CIDA acknowledged that ‗the weakness of failed 
states makes them obvious breeding grounds for terrorist networks and organised 
crime, which can directly threaten the security of Canadians‘ (CIDA 2005: 13). 
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However, in these examples, addressing international security concerns is a benefit 
of existing development practices, rather than pointing to a need to adopt 
development strategies specifically to achieve security outcomes. In Sierra Leone 
and Bosnia, development is used to achieve security, with security the primary 
concern. This points to security actors as the driver behind initiatives to address 
organised crime. 
 
The implementation of the security-development nexus by security actors further 
strengthens the prioritisation of international security concerns. However, it also 
ensures that development is implemented from a security perspective. This 
undermines the core focus of development on improving lives. 
 
The Securitisation of Development? 
 
While the prioritisation of international security actors and the prominence of 
security actors within the security-development nexus appears to support the 
arguments of critical peacebuilding scholars on the securitisation of development, the 
inclusion of development has still resulted in a shift in approach. In Sierra Leone, 
external actors have been encouraging a preventative focus on organised crime as 
enhancing law enforcement is believed to be a deterrent. This shifts away from a 
traditional, responsive security approach. However, it does not extend to addressing 
the factors that encourage organised crime, such as youth unemployment and weak 
governance.  
 
In other areas of external engagement, the contribution of development has been 
embraced to a greater extent. There has been an emphasis on community engagement 
to gain a better understanding of organised crime, but also to raise awareness of the 
risks. UNIPSIL has implemented a drug users programme. Rather than seeking to 
neutralise the threat directly, external actors have been building the capacity of local 
law enforcement. External actors in Bosnia have taken a similar approach, focusing 
on capacity building rather than direct engagement, and seeking to prevent organised 
crime through law enforcement. EUPM has also included a focus on good 
governance and corruption, areas that begin to engage with the factors that allow 
organised crime to flourish.  
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These factors point to a shift away from a traditional security approach. There is a 
focus on long-term, sustainable outcomes; external actors have engaged with the 
local community; and there is an acknowledgement of the factors that encourage 
organised crime. However, because development is implemented through a security 
lens, it is always going to be skewed in favour of security needs. This was 
particularly evident in the analysis of the institutional tension, which highlighted the 
difficulty in moving away from the institutional underpinnings of security actors. 
 
The implementation of the security-development nexus through a security lens 
appears to support the arguments on the securitisation of development, as 
development is implemented to enhance security outcomes. However, proponents of 
the securitisation of development argument contend that development is being co-
opted by security actors to further their own agenda. For example, Goodhand 
(2001b) noted fears that development would be driven by the political and strategic 
interests of the North. Similarly, Waddell (2006: 253) highlights how ‗many in the 
development sector are concerned about a subordination of development to the 
West‘s domestically inspired security priorities‘. These arguments derive from 
earlier attempts at integrating security and development, such as counterinsurgency 
strategies to ‗win hearts and minds‘, where development tools were employed to 
directly support military objectives. This suggests that the use of development to 
enhance security is an explicit strategy. 
 
In contrast, the adoption of the security-development nexus derives from the 
acknowledgement that a broader strategy is required to address the multifaceted 
challenges present in the post-conflict context. It also draws on the lessons of earlier 
attempts at post-conflict reconstruction – recognising the role of non-state actors in 
conflict and post-conflict agreements, the impact of violence on civilians, the role of 
inadequate state structures and the neglect of human and social capital. In relation to 
organised crime, the focus shifts away from the security threat, to its impact on 
public health, governance and the rule of law. This suggests a more sophisticated 
approach than the one-sided relationship outlined by critical peacebuilding scholars 





While the focus of this research was on the epistemic knowledge of external actors 
addressing organised crime, their tacit knowledge was a key factor. Analysis of the 
four tensions reveals that rather than the dominance of security being an explicit 
strategy, it derives from the tacit knowledge of external actors addressing organised 
crime. As Pouliot (2010: 12) argues ‗an essential dimension of practice is the result 
of inarticulate, practical knowledge that makes what is to be done appear self-evident 
or commonsensical‘. However, there is disagreement on what constitutes tacit 
knowledge. Within critical security studies, the practice turn draws heavily from 
Bourdieu, who was interested in how practices emerge. For Bourdieu (1977) 
practices are derived from habitus – the internalised and informal subjective 
dispositions of actors, and doxa – the unquestioned beliefs of these actors. This 
implies that tacit knowledge exists and can be understood. However, other 
approaches to practice theory have criticised Bourdieu‘s approach. For example, De 
Certeau has focused on metis, which is learned action: ‗a wide array of practical 
skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and 
human environment‘ (Scott 1998: 313). This highlights the changing nature of tacit 
knowledge; it is learned and evolving rather than just existing. This debate focuses 
on how tacit knowledge is formed and exists. However, both perspectives agree that 
tacit knowledge and presuppositions underpin activities. In the context of the 
security-development nexus, tacit knowledge informs the integration of security and 
development.  
 
The prominence of security actors addressing organised crime suggests that their 
tacit knowledge informs the implementation of the security-development nexus. The 
four tensions support this notion. The conceptual tension revealed that 
understandings of security primarily adhere to a ‗hard security‘ approach, through a 
focus on the state/international level as referent object. This understanding of 
security has a significant bearing on how development is understood, and how it 
relates to security, as the urgency of security ensures that development is shaped by 
security needs. In both case studies, development tools and strategies broadened the 
approach of external actors addressing organised crime. Rather than immediately 
addressing threats, strategies became more long term. However, rather than being an 
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essential element of an integrated approach, development tools are deployed to 
achieve security outcomes. In Sierra Leone, development was focused on the state/ 
international level as referent object. In Bosnia, development was focused on 
individual and community needs. However, initiatives were implemented at the state 
level. This suggests that the understanding of development is influenced by the tacit 
knowledge of security actors, as development is positioned in relation to security 
rather than aligning with human security. 
 
The causal tension also revealed that the security-development nexus was influenced 
by the tacit knowledge of security actors. The application of security remained 
unchanged in both case studies – it is a condition to be restored. However, the 
application of development is ambiguous. In many cases it is understood in the same 
way as security, which suggests that security actors are applying their own frame of 
reference. However, in some instances development is understood as a process. With 
security as an end goal, this implies development is understood as a strategy to 
achieve security. In terms of linkages, the security-development nexus is primarily 
understood to create space for development. This also implies that the security-
development nexus is driven by the tacit knowledge of security actors as the 
potential contribution development can make to organised crime is not realised. 
 
Rather than integrating security and development in a consistent way, the 
institutional tension results in an ad hoc and haphazard nexus. Traditionally, 
organised crime has been addressed by security actors. While development is 
brought into the security-development nexus, it is clear that security actors remain 
dominant as the starting point of external actors addressing organised crime in Sierra 
Leone and Bosnia primarily adhered to the security ideal type. As a result, the 
integration of development into initiatives to address organised crime is through a 
security lens. This means that development elements are brought into initiatives to 
address organised crime as they are understood by security actors. 
 
The motivational tension highlighted the self-interest of external actors addressing 
organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia. This has the potential to ensure an 
integrated approach, as it would contribute to better outcomes for international and 
local actors. However, the disjuncture of international and local priorities ensures 
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that development is brought into initiatives to address organised crime in order to 
achieve security outcomes. While this isn‘t exactly an example of tacit knowledge, as 
external actors do acknowledge their motivations, it still ensures that development is 
implemented superficially despite acknowledgement of its importance for effectively 
addressing organised crime. 
 
As Salter (2013: 85) argues ‗fields have particular logics, specific rules of the game, 
that structure the competition over the form of economic, cultural, social or symbolic 
capital at stake‘. The tacit knowledge that frames the practice of external actors 
ensures that development is brought into the security-development nexus through a 
security lens. This has implications for the integration of security and development. 
However, it is not a deliberate attempt to co-opt development to achieve security 
outcomes. Rather, development is removed from its evolution and best practices, as 
development is implemented the way it is understood by security actors.  
 
Use of Tacit Knowledge: Capacity Building 
 
The tacit knowledge of security actors has a significant impact on how security and 
development come together. The impact of tacit knowledge is evident in the use of 
capacity building as a development tool to address organised crime. In both case 
studies capacity building was a key element of external engagement. However, the 
use of capacity building to address organised crime differed significantly from its use 
by development actors. This section examines how the tacit knowledge of security 
actors impacted on how capacity building was put into practice.  
 
While it is often referred to as jargon, or a fad in development practice, capacity 
building is an essential part of people-centred development. For Oxfam, 
‗strengthening people‘s capacity to determine their own values and priorities, and to 
act on these is the basis of development‘ (Eade 1997: 3). Oxfam takes the time to 
identify existing capacities and situates capacity building in the social, economic and 
political environment: ‗understanding this environment is critical in order to 
understand who lacks what capacities, in any given context, why and why this 
matters‘ (Eade 1997: 3). In this setting, capacity building gives individuals the skills 
and knowledge to participate in decision-making on how resources can be used to 
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improve their lives in a way that is meaningful to them. As a result, capacity building 
contributes to emancipation – it is embedded in the local context, it relies on local 
knowledge, seeks to empower individuals, treats them as agents in the change 
process, and it is holistic, engaging with social, economic and political factors. 
 
Within development practice, capacity building is interpreted and applied differently. 
Rather than being a people-centred approach, Eade (2007) notes that capacity 
building has also been employed as a top-down process, where development actors 
are focused on retaining power and view capacity building as a one way transfer of 
knowledge. For instance, it is ‗today commonly used to further a neo-liberal ―pull-
yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps‖ kind of economic and political agenda‘ (Eade 2007: 
632). A top-down approach to capacity building depoliticises it and it then becomes 
technocratic, emphasising the techniques rather than the meaning behind them (Leal 
2007: 544). This type of capacity building undermines emancipation, as ‗genuine 
empowerment is about poor people seizing and constructing popular power through 
their own praxis. It is not handed down from the powerful to the powerless‘ (Leal 
2007: 545). 
 
The tacit knowledge of security actors has a similar effect. In both Sierra Leone and 
Bosnia, capacity building was employed by external actors addressing organised 
crime to enhance the capabilities of local law enforcement. The impetus was to 
ensure that both countries were equipped to respond and address organised crime to 
limit the spill over into donor countries. This concern over international security 
resulted in a top-down, instrumental approach to capacity building. The focus of the 
programmes was confined to the priorities of internationals. In neither country was 
organised crime viewed as the most pressing security concern by local actors. 
Although some internationals argue that this is based on a lack of knowledge, the 
continued belief that resources would be better used elsewhere means that there was 
no attempt to address this knowledge deficit. This further reinforces the focus on 
international priorities regardless of local concerns. 
 
Accordingly, capacity building was limited to the bodies seen as relevant to achieve 
international priorities. In both cases capacity building focused on local law 
enforcement agencies. Programmes have expanded to the criminal justice system in 
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order to improve law enforcement approaches. However, other bodies that may have 
a role to play in addressing organised crime, particularly bodies that are locally 
specific, with a contribution not immediately obvious to internationals are excluded. 
While one EUPM official argued that improving capabilities to address organised 
crime ensures that law enforcement is better equipped to address other areas, the 
focus of local law enforcement was limited to the areas of concern to internationals. 
As highlighted in the analysis of the motivational tension, Sierra Leonean law 
enforcement had difficulty getting cannabis production on the agenda, as 
internationals were primarily interested in addressing the cocaine trade. 
 
This approach to capacity building highlights its instrumental nature. It is employed 
as a technical tool to achieve the goals of international actors. As a result, it has been 
stripped of the qualities that underpin it when employed as part of a people-centred 
approach to development. This undermines the emancipatory potential of capacity 
building. Local context and knowledge is subdued in favour of international 
priorities. Local actors are not empowered to contribute to the process. It is top-
down, with external actors driving the agenda. Local law enforcement has had to 
fight for their concerns to be included. The approach is not holistic as it focuses 
narrowly on international concerns. This version of capacity building appears to 
support the argument on the securitisation of development, as the tools of 
development have been employed to further security objectives.  
 
Rather than being a concerted attempt to co-opt the tools of development, this 
approach to capacity building, and other development tools, has emerged as security 
actors do not understand how the tool has emerged and evolved. Since its first 
emergence, people-centred development, of which capacity building is a core 
component, has changed significantly. 
 
After two early attempts in the 1950s and 1980s, people-centred approaches became 
a key element of development in the mid-1990s. ‗Critics of the top-down approach 
began to complain that many large-scale, centralised, government-initiated 
development programmes – from schooling to health to credit to irrigation systems – 
were performing poorly, while rapidly degrading common-pool resources and having 
significant negative environmental and poverty impacts‘ (Mansuri and Rao 2004: 
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28). During this period, development actors were drawing on the work of radical 
thinkers that explored the potential of participation. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 
Friere (1970) called for ‗dialogic‘ education that embraced diverse forms of 
knowledge. Chambers (1983) called for local involvement in decision-making on 
how resources were used, with development actors playing a supporting role. 
Successful grassroots, locally driven projects were also coming to light, including the 
Self-Employed Women‘s Association in India, the Orangi Slum Improvement 
Project in Pakistan, and the Iringa Irrigation Project in Tanzania, displaying the 
potential of bottom-up programming (Krishna et al. 1997). 
 
Coupled with the increased role of NGOs in development in the 1980s, these factors 
contributed to a third wave of people-centred development. Since then participatory 
approaches have become a key element of development. Mohan (2008: 46) argues 
that there is ‗a growing acceptance regarding the importance of local involvement‘. 
Similarly, Cornwall (2000) points out that participatory development has become a 
new orthodoxy. However, there have been numerous criticisms. For example, 
without empowerment participation is meaningless; participation creates cheap 
labour; communities are treated as homogenous; and it does not address the larger, 
global problems that contribute to underdevelopment (Cornwall 2000). While this is 
a very condensed summary of the evolution of people-centred approaches, it 
highlights that these approaches have been influenced by earlier failures, critical 
writing on the subject, and grassroots projects. Despite flaws in each wave, there is a 
concerted attempt to continue to improve the approach based on the lessons learned. 
 
Not all development actors engage with a people-centred approach, and those that do 
can still be flawed. However, the adoption of tools and modalities derived from 
people-centred approaches is more difficult for security actors. Security actors are 
not aware of the evolution of people-centred approach or the lessons that inform 
current practice. As Spear and Williams (2012) note ‗specialists in each area 
sometimes see each other as possessing new and improved tools to adapt to tackle 
the problems they face without necessarily understanding the difficulties that need to 
be overcome or understanding the mixed records of each approach‘. The dominance 
of security actors and the role of tacit knowledge in implementing the security-
development nexus ensures that the lessons that have gradually improved the people-
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centred approach to development do not inform initiatives to address organised 
crime. This affects how the modalities of development are put into practice. As a 
result, development is stripped of its emancipatory qualities and becomes focused on 
enhancing security objectives. 
 
Engagement with Development 
 
The comparison of the implementation of the security-development nexus in Sierra 
Leone and Bosnia highlighted many similarities despite the different contexts of the 
two peacebuilding missions. Despite subtle differences among the four tensions, in 
both case studies, all four had an influence on the integration of security and 
development. However, one key difference was the level of engagement with 
development among external actors addressing organised crime. In this sense, the 
external actors that participated in the WACI had a stronger focus on development 
than EUPM. Alongside the emphasis on law enforcement, the WACI included a drug 
users programme, the institutional underpinnings of the WACI were further away 
from the security ideal type, and there was an emphasis on community engagement 
within law enforcement. 
 
In part, this arises from the actors involved in the programme. As highlighted in the 
analysis of the institutional tension, EUPM was staffed by police, and in many cases 
military police, ensuring a strong emphasis on law enforcement. The WACI also had 
a strong police presence. However, the mandate of UNIPSIL extended to many areas 
with a development focus, whereas EUPM focused solely on SSR. UNODC also has 
a history of engaging in alternative development strategies, which indicates a shift 
away from a traditional security approach. The multi-agency engagement in the 
WACI also requires negotiations between the various actors on how to address 
organised crime. This suggests that factors that influence the implementation of 
security and development are specifically articulated. As such, UNODC and 
UNIPSIL have similar understandings of security and development. In contrast, 
within EUPM, because it is expected to be more consistent, the understanding of 




The depth of engagement with development can also be attributed to how 
development is understood in each country. As Sierra Leone is a ‗less developed 
country‘, there is a strong presence of development actors. There is also a long 
history of development engagement within the country, which means local 
communities have participated in development processes. Even law enforcement 
agencies have worked closely with development actors, as DfID managed the SSR 
process. As external actors in Sierra Leone have worked closely with local law 
enforcement, it is likely that these influences were filtered into initiatives to address 
organised crime. In contrast, Bosnia has little history with development engagement 
due to the political context. While some development actors have been active in the 
country since the war ended, development is often seen in a negative light, as many 
local actors do not consider the country to be in need of development assistance. 
 
These differences reveal that the level of engagement with development depends on 
how security focused external actors are, and what interaction exists with 
development actors and practices. However, even in Sierra Leone, where there has 
been much more interaction with development practice, security actors still dominate 
the security-development nexus and international security concerns remain the 
priority. As such, it is likely that the adoption of the security-development nexus to 
address organised crime in other cases will have the same result as long as security 
actors are driving the process, as engagement will be influenced by their tacit 
knowledge. While this appears to point to a failure in integrating security and 
development into a nexus, it actually points to the latent potential of the security-
development nexus. 
 
The Latent Potential of the Security-Development Nexus 
 
A key idea within the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies is the concept of 
unfulfilled potential, which is contained within immanent critique. Immanent critique 
was employed to analyse the four tensions, as it compares the outcomes with the 
stated objectives – a comprehensive approach that integrates security and 
development. The analysis uncovered the factors that inhibit the integration of 
security and development, resulting in a rich and detailed explanation of why the 
security-development nexus results in the outcomes outlined by critics. However, the 
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analysis also points to the latent potential of the security-development nexus as it is 
currently constituted. 
 
Despite the barriers created by the prioritisation of international security concerns 
and the prominence of security actors, the adoption of the security-development 
nexus results in the beginnings of a shift away from a traditional security approach 
towards emancipation. In both cases, external actors have engaged in a range of 
activities that extend beyond a traditional security approach, from the drug users 
programme to capacity building. However, as noted above, development is brought 
into initiatives to address organised crime through a security lens. The tacit 
knowledge of security actors ensures that development tools and modalities are 
removed from their people-centred, emancipatory nature.  
 
For the security-development nexus to become less one-sided, development actors 
need to play a more active role in addressing organised crime. Direct engagement of 
development actors would ensure that development concerns, such as youth 
unemployment and corruption, that create a conducive environment for organised 
crime, receive more attention. It would also ensure that the needs of individuals and 
communities were addressed, rather than just international security concerns. The use 
of development practices would also remain consistent with their underlying 
principles such as local ownership, participation and empowerment.  
 
When development actors have engaged with security issues, it results in a 
significantly different approach that moves beyond traditional security approaches. 
DfID‘s approach to SSR in Sierra Leone was implemented in a ‗security first‘ 
framework based on the understanding that an improved security sector would create 
space for development. Rather than just reforming the security sector, the 
programme included the creation of civil oversight bodies to monitor the practices of 
the security sector and the mandate of security forces was refocused on citizen 
security rather than state security (UK Government 2004). This represents a 
significant shift in how security issues are addressed. DfID‘s approach created space 




In Bosnia, UNDP engaged in security issues by creating community safety forums. 
Through their work at the local level, communities conveyed a desire for their 
security concerns to be integrated into municipal development plans and strategies.  
However they didn‘t have means and they didn‘t have knowledge. What 
we gave them, we helped them to think strategically about risks and 
threats, posed at the local level and to give them an opportunity to discuss 
and decide what are the most appropriate actions to be taken and who is 
responsible. So what we have now at the level of the municipality, we 
have community safety forums, which are literally chaired by the mayor, 
but it also includes the police, the protection agency, it includes 
representatives of IDPs, women NGOs and centres for social welfare. So 
they sit around the table, they discuss issues and problems and so on and 
they discuss what would be the immediate, mid term and long term 
measures they need to undertake in terms of minimising.
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This adheres to an emancipatory approach as it engages with the local context and 
knowledge, it empowers local actors and treats them as agents in the change process. 
It is also holistic, as  
what comes up as a risk and threat by the population is for instance the 
misuse of the local stadiums, and you have issues like floods, disaster 
prevention, interventions, and we have issues in quite a few 
municipalities of stray dogs. So there are a number of issues that they 





Despite the increased involvement of development actors on security issues, in 
particular SSR, there remains a reticence to engage with organised crime. As 
Cockayne (2011: 7) noted  
a review of key development actors‘ guidance and assessment tools for 
peacebuilders… reveals that not one of them includes indicators or 
assessment methodologies for mapping or analysing organised crime… 
The new Rule of Law indicators developed by the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations seek to take a comprehensive approach, but also 
exclude organised crime. The OECD DAC has recognised that organised 
crime is a factor in peacebuilding, but has offered no comprehensive 
guidance on what to do about it. 
Some progress has been made. USAID has produced a programming guide on drug 
trafficking in Africa (USAID 2013). DfID has commissioned research on what 
development can offer initiatives to address organised crime, resulting in the report 
Getting Smart and Scaling Up: Responding to the Impact of Organised Crime on 
Governance in Developing Countries (Kavanagh 2013). Yet, there has been limited 
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engagement in practice. One development professional noted that it has taken a long 
time to acknowledge the relationship between security and development, and 
development actors are still not there, organised crime is another step beyond: ‗we‘re 
where we were 10 years ago with human security‘.165 
 
Development Engagement with Organised Crime 
 
The current reticence to engage with organised crime, but increasing recognition of 
the links between organised crime and development has parallels to the growing 
involvement of development in conflict in the 1990s. As development actors began 
linking their initiatives to conflict, many scholars grappled with the emerging 
connections. Goodhand created a framework to map the contribution that 
development actors could make to conflict resolution and post-conflict 
reconstruction. ‗Working around war‘ pointed to early development engagement 
with war, as development actors sought to avoid direct involvement, but continued 
their activities where possible (Goodhand 2001a). Development actors ‗working in 
war‘ acknowledged the relationship between development and conflict and sought to 
minimise their impact, but didn‘t seek to address war directly (Goodhand 2006a). 
The final category ‗working on war‘, was the most proactive approach and saw 
development actors directly engage in peacebuilding activities (Goodhand 2006b).  
 
The current approach of development actors to organised crime has parallels to 
‗working around war‘, where conflict is an ‗impediment or negative externality that 
is to be avoided‘ (Goodhand 2001a: 61). From this perspective, development was 
understood to automatically contribute to peace, which means nothing additional is 
required (Uvin 2002). Existing development programmes engage with the factors 
that encourage organised crime, such as corruption, poverty and unemployment. This 
suggests that development practice does not need to change to address organised 
crime, as it already is. However, this type of engagement neglects the power of 
organised crime to undercut advances achieved by development actors, particularly 
in relation to governance. While the impact of organised crime on development has 
been increasingly recognised, most notably by the World Bank‘s 2011 World 
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Development Report, there has been little effort by development actors to directly 
engage with organised crime. 
 
The dangers of this were highlighted by the crisis in Mali during 2012 and 2013. 
Mali has often been praised as a development success. During a visit to the country 
in 2010, UNDP director Helen Clark commended the country on its progress towards 
the MDGs and democratic governance (UNDP 2010).  While the transition from 
fragile state to democracy was considered a success in Mali, external actors 
‗neglected to acknowledge that an independent source of resources in the sub region 
over the last decade has been the proceeds of drug trafficking. The continued failure 
to address the problem makes those behind the trafficking bolder and more 
aggressive in seizing new opportunities across a broader geographic area‘ (Shaw 
2012: 2). As Lacher (2012: 1) noted, ‗up until Mali‘s military coup of March 2012, 
state complicity in organised crime was the main factor involved in AQIM‘s166 
growth and driver of conflict in the north of the country. Actors involved in 
organised crime currently wield decisive political and military influence in Northern 
Mali‘. Even when discussions turned to rebuilding Mali‘s institutions and democratic 
elections, the involvement of organised crime remained a blind spot for all actors 
(Reitano and Shaw 2013). By not acknowledging the criminal factors in Mali, 
development actors perceived the country to be a development success with 
democratic governance in place. However, this ignored the penetration of organised 
crime, which undermined state institutions and the governance development actors 
were so proud of. 
 
Development actors can become more engaged with organised crime by becoming 
crime-sensitive. This has parallels with ‗working in war‘, where development actors 
are conscious of the relationship between conflict and development and the potential 
impact their activities can have on conflict. ‗Agencies working in areas of active 
violence have attempted to mitigate war-related risks and also to minimise the 
potential for programmes to fuel or prolong violence‘ (Goodhand 2006a: 264). 
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In relation to drug trafficking, USAID recognises that ‗development efforts could 
unintentionally foster drug trafficking by: (1) bolstering the power of those complicit 
in drug trafficking, (2) deincentivising opposition to drug trafficking, (3) facilitating 
the movement of drugs, and (4) facilitating money laundering‘ (USAID 2013: 33). 
Building the capacity of government structures inadvertently supports officials 
connected to crime; transparency measures discourage open opposition to crime; 
enhancements in trade and the transportation of development supplies provides new 
shipment opportunities for trafficking; new banking infrastructure and innovative 
small scale banking mechanisms such as mobile banking provides money laundering 
opportunities (USAID 2013). 
 
Crime sensitivity also requires attention on the impact crime can have on 
development. For instance, criminal groups can siphon development resources for 
their own purposes. Similarly, individuals are more open to the opportunities and 
services provided by organised crime when faced with few other options. ‗While 
knowledge on the overarching impact of organised crime is still limited… under dire 
socio-economic conditions, people are more receptive to supporting, engaging in, or 
turning a blind eye to illicit activity‘ (Kavanagh 2013: 26). This can undermine 
development programmes. However, implicit support for organised crime can also 
have negative public health consequences and affect food security through the 
production of illegal crops. Natural resources exploitation has negative 
environmental consequences, the services providing by organised crime groups can 
undermine legitimate service provision by governments and there are also cases 
where governments have supported organised crime to enhance their legitimacy on 
the basis of the services provided by criminal groups. While crime sensitivity 
minimises the unintended consequences of development that may foster organised 
crime, it does little to contribute to an integrated approach. 
 
Goodhand‘s final category, ‗working on war‘ outlines a role for development actors 
to become directly involved in preventing and resolving conflict. A parallel would be 
programmes that were directly focused on addressing organised crime. A study by 
the Centre of International Cooperation at New York University highlighted five 
core areas where development can engage with organised crime: protecting the 
political process; modernising and strengthening law enforcement and the judiciary; 
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supporting crime-sensitive economic and social development; engaging civil society 
and the media; and deepening the knowledge base (Kavanagh 2013). 
 
Combating corruption is a key area where development actors can address organised 
crime, as it is an area where many development agencies are already active. In many 
countries, ‗political and public sector corruption has allowed organised crime to 
develop or flourish, undermining the legitimacy of state institutions, and providing 
limited incentives for citizens not to engage in, or benefit from, organised crime‘ 
(Kavanagh 2013: 14). Particularly in post-conflict countries where state revenue is 
low, government representatives may find it difficult to resist funds offered by 
organised crime groups. Corruption also makes it difficult to address organised 
crime, as state institutions are implicated. In Jamaica, DfID engaged in a police 
reform project improving equipment and conducting training. However, ‗corruption 
within the system blocked reform as police were de facto accountable to criminal 
―dons‖‘ (USAID 2013: 29). Even when law enforcement agencies aren‘t directly 
implicated in organised crime, there is still reticence in pursuing senior figures that 
are. In Bosnia many prosecutors are fearful of addressing corruption.
167
 As such, 
development initiatives focused on corruption make a significant contribution to 
addressing organised crime. 
 
Development actors have already begun participating in, or even leading, security 
sector reform and judicial reform. However, in some instances enhancing the skills 
of law enforcement and the judiciary can have negative consequences, such as 
increased violence or corruption. ‗Unless the mechanisms are in place, strengthened 
security can also lead to increases in violence, while a strengthened judiciary or 
empowered economic or financial crimes unit can actually lead to enhanced 
corruptibility and the use of organised crime-related intelligence tools for political or 
financial gain‘ (Kavanagh 2013: 24). Effective civil oversight bodies can monitor 
security and judicial bodies to ensure their power is restricted. This is often beyond 
the remit of security actors who focus on transmitting technical expertise, which 
creates a key role for development agencies in addressing organised crime. 
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As noted above, organised crime can provide lucrative income generating 
opportunities. This is particularly prevalent in the post-conflict period, when there 
may be few other opportunities and the state is unable to provide basic services. 
Referring to West Africa, Alemika (2013: 28) has recognised the role of 
dysfunctional and unproductive economic systems that are unable to ensure social 
welfare, employment, goods and services, or good governance, rule of law and 
democracy, as a key factor in promoting organised crime. Kavanagh (2013: 26) 
reports how organised crime has taken advantage of the state‘s inability to deliver 
social services and promote socio-economic development, becoming providers of 
services and employment themselves, and in turn generating social capital and 
legitimacy. As such, there is a key role for development actors in providing 
alternative opportunities and basic services to undermine the lure of criminal 
entrepreneurs, and undercut their legitimacy before criminal groups are an integral 
part of economic and governance structures. Shaw and Reitano (2013: 21) add that 
‗development initiatives need to be targeted at the groups that are vulnerable to being 
co-opted along the supply chain, with a focus on the root causes of gang membership 
and illicit activity‘. 
 
As development actors often have a close relationship with civil society actors they 
can also enhance community engagement with organised crime. This is not always 
forthcoming as there are fears of reprisals. In 2011, several bloggers were killed by 
drug cartels in Mexico for criticising the drug situation (Kavanagh 2013). However, 
with support, civil society and media reporting on organised crime can be an 
effective tool to address organised crime. Ralchev (2004: 329) identifies key areas 
where civil society can play a key role in the fight against organised crime, 
including: ‗raising public awareness, informing the general public and influencing 
public attitudes; conducting research and analysis on issues inter-related with 
organised crime; and cooperating with state institutions in charge of combating 
organised crime‘. Shaw and Reitano (2013) also recommend the creation of local 
democratic structures where people can express grievances to strengthen community 
responses to organised crime. 
 
A final area where development actors can contribute is expanding the knowledge 
base. Official data on organised crime is often derived from statistics on arrests and 
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seizures. However, this only provides a snapshot of organised crime. Through 
contact with civil society, development actors can gain a deeper understanding of 
how organised crime operates, as well as local reactions to it, which can contribute to 
a stronger understanding of the nuances of organised crime in each context.  
 
These elements highlight the programmatic contributions that development can make 
to initiatives to address organised crime. The involvement of development actors in 
this way points to a significantly different approach to organised crime that engages 
with the factors that make a country conducive to organised crime, the impact 
organised crime has on individuals and communities, but also factors that create 
insecurity, both locally and internationally. Alongside security elements that 
emphasise law enforcement strategies, the engagement of development actors in 
programmes that directly respond to and address organised crime would contribute to 
a comprehensive approach that integrates security and development elements. 
However, many development practitioners consider this to be too significant a leap 
away from their core mandate.  
 
The reluctance to address organised crime despite the recognition of the connection 
between security and development is similar to the reluctance to address conflict in 
1990s. Development engagement with conflict was seen ‗as part of a worrying trend 
in which development assistance is driven by political and strategic interests; in 
effect it becomes another policy tool through which the North projects its power and 
influence on the South‘ (Goodhand 2001b: 32). This is connected to the fear of the 
securitisation of development. Attempts to link development and organised crime 
raise the same concerns. As noted above, while the implementation of the security-
development nexus appears to support the arguments on the securitisation of 
development, this is not a concerted attempt by security actors to co-opt development 
strategies to achieve their goals. Rather, because development tools and modalities 
are implemented through a security lens, they are influenced by the tacit knowledge 
of security actors. As a result, the ‗humanising‘ effect of development is often 
removed, as highlighted by the use of capacity building. 
 
As it stands, the adoption of the security-development nexus reveals a glimpse of 
emancipation, as practices shift away from a traditional security approach. In Sierra 
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Leone and Bosnia, external actors engage in a number of activities set out as 
potential development interventions in relation to organised crime. In Sierra Leone 
this includes raising awareness through the drug use programme, as well as the 
establishment of a hotline for citizens to report incidents of organised crime. In 
Bosnia, external actors strengthened the criminal justice system and aimed to address 
corruption. However, because these activities are implemented through a security 
lens, they were designed to contribute to international security objectives. As with 
capacity building, they are removed from the context of people-centred development. 
For example, the hotline established in Sierra Leone to receive individual complaints 
on organised crime was instituted by law enforcement to enhance their interdiction 
capacity, rather than being part of a strategy to empower and promote local activism 
to bolster political will to address organised crime. Similarly, strengthening the 
Bosnian criminal justice system was an addition to the law enforcement approach to 
facilitate prosecutions after arrests were made. When development actors engage 
directly in programmes to prevent and address organised crime, they maintain 
control over their practices. This would ensure that development tools are applied as 
they were intended – to improve conditions for individuals and communities.  
 
Of course, such an approach relies on a specific type of development engagement – a 
people-centred approach. As highlighted by the conceptual tension, there are 
multiple understandings of development. This means the inclusion of development 
does not immediately address the tensions in the security-development nexus. The 
inclusion of development does not automatically imply a shift towards an 
emancipatory approach either. Duffield (2001) points out that development can be an 
imperial force to contain problems, but at its heart ‗development embodies an urge to 
protect and better others less fortunate that ourselves. As such, it indicates a noble 
and emancipatory aspiration‘ (Duffield 2007: 227). Despite emancipatory objectives, 
development is not a magic wand to address organised crime. 
 
Other difficulties also arise from the inclusion of development. For example, 
addressing organised crime through development is much harder to measure. If 
initiatives were successful in addressing the factors that make Sierra Leone and 
Bosnia conducive to organised crime, the result would be a reduced presence of 
organised crime. As organised crime groups seek to be discrete in their activities, this 
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is not always obvious. It is also impossible to know exactly what causes a reduction. 
As UNDP noted in relation to their community safety forums in Bosnia, ‗one of the 
key challenges we have is how do you measure things. It‘s very difficult when you 
have zero baseline and you start from zero, how to measure your impact, and most of 
our projects are of a long-term impact rather than short-term‘.168 
 
Despite these challenges, the direct involvement of development actors in initiatives 
to address organised crime would also have a positive effect on international 
security. However, this is not the primary goal. Felbab-Brown (2010) argues that 
standard law enforcement programmes can have unintended consequences – ‗the 
weakest criminal groups can be eliminated through such as approach, with law 
enforcement inadvertently increasing the efficiency, lethality and coercive and 
corruptive power of the remaining criminal groups‘. As a result, the softer, people-
centred elements of development engagement can garner more effective results. As 
USAID (2013: 30-1) argues ‗the longer term democracy, rights and governance 
programming implemented by development agencies has a crucial role to play in 
establishing the systems, policies and practices necessary to effectively deter drug 
trafficking‘ and other forms of organised crime.  
 
The use of development to directly address organised crime also aligns with current 
donor trends to focus on countries and issues that will have a benefit for national 
security (see for example CIDA 2005; DANIDA 2005; Watt 2010). However, when 
implemented by development actors, initiatives to address organised crime will be 
focused on individual needs and local engagement. Development actors also 
recognise that all programmes need to be based on an analysis of the political 
economy. When addressing organised crime, they would assess the potential 
complicity and opposition of government officials (USAID 2013). Within this 
framework, development would have a ‗humanising‘ effect on security. 
 
Fears of the securitisation of development ensure that development actors are 
reluctant to engage with organised crime. Analysis of the two case studies reveals 
that rather than an explicit strategy to co-opt development, what appears to be 
                                                 
168
 Interview, UNDP, Sarajevo, 6 October 2011. 
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securitisation is merely the tacit knowledge of security actors, which informs how 
development is implemented. This suggests that direct involvement of development 
actors would prevent securitisation, as they would maintain control over 
development tools and modalities. However, unless development activities are 
implemented in coordination with security strategies, there is a risk that 
implementation of the security-development nexus will be reversed. Rather than the 
securitisation of development, the result will be the developmentalisation of security, 
as security practices would be implemented through a development lens. Unless the 
two sides are balanced, initiatives to address organised crime will not achieve an 
integrated security-development nexus. Analysis of the four tensions revealed that 
implementation of the security-development nexus is not currently balanced, 
pointing to a need for more proactive development engagement in partnership with 
security actors. This raises further challenges regarding coordination and 
collaboration as well as the four tensions examined here. 
 
The focus on the latent potential of the security-development nexus appears to align 
with the critiques of orthodox peacebuilding scholars, in that it takes a problem-
solving approach to enhance the nexus in practice. While the analysis does indicate 
strategies to harness the positive potential of the nexus, the focus has not been on 
what would make the nexus more effective. Rather analysis has engaged with what 
would make the nexus achieve its emancipatory potential in line with immanent 
critique. The latent potential does not rest on quick fixes such as better coordination 
and sequencing. What is needed is more fundamental; it is a shift away from the 
dominance of security to expand the role of development. As a result, this research 
challenges both critical and orthodox approaches to the security-development nexus. 
It ‗raises questions about existing institutions, policy assumptions and the interests 
they serve‘ (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009:23), but also engages with the latent 




Rather than integrating security and development, the use of the security-
development nexus to address organised crime appears to adhere to the arguments 
put forward on the securitisation of development. Within initiatives to address 
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organised crime international security concerns are prioritised and security actors 
remain dominant. This contributes to the dominance of security within the nexus. 
However, this is not an explicit strategy, as the nexus is adopted on the basis that it 
will contribute to a new and comprehensive approach. Rather it is the tacit 
knowledge of security actors that influences how security and development come 
together. 
 
As a result of this tacit knowledge, development is brought into security programmes 
to achieve the outcomes desired by security actors within their frameworks. As such, 
the processes of external actors remain security focused. This is evident in the use of 
capacity building. As a process that has emerged from people-centred approaches to 
development, its use in Sierra Leone and Bosnia has been stripped of its political 
nature and its desire for bottom-up, locally driven engagement. Instead it is used 
within narrow, internationally defined parameters. However, the adoption of 
development tools and modalities by security actors displays a glimpse of 
emancipation. External actors have taken a preventative approach and addressed a 
wider range of issues, including drug demand reduction, good governance and 
corruption – areas that go beyond a traditional security approach. However, the four 
tensions investigated in this research inhibit the complete integration of development 
with security. 
 
While this suggests that the security-development nexus fails to live up to 
expectations, it merely highlights the latent potential of the nexus. A full 
emancipatory approach has not been achieved in these two cases, but the inclusion of 
development, even from a security perspective has resulted in some changes in how 
the security-development nexus is implemented.  
 
The reluctance of development actors to directly engage in initiatives to address 
organised crime limits a shift to an emancipatory approach. Although addressing 
organised crime is often seen as a step too far away from the core mandate of 
development actors, direct involvement would maintain control over their tools. It 
ensures that development modalities, such as capacity building are employed within 
a people-centred approach, rather than being stripped of its political and 
emancipatory potential. While this raises additional challenges related to 
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External actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction have enthusiastically adopted 
the security-development nexus as a framework to inform their approach. The 
institutionalised linkage between security and development has emerged at a 
particular historical point, as a response to earlier failures in post-conflict 
reconstruction. With the end of the Cold War, new forms of insecurity were also 
recognised, such as weak or failed states, which require new approaches to address 
the multifaceted challenges they pose. More recently, additional security challenges, 
such as organised crime, have gained further attention. With an impact on both 
security and development, organised crime cannot be adequately addressed through a 
security approach. It requires a comprehensive approach that engages with both 
security and development. External actors engaged in post-conflict reconstruction 
have readily taken this on board and broadened their approach. The desire for a new 
and comprehensive approach suggests a shift away from a traditional security 
approach towards emancipation as defined by human security. 
 
Although security and development have been linked in earlier approaches, the 
contemporary security-development nexus is qualitatively different. Rather than 
pursuing security and development objectives in tandem, the two concepts are 
integrated in deeper, more institutionalised ways. In response, there has been an 
attempt to integrate security and development in practice. Governments have 
allocated additional resources and transformed institutions to bring security and 
development together into a comprehensive approach. For organised crime, this has 
included the pairing of alternative development strategies and programmes focused 
on rule of law and good governance with law enforcement approaches – ‗making use 
of the full range of military, development and crime prevention tools available‘ 
(UNODC 2008a: 55). 
 
Despite the enthusiasm of policymakers and practitioners, the security-development 
nexus has also received significant criticism. The primary critique emerges from 
critical peacebuilding scholars, who argue that rather than an integrated approach, 
the nexus is one-sided, with security continuing to dominate. The argument on the 
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securitisation of development contends that development is being employed to 
further security objectives. Underdevelopment is understood as dangerous and needs 
to be addressed to curb the impact it has on international security. Rather than an end 
goal, development strategies such as poverty reduction are focused on addressing 
insecurity rather than individual wellbeing. Such an approach undermines a shift 
away from a traditional security approach even though new strategies may be 
employed to achieve security outcomes. 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, these criticisms appear to be borne out in practice. In Sierra 
Leone, the policy document that informed the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) 
recognised a two-way relationship between security and development. Poverty, weak 
institutions and Sierra Leone‘s weak position on the Human Development Index 
foster organised crime, while organised crime, drug use and an increasing crime rate 
undermine development (UNODC 2010a: 55). Youth were identified as a particular 
priority as high rates of youth unemployment creates an entry point for organised 
crime, but they are also the most susceptible to increased drug use that accompanies 
a rise in drug trafficking. However, in practice the approach of external actors 
remained security focused. The WACI established the Transnational Organised 
Crime Unit (TOCU) and enhanced the capacity of law enforcement. Other elements 
have broadened the focus, such as the emphasis on drug demand reduction and 
treatment. As highlighted by the analysis of the conceptual tension, these 
programmes were understood to contribute to national, regional and international 
security. 
 
Although the EU already had a detailed policy on the security-development nexus, 
the practices of the EU in Bosnia were even more security focused. The EU Police 
Mission (EUPM) had a mandate that brought security, development and organised 
crime together. However, the primary focus was on law enforcement. The key tasks 
of EUPM included the strengthening of operational capacity and joint capability of 
the law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime and 
corruption; assisting and supporting the planning and conduct of investigations in the 
fight against organised crime and corruption; assisting and promoting the 
development of criminal investigative capacities; enhancing police-prosecutor 
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cooperation and police-penitentiary cooperation; and ensuring a suitable level of 
accountability (UNODC 2010c). 
 
Arguments about the securitisation of development primarily focus on the outcome 
of the security-development nexus. The nexus is taken as a fixed concept; there is no 
analysis of how or why this outcome is reached. In line with the Copenhagen School 
of Security Studies, the security-development nexus is viewed negatively, resulting 
in calls for desecuritisation. This research has taken a different approach. Based on 
the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies, the security-development nexus is 
understood to be imbued with a positive result. The starting point is the expectation 
that the nexus will result in a new and comprehensive approach that enhances the 
effectiveness and sustainability of post-conflict reconstruction with benefits for 
individuals and communities rather than just the state. As the securitisation of 
development literature argues that the nexus is one sided, this research investigated 
the relationship between security and development. The focus is on the processes of 
external actors to identify what inhibits the integration of security and development 
into a nexus. Four hypotheses were developed of tensions that influence the 
integration of security and development. Investigating these tensions through the 
case studies of internationally driven initiatives to address organised crime in Sierra 
Leone and Bosnia revealed a much more complex picture than the securitisation of 
development literature suggests. 
 
The conceptual tension revealed the ambiguity of how the security-development 
nexus is understood, as there are diverse understandings of security and 
development. This has implications for collaboration as the nexus holds a different 
meaning for different actors. However, more importantly, understandings of security 
overwhelmingly adhere to a ‗hard security‘ perspective, prioritising state and 
international referent objects and implementing initiatives at the state level. As a 
result, understandings of security do not correspond with the shift towards human 
security. Understandings of development also lack a focus on individual needs. In 
Bosnia, aspects of development were focused on individuals and communities 
through an emphasis on good governance. However, the primary referent object 
remained the state/ international level. In Sierra Leone, development initiatives were 
implemented at the community level. However, as in Bosnia they continued to focus 
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on the state and international level as the referent object. These different 
understandings affect the integration of security and development as they influence 
the type of nexus that emerges.  
 
As with the conceptual tension, there is a lack of understanding of how security and 
development come together. Causal tension emerges from the divergent 
understandings of how security and development are applied and how they are 
linked. Although both security and development are valued by external actors 
addressing organised crime in Sierra Leone and Bosnia, their approach primarily 
deploys security strategies to create space for development. In part this arises 
because there is no clear understanding of how development is applied, while 
security is more tangible. However, it also arises from the belief that organised crime 
threatens security and development. Such a perspective does not require an 
integrated response. The tendency is to rely on traditional strategies to address 
organised crime to achieve security and development as end goals. This 
understanding fails to benefit from the contribution that development can make to 
initiatives to address organised crime. It also affects the form of integration between 
security and development. 
 
The institutional underpinnings of security and development continue to influence 
the interface between security and development. Rather than overcoming the division 
between the two, the institutional underpinnings of security continue to dominate. 
Development does influence some areas of practice through the security-
development nexus. In Sierra Leone elements of development contributed to the 
language employed by the WACI, how organised crime is understood, the approach 
of the WACI and the structure of UNIPSIL. In Bosnia, development influenced the 
understanding of organised crime and EUPM‘s approach to problems. However, in 
both countries, the primary contributors were security actors. The institutional 
tension influences the extent of integration between security and development, as 
development was brought in to address organised crime through a security lens. 
 
A final tension emerges from the motivational drivers of external actors addressing 
organised crime. A primary argument behind the securitisation of development is 
that international responses to security threats are driven by concerns of these threats 
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spreading internationally. However, it is self-interest that has driven the search for 
more effective approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. A comprehensive 
approach would be mutually beneficial – improving the lives of individuals and 
communities with sustainable security outcomes. However, the urgency of 
international security concerns ensures that development is brought into initiatives to 
address organised crime to the extent that it enhances international security 
outcomes. These concerns have also influenced development actors, with many now 
considering their activities a response to security threats. The drivers of external 
actors addressing organised crime influences why security and development are 
integrated and which element is prioritised. 
 
These tensions reveal two trends in the implementation of the security-development 
nexus – international security concerns are prioritised and security actors remain the 
key implementers of initiatives to address organised crime. These trends appear to 
support the argument on the securitisation of development, as development is 
employed to achieve security outcomes. However, the analysis of the tensions 
revealed that this is not an explicit strategy of the security-development nexus, but 
merely a consequence of the tacit knowledge of the key implementers of initiatives 
to address organised crime – security actors. While it is recognised that security 
strategies alone are inadequate to address organised crime, development actors 
remain reluctant to directly engage in initiatives to address organised crime. As a 
result, security actors are adopting the tools and strategies of development through a 
security lens. Without understanding the history of particular tools – how they have 
evolved, their mixed records and the challenges that have had to be overcome to 
ensure success – they are stripped of their political meaning and emancipatory 
potential. The use of development tools in this way supports the arguments on the 
securitisation of development. 
 
Despite the appearance of the securitisation of development, a deeper analysis 
reveals that development practices have had a significant impact on the processes of 
the security-development nexus. In Sierra Leone, although ECOWAS‘s approach 
still primarily focuses on the state, this is driven by a desire to improve the wellbeing 
of citizens. UNODC and UNIPSIL engaged in initiatives at the community level that 
focused on drug demand reduction and treatment. Although they contributed to 
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international security, they also engaged with the needs of individuals affected by 
increased drug flows through the country. While there is no direct causal relationship 
between security and development, the relationship still reveals a shift in the 
approach of external actors. The sequential relationship reveals that creating space 
for development is now an objective of external engagement. Although this is not the 
same as directly engaging in development, it does indicate a shift away from a 
traditional security approach. The institutional tensions also highlighted areas where 
external actors have shifted away from a pure security focus. The understanding of 
organised crime engaged with elements of development. In terms of their approach, 
external actors have acknowledged the need for prevention, and they have engaged 
in capacity building to achieve long-term objectives. The language related to 
capacity building and the anti-drugs programmes also shifted away from security. 
 
In Bosnia, the focus on good governance and rule of law focused on both state level 
and individual referent objects, expanding beyond just protecting the state. The 
sequential relationship also indicated a shift in approach, as EUPM sought to create 
space for development. How EUPM understood organised crime has resulted in a 
shift away from a traditional security approach. As in Sierra Leone, to a certain 
extent the approach aimed to prevent organised crime and build capacity to ensure a 
long-term approach. This was bolstered by the shift from a policing mission to a rule 
of law mission. The approach to organised crime also shifted, working in partnership 
with local law enforcement through mentoring and co-location. EUPM engaged in a 
broader range of activities beyond law enforcement, including gender and human 
rights programmes, and outreach and public information campaigns. While these 
were seen as horizontal and marginal to the primary focus, they still broadened the 
approach. Accordingly, EUPM encouraged civil society involvement on corruption 
and organised crime and improved their interaction with key ministries within 
Bosnia. 
 
These changes challenge the dominant thinking on the security-development nexus. 
Although proponents of the securitisation of development argument point to a one-
sided nexus, the analysis of the two case studies reveals integration of security and 
development in some areas. While security continues to dominate, the adoption of 
the security-development nexus in Sierra Leone and Bosnia reveals glimpses of 
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emancipation. In contrast to the focus on the outcomes of the nexus amongst its 
critics, this thesis has explained why and how these outcomes arise, highlighting that 
the outcomes are more complex than the label of securitisation suggests. The 
emphasis on securitisation also dismisses the latent potential of the security-
development nexus.  
 
Fear of securitisation has deterred development actors from directly engaging in 
initiatives to address organised crime. This lack of engagement has resulted in the 
use of development tools by security actors, which removes them from their 
underlying philosophy. The direct involvement of development actors would ensure 
they maintain control over development tools, preserving the people-centred 
approach that underpins them. While the examination of the latent potential appears 
to align with problem-solving critiques, it challenges this approach also. Rather than 
a quick fix, what is required is a more fundamental shift to engage with development 
as it was intended. This is the key contribution of the thesis - analysing the security-
development nexus through the lens of human security, it engages with the positive 
potential of the nexus. From this perspective, the thesis challenges the arguments of 
critical scholars and their call for desecuritisation, but also the quick fixes of 
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